





The	  Idea	  of	  Conditional	  Cash	  Transfers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   LAURI	  HEIMO	  University	  of	  Tampere	  School	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  and	  Humanities	  Social	  Policy	  Master’s	  Thesis	  	  	  May	  2014	  	  	  
	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  TAMPERE	  School	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  and	  Humanities	  	  HEIMO,	  LAURI:	  The	  Idea	  of	  Conditional	  Cash	  Transfers	  	  Master’s	  Thesis,	  123	  p.	  Supervisor:	  Anneli	  Anttonen	  Social	  Policy	  May	  2014	  	  	  The	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   this	   thesis	   was	   that	   a	   social	   policy	   model	   based	   on	   social	  investment	   principles	   became	   dominant	   in	   Latin	   America	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	  Conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   on	   requirements	   of	   human	   capital	   accumulation	   became	   the	  prevailing	   idea	   on	   the	   anti-­‐poverty	   and	   development	   agenda	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	  subsequently	  in	  other	  development	  contexts.	  The	  policy	  model	  was	  built	  to	  tackle	  persistent	  and	  extreme	  poverty	  by	  attempting	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  and	  by	  breaking	  the	  intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  	  Nearly	  all	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  several	   others	   in	   the	   Global	   South,	   have	   implemented	   a	   CCT	   regardless	   of	   government	  ideologies	   and	   political	   perspectives,	   which	   raises	   interesting	   questions	   on	   the	   substantive	  content	   of	   the	   idea	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   appeal	   to	   such	   a	   diverse	   group	   of	   politicians	   and	  policymakers.	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  the	  idea	  of	  CCTs	  is	  studied	  from	  a	  broad	  theoretical	  perspective.	  I	  approach	  CCTs	  through	  the	  framework	  established	  most	  particularly	  by	  Jal	  Mehta	  (2011)	  who	  views	  ideas	  as	  
problem	  definitions	  and	  as	  policy	  solutions.	  Through	  this	  framework	  I	  examine	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  principles	  and	  assumptions	   that	  have	  guided	   the	  policy	   formation	  of	   conditional	  cash	  transfers,	  while	  assessing	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  policy	  model	  so	  appealing	  to	  governments	   from	   different	   ideological	   backgrounds.	   The	   study	   is	   mainly	   carried	   out	   as	   a	  theoretical	   policy	   analysis,	   but	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   theoretical	   part	   of	   the	   study,	   I	   got	   an	  opportunity	   to	   study	  a	  particular	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   in	  practice	   through	  a	   case	   study	  research	  strategy.	  The	  conditional	  cash	   transfer	  program	  of	   the	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	   Ciudadania	   Porteña,	   is	   studied	   as	   empirical	   proof	   of	   the	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  phenomenon.	  	  	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  the	  policy	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  merges	  different	  social	  policy	   traditions	  and	  different,	   sometimes	  contradictory,	   theoretical	  principles.	  CCTs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  representing	  rights	  based	  social	  protection,	  residual	  and	  cost-­‐effective	  targeted	  social	  protection	  and	  economically	  productive	  social	  protection	  based	  on	  social	  investments.	  I	  argue	  that	  as	  hybrid	  social	  protection	  programs	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  and	  appeal	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policymakers	  based	  on	  the	  underlying	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  framed	  from	  different	  angles	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  proper	  solution	  to	  various	  problems,	  constructed	  from	  various	  perspectives.	  	  	  Keywords:	   conditional	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   transfers,	   ideas,	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   social	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1.	  Introduction	  
The	  notion	   that	  governments	  should	  use	  social	   spending	  as	  a	  means	   to	  enhance	   the	  human	  capital	   accumulation	   of	   its	   citizens	   has	   caught	   on	   in	   social	   policy	   approaches	   from	   the	  developed	  to	  the	  developing	  countries,	  penetrating	  policy	  formulation	  in	  both	  contexts.	  	  	  The	  basic	   idea	  is	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  benefit	  when	  people	  are	  more	  skilled	  and	  able	  to	  support	  themselves.	  This	  social	  policy	  approach	  has	  been	  conceptualised	  as	  the	  social	  investment	  perspective	  (Jenson	  2009).	  A	  social	  policy	  idea	  based	  on	  social	  investment	  principles	  became	  dominant	  in	  Latin	  America	  at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	   The	   basic	   design	   and	   policy	   rationale	   for	   what	   became	   the	  
conditional	  cash	  transfer	   phenomenon	  was	   created	   in	   the	  particular	   contexts	   of	  Mexico	   and	  Brazil.	  The	  two	  countries	  launched	  social	  assistance	  programs	  intended	  to	  alleviate	  poverty	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  and	  to	  break	  the	   intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty	   in	  the	   long-­‐term	  through	  conditioning	  a	  cash	  transfer	  on	  human	  capital	  interventions.	  In	  an	  interview	  published	  on	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank’s	  youtube-­‐channel,	  Santiago	  Levy,	  the	  creator	  of	  Mexico’s	  conditional	   cash	   transfer	   program	   PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades,	   crystallises	   the	   idea	   of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  as	  follows:	  
“The	  idea	  is	  simple:	  to	  help	  poor	  families	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now,	  while	  investing	  in	  the	  human	  
capital	   of	   their	   children	   in	   the	   form	   of	   education,	   nutrition	   and	   health	   so	   that	  we	  wont	  
have	  to	  help	  them	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  obtained	  human	  capital	  resulting	  in	  more	  productive	  
work	  opportunities	  and	  better	  salaries	  so	  that	  they	  can	  overcome	  poverty.”	  (Santiago	  Levy	  2013.)	  The	   first	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   programs,	   Mexico’s	   Progresa,	   which	   was	   later	   named	  
Oportunidades,	  and	  Brazil’s	  Bolsa	  Escola,	  that	  later	  merged	  with	  other	  programs	  to	  form	  Bolsa	  
Família,	   became	   success	   stories	   spearheading	   a	   social	   policy	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   swept	  through	  Latin	  America	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  been	  imported1	  and	  imitated	  from	  New	  York	  to	  the	  Philippines.	  Considered	  innovative	  and	  groundbreaking	  CCTs	  have	  been	  applauded	  for	  reducing	   poverty,	   increasing	   school	   attendance	   rates	   and	   contributing	   to	   improvements	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Today	  there	  are	  numerous	  CCTs	  outside	  of	  Latin	  America,	  for	  example	  in:	  New	  York,	  Turkey,	  Pakistan,	  Philippines,	  India,	  Indonesia,	  Burkina	  Faso,	  Cambodia,	  Jamaica,	  Kenya,	  Nigeria,	  South	  Africa,	  Yemen	  (worldbank.	  Conditional	  Cash	  Transfers	  -­‐	  Country	  Overviews	  &	  Project	  Info,	  accessed	  12.5.2014)	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health	   and	   nutrition.	   CCTs	   are	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   the	   social	   policy	   and	   development	  policy	   communities,	   because	   they	   are	   state	   led	  monetary	   transfer	   schemes	   implemented	   in	  developing	  and	  middle	  income	  countries	  and	  built	  to	  tackle	  persistent	  and	  extreme	  poverty.	  Today	  there	  are	  numerous	  CCT	  programs	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  increasingly	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  reflecting	  the	  particular	  local	  contexts,	  and	  although	  the	  size	  and	  technical	  details	  may	  vary	  significantly,	  the	  programs	  share	  three	  key	  features:	  a	  monetary	  transfer	  (generally	  favouring	  women	  as	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  transfer),	  conditions	  on	  education	  and/or	  health	  and	  a	  targeting	  mechanism	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009).	  Since	   the	   first	  programs	  were	   initiated	   in	   the	   late	  1990s,	  a	  great	  number	  of	   comprehensive	  studies	   about	   CCTs	   have	   been	   produced	   by	   the	   institutions	   put	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   program	  evaluations	   (Skoufias,	   2002;	   Skoufias	  &	  Parker	  2001),	   academic	   scholars	   (Hanlon,	  Hulme	  &	  Barrientos	   2010;	   Soares	   &	   Osório	   2007;	   Soares,	   Ribas	   &	   Osória	   2010;	   Osório,	   Soares,	  Medeiros	  &	  Zepeda	  2009;	  Lomelí	  2008)	  and	  researchers	  representing	  international	  financial	  institutions,	   particularly	   the	  World	  Bank	   (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009;	  Rawlins	  &	  Rubio	  2004).	  These	   studies	   offer	   a	   broad	   overview	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   –programs:	   their	   design,	  impacts	  and	  the	  main	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  this	  particular	  brand	  of	  cash	  transfer.	  In	  2004,	  Feitosa	  de	  Britto	  (7)	  noted	  that:	  	  ”Since	   CCTs	   are	   very	   recent	   initiatives,	   with	   considerable	   support	   from	   the	   donor	  
community,	   most	   studies	   and	   reports	   have	   been	   published	   as	   grey	   literature,	   either	   by	  
governments	  or	  international	  organizations.	  This	  material	  tends	  to	  highlight	  all	  the	  good	  
things	   about	   CCTs,	   with	   little	   information	   on	   their	   potential	   problems,	   making	   it	   more	  
difficult	  to	  convey	  an	  objective	  overview”.	  	  A	  decade	  has	  passed,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part	  the	  literature	  is	  still	  evaluative	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  design	  features	  and	  impacts	  of	  CCTs.2	  Surprisingly	  little	  has	  been	  written	  on	  how	  this	  precise	  
social	  assistance	  instrument	  has	  become	  so	  overwhelmingly	  popular	  that	  countries	  around	  the	  Global	  South	  are	  adopting	  it	  and	  nearly	  each	  Latin	  American	  country	  has	  implemented	  at	  least	  one	   such	   program	   regardless	   of	   their	   political	   position	   (Sugyama	  2011,	   258).	   Although	   the	  literature	   is	   scarce,	   some	   scholars	   have	   approached	   the	   phenomenon	   through	   perspectives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  large	  part	  of	  the	  evaluations	  focus	  on	  the	  Mexican	  program	  PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades	  that	  included	  extensive	  nonpartisan	  evaluations	  as	  part	  of	  the	  original	  program	  design.	  The	  International	  Food	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  (IFPRI)	  was	  entrusted	  to	  coordinate	  the	  first	  round	  of	  evaluations	  in	  1998.	  (Lomelí	  2008,	  477.)	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that	   Schmidt	   (2010,	   2008,	   see	   chapter	  2)	  would	   call	   discursive	   institutionalism,	   specifically	  asking	   questions	   why	   the	   idea	   of	   CCTs	   has	   become	   so	   prominent	   in	   Latin	   America,	   what	  explains	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  CCT	  model	  and	  which	  factors	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  analysing	  why	  a	  particular	   state	  has	  established	  a	  CCT	   (see	  de	  Britto	  2004;	  Sugyama	  2011;	  Fenwick	  2013;	  Franzoni	  &	  Voorend	  2011).	  CCTs	  have	  been	   considered	  a	  new	  and	   innovative	   form	  of	   social	  policy	   and	   they	  have	  been	  embraced	   across	   ideological	   boundaries,	   but	   very	   little	   has	   been	  written	   on	   the	   underlying	  theoretical	  principles	  and	  assumptions	  that	  have	  guided	  the	  policy	  formulation	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  and	  what	  are	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  policy	  model	  so	  appealing.	  
1.1	  The	  research	  mission	  and	  approach	  The	   thesis	  deals	  with	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   as	   a	  new	  policy	   idea	   for	  poverty	   reduction	  and	  social	  protection.	  The	   focus	  on	  CCTs	  as	  a	  policy	  idea	   links	   the	  research	  approach	   to	   the	  policy	  analysis	  research	  tradition.	  In	  addition,	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  links	  the	  approach	  to	  a	  school	  of	  thought	  labelled	  discursive	  institutionalism	  (further	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2)	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  in	   this	   thesis	   ideas	   are	   taken	   seriously	   and	   they	  are	   considered	   to	  play	  a	   significant	   role	   in	  explaining	  change	  and	  new	  innovations	  in	  social	  policy.	  CCTs	   have	   become	   the	   gold	   standard	   of	   social	   protection	   instruments	   in	   The	  Global	   South,	  with	  the	  policy	  model	  having	  spread	  widely	  outside	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  programs	  being	  implemented	  by	  governments	  representing	  different,	  often	  contrasting,	  political	  orientations	  (see	   Sugyama	  2011).	   This	   raises	   interesting	  questions	   about	   the	   substantive	   content	   of	   the	  idea	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   potential	   to	   appeal	   to	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   policymakers.	  With	   CCTs	   having	  become	  so	  influential	  and	  widespread,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  idea	  or	  ideas	  behind	  the	  policy	  model.	   	  All	  social	  policies	  reflect	  certain	  theories	  about	  human	  behaviour,	  and	  the	  role	   of	   the	   state,	   market	   and	   individuals	   in	   providing	   social	   protection	   (O’Brien	   &	   Penna	  1998),	  and	  awareness	  of	  these	  theories	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  implementation	  stage	  of	  a	  new	  policy.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  debate	  about	  conditionality	  in	  social	  security	  is	  currently	  a	  topical	  issue	  also	  in	  Finland.	  Public	  debate	  on	  increased	  work	  obligations	  for	  the	  unemployed	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  youth	  through	  tightening	  of	   the	  conditionalities	   in	  social	  assistance	  and	  non-­‐contributory	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  timely	  issues	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  “Nordic	  welfare	  model”	  as	  well.	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In	   an	   attempt	   to	   unpack	   some	   of	   the	   underlying	   theoretical	   principles	   and	   assumption	   of	  conditonional	  cash	  transfers	  and	  explore	   the	  aspects	   that	  make	  them	  so	  widely	  embraced,	   I	  study	  CCTs	   from	  a	  broad	  theoretical	  perspective	  with	  a	   focus	  on	  the	  policy	   idea.	  This	   thesis	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  study	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  have	  led	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	   in	  Latin	  America	  and	  elsewhere.	   It	  also	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  cover	   the	  discursive	  process	   that	   led	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   CCTs	   becoming	   the	   prevailing	   idea	   on	   tackling	   poverty	   in	   a	  development	  context,	  or	  the	  actual	  performance	  or	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  design	  features	  of	  the	  programs	  regarding	  performance.	  Moreover,	  as	  a	  complex	  phenomenon,	  there	  are	  several	  aspects	  of	  CCTs	  that	  could	  be	  emphasized	  in	  a	  theoretical	  study,	  but	  due	  to	  the	  need	  to	  delimit	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research;	  interesting	  aspects	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  left	  out	  of	  this	  thesis.	  For	  example,	  the	  design	  of	  CCTs	  evokes	  an	  interesting	  angle	  on	  gender,	  regarding	  the	  focus	  on	  mothers,	  girls	  education	  and	  intrahousehold	  relationships,	  but	  these	  themes	  are	  not	  dealt	  with	   in	   this	   thesis.	   For	   analysis	   on	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  gender	  see	  Molyneux	  (2007),	  Jenson	  (2009b)	  and	  Tabbush	  (2009).	  I	   start	   from	   the	  assumption	   that	  CCTs	  have	  become	   the	  prevailing	   idea	  on	   the	  anti-­‐poverty	  and	  development	  agenda	  and	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  and	  political	  commitment	  of	  CCTs.	   	  O’Brien	  and	  Penna	   (1998,	  3)	  describe	   the	   importance	  of	   theory	   in	   social	  policy	  as	  follows:	  	  
“To	  understand	  social	  policy	  and	  social	  welfare	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  conscious	  of	  theory	  in	  
two	   senses	   simultaneously.	   First,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   theories	   and	  
assumptions	  within	  which	  particular	  policies	  are	  formulated	  and	  implemented.	  Second,	  it	  
is	   necessary	   to	   be	   aware	   that	   different	   theories	   bring	   different	   dimensions	   of	   the	   effects	  
and	  consequences	  of	  policies	  into	  view:	  they	  enable	  us	  to	  see	  elements	  of	  the	  organisation	  
of	  welfare	  on	  which	  we	  do	  not	  normally	  focus	  our	  attention.”	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   theoretical	   part	   of	   the	   study,	   I	   got	   an	   opportunity	   to	   study	   a	   particular	  conditional	   cash	   transfer	   in	   practice.	   The	   case	   study	   was	   included	   to	   provide	   a	   concrete	  example	  of	  how	  the	  social	  policy	   idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	   transfers	  has	  been	  put	   into	  effect.	  The	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  program	  of	   the	  Autonomous	   city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña,	  was	   studied	   as	   empirical	   proof	   of	   the	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   phenomenon.	   The	  mission	  was	   to	   deepen	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   CCTs	   through	   a	   concrete	   case.	   Therefore	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  approached	  as	  an	  exemplary	  analytical	  unit,	  tied	  to	  a	  certain	  time	  and	  space.	   In	   a	  mission	   to	   account	   for	   a	   concrete	   example	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   idea,	   a	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more	   descriptive	   overview	   of	   the	   particular	   design	   features	   of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   is	  provided.	  	  While	  aware	  of	  the	  challenge	  in	  combining	  these	  two	  tasks	  and	  approaches	  to	  CCTs,	  I	   found	   the	   combination	   to	   be	   relevant.	   The	   case	   of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   allows	   for	   a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  CCTs	  as	  a	  policy	  solution,	  while	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program.	  Through	   this	   research	   approach	   I	   aim	   at	   making	   two	   contributions	   to	   the	   research	   on	  conditional	   cash	   transfers.	   The	   primary	   aim	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  programs	  as	  a	  policy	  idea	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  principles	  and	  assumptions,	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   uncovering	   some	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   make	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   so	  appealing	   to	  governments	   from	   left	   to	   right.	   	  The	   secondary	  aim	   is	   to	   shed	   light	  on	  a	   little-­‐known	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   program	   by	   using	   it	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   idea	   of	  conditional	   cash	   transfers	   has	   been	   implemented	   in	   practice.	   The	   hypothesis	   here	   is	   that	  based	   on	   it’s	   characteristics	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   (CP)	   represents	   the	   CCT	   phenomenon	   and	  using	  CP	  as	  a	  case	  opens	  up	  a	  new	  angle	  to	  understanding	  the	  studied	  idea.	  
1.2	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
Chapter	   two	   outlines	   the	   way	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   approached	   as	   an	   idea.	   The	  chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   research	   on	   ideas,	   followed	  by	   an	   introduction	   of	   the	   tools	   that	   are	  used	  to	  study	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  as	  policy	  ideas	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
Chapter	  three	  aims	  at	  contextualizing	  the	  studied	  phenomenon	  and	  at	  introducing	  the	  central	  concepts	   that	   are	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   understand	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   conditional	   cash	  transfers.	   First,	   I	   explore	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   social	   investment	   perspective	   in	   social	   policy	  thinking.	   This	   is	   done	   to	   trace	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   most	   essential	   idea	   in	   conditional	   cash	  transfers;	  that	  social	  spending	  should	  be	  regarded	  an	  investment	  in	  the	  human	  capital	  of	  the	  beneficiaries.	  	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  social	  protection	  as	  a	  policy	  approach	  and	  a	  historical	  look	  at	  social	  protection	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
Chapter	   four	   deals	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   examine	   the	  theoretical	   principles	   and	   assumptions	   that	   the	   programs	   are	   based	   on,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  uncovering	   some	   of	   the	   factors	   that	  make	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   so	   appealing.	   Chapter	  four	  is	  the	  anchor	  and	  the	  most	  important	  chapter	  of	  this	  study.	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In	  chapter	  five	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  Argentina	  and	  the	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  an	  additional	  angle	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  The	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   political	   and	   social	   policy	   context,	   in	   which	   the	   program	  Ciudadania	   Porteña	   –	   Con	   Todo	   Derecho	   was	   created	   and	   implemented.	   And	   examines	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  through	  a	  case	  study	  research	  strategy.	  	  
Chapter	  six	  sums	  up	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  study	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2.	  The	  framework	  for	  studying	  ideas	  
This	   thesis	  deals	  with	  conditional	   cash	   transfers	  as	  a	  policy	   idea;	   it	   is	   therefore	  essential	   to	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  idea	  and	  the	  process	  of	  studying	  them.	  First,	  I	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  study	  followed	  by	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  tools	  used	  to	  study	  ideas.	  Second,	  I	  will	  describe	  the	  approach	  used	  to	  study	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
2.1	  On	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  The	  Internet	  is	  full	  of	  quotes	  from	  clever	  human	  beings	  who	  are	  cited	  on	  the	  power	  that	  ideas	  have	  in	  shaping	  our	  social	  realities.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  has	  been	  acknowledged	  by	  intellectuals,	  poets	  and	  statespersons,	  but	  until	  recently	  neglected	  in	  social	  science	  research.	  What	  is	  meant	  by	  ideas	  has	  varied	  from	  broad	  notions	  of	  culture,	  shared	  belief	  systems	  and	  worldviews	  to	  specific	  strategies	  of	  action	  and	  policy	  programs	  (Campbell	  1998,	  377).	  	  While	  it	   is	   common	   sense	   that	   ideas	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ideologies,	   economic	   theories	   and	   political	  programs	   have	   been	   essential	   in	   creating,	   shaping	   and	   changing	   the	   institutions	   and	  structures	   that	   constitute	   the	   societies	   we	   inhabit,	   the	   research	   on	   how	   ideas	   mold	   these	  institutions	   is	   of	   fairly	   recent	   origin	   (Campbell	   1998;	   Saari	  &	  Kananen	  2009;	  Beland	  &	  Cox	  2009;	  Schmidt	  2008,	  2010).	  The	  literature	  on	  ideas	  generally	  uses	  the	  “three	  new	  institutionalisms”	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  in	   explaining	   the	   emergence	   of	   research	   focused	   on	   ideas.	   Traditionally	   the	   research	   on	  change	  in	  social	  policy	  has	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  structures,	  class	  based	  interests	  and	  institutions	  as	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  shaping	  of	  social	  policy	  (Saari	  &	  Kananen	  2009).	  In	   practice	   this	   has	   meant	   that	   welfare	   systems	   and	   social	   policy	   have	   been	   approached	  through	  an	  institutionalist	  research	  framework,	  and	  since	  the	  1980’s	  specifically	  through	  the	  three	  “new-­‐institutionalisms”:	  rational	  choice	  institutionalism,	  historical	  institutionalism,	  and	  sociological/cultural	   institutionalism	   (Campbell	   2004;	   Beland	   &	   Cox	   2011;	   Schmidt	   2008;	  Schmidt	  2010).	  The	  ‘new	  institutionalisms’	  explain	  change	  and	  continuity	  in	  social	  policy	  and	  welfare	   states	   through	   behaviour	   of	   rational	   actors	   within	   political	   institutions	   (RI),	  structures	  and	  practices	  (HI)	  and	  norms	  and	  culture	  of	  social	  agents	  (SI).	  The	  acknowledged	  weakness	  of	  the	  new	  institutionalisms	  has	  been	  their	  analysis	  of	  change.	  All	  have	  traditionally	  explained	   change	   as	   coming	   from	   outside	   as	   exogenous	   shocks.	   They	   stress	   continuity	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through	   for	   instance	   fixed	   preferences	   and	   stable	   institutions	   (RI),	   path	   dependencies	   (HI)	  and	  cultural	  norms	  and	  rules	  (SI).	  	  (Schmidt	  2010,	  2008.)	  The	   new	   institutionalisms	   have	   been	   conceived	   as	   useful	   tools	   in	   explaining	   continuity	  (Schmidt	  2010,	  2)	  and	  the	  prospects	  for	  policy	  reform,	  but	  limited	  in	  providing	  an	  explanation	  of	   the	   specific	   form	   that	   policy	   change	   takes	   (Béland	  &	  Hacker	   2004,	   45).	   	   If	   the	   aim	   is	   to	  provide	  insight	  on	  why	  a	  particular	  welfare	  state,	  for	  example,	  is	  different	  than	  others,	  it	  may	  be	   enough	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   distinctive	   framework	   of	   political	   institutions.	   But	   if	   the	   aim	   is	   to	  explain	  how	  the	  particular	  framework	  of	  political	  institutions	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  that	  it	  has,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  forces	  that	  shape	  actual	  policy	  choices.	  (ibid.	  45.)	  Decision-­‐making	  and	   implementation	   are	   not	   exclusively	   rational	   planning	   based	   on	   self-­‐interest	   and	  knowledge.	  Different	  perceptions	  of	  reality,	  values	  and	  justice	  influence	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  final	  outcomes	  of	  policies.	  (Saari	  &	  Kananen	  2009,	  15.)	  The	  scholars	  working	  with	  ideas	  emphasize	   the	  analytical	  difference	  between	   ideas	  and	   interests.	  Opposed	   to	   the	  materialist	  tradition,	   interests	   are	   not	   seen	   as	   objective	   facts,	   but	   historical,	   social	   and	   political	  constructions	  (Campbell	  1994).	  Schmidt	  (2008,	  2010)	  argues	  that	  the	  turn3	  to	  ideas	  has	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  fourth	  new	  institutionalism	   that	   she	   labels	   discursive	   institutionalism.	   She	   describes	   discursive	  institutionalism	   as	   an	   “umbrella	   concept	   for	   the	   vast	   range	   of	  works	   in	   political	   science	   that	  
take	  account	  of	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  interactive	  processes	  by	  which	  ideas	  are	  
conveyed	   and	   exchanged	   through	   discourse”.	   Concretically	   this	   means	   that	   discursive	  institutionalists,	  all	  those	  who	  take	  ideas	  and	  discourse	  seriously,	  deal	  with	  ideas	  about	  ‘what	  
is	  and	  what	  ought	  to	  be’,	  combining	  cognitive	  ideas	  referring	  to	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  things	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “what	  is	  and	  what	  to	  do”,	  and	  normative	  ideas	  indicating	  “what	  is	  good	  or	  bad	  about	   this	   in	   reference	   to	  what	   one	   ought	   to	   do”	   (Schmidt	   2008,	   306).	   Kananen	   and	   Saari	  (2009)	   note	   that	   perhaps	   the	   biggest	   contribution	   of	   the	   ideational	   analysis	   to	   the	   earlier	  frameworks	   (see	   the	   three	  new	   institutionalisms)	   is	   the	  more	  explicit	  understanding	  of	   the	  limits	   of	   rationality.	   Policy-­‐making	   and	   implementation	   are	   not	   merely	   acts	   based	   on	   self-­‐interest	   and	   rationality,	   but	   different	   understandings	   of	   reality,	   different	   sets	   of	   values	   and	  views	  about	  equity	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Or	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  ideas.	  In	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  ideas	  	  such	  as	  marxism,	  sosialism,	  liberalism	  were	  generally	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  forces	  shaping	  policies	  (Saari	  &	  Kananen	  2009;	  Béland	  &	  Cox	  2011)	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  My	  interest	  lies	  specifically	  in	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  ideas.	  Therefore	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	   the	   idea	   that	  has	  been	  established	  and	   taken	   the	   form	  of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers.	  The	  interactive	   process	   by	   which	   ideas	   were	   conveyed	   and	   exchanged	   through	   discourse,	   and	  which	  led	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  CCTs	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  For	  studies	  dealing	  with	   the	   interactive	   and	   discursive	   processes	   that	   have	   led	   to	   the	   formulation	   and	  diffusion	  of	  CCTs	  see	  Sugiyama	  (2011),	  Franzoni	  (2011)	  and	  Feitosa	  de	  Britto	  (2004).	  
2.2	  The	  framework	  for	  studying	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  
transfers	  Within	  the	  framework	  of	  discursive	   institutionalism	  the	  role	  of	   ideas	  have	  been	  approached	  from	  different	  perspectives	  and	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  using	  different	  tools.	  The	   toolkit	   consists	   of	   ways	   to	   analyse	   different	   dimensions	   or	   levels	   of	   understanding.	  Kananen	  and	  Saari	  (2009)	  consider	  the	  core	  elements	  of	   idea	  analysis	  concerning	  change	  in	  social	   policy	   to	   be	  policy	  paradigms,	  policy	   frames	  and	  agenda	   setting.	   On	   the	  most	   general	  level	  ideas	  have	  been	  studied	  as	  general	  philosophies	  and	  paradigms.	  These	  are	  broad	  ideas	  cutting	   across	   substantive	   areas	   that	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   dominant	   perspectives	   (see	   Jenson	  2009)	   in	  a	   society	  as	  a	  whole	  or	   in	  a	   certain	  scientific	   field	   for	  example.	   In	  chapter	  3.1	   two	  such	  cross	  cutting	  and	  dominant	   ideas,	   the	  perspectives	  of	  keynesianism	  and	  neoliberalism,	  are	  introduced.	  Most	  of	  the	  political	  battle	  is	  fought	  at	  the	  level	  of	  framing	  and	  agenda	  setting.	  Framing	  different	  policy	  approaches	  may	  be	  used	  to	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  convincing	  political	  opposition	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  approach	  as	  well	  as	  attracting	  potential	  voters	  behind	   the	   proposed	   policy	   approaches	   (Saari	   2011).	   The	   way	   a	   problem	   is	   framed	   has	  significant	  implications	  on	  the	  types	  of	  policy	  solutions	  that	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  desirable”	  (Mehta	  2011,	  27).	  Agenda	  setting	  is	  a	  process	  through	  which	  each	  interest	  group	  uses	  the	  recourses	  available	  to	  include	  certain	  themes	  on	  the	  agenda	  and	  exclude	  others	  (Kananen	  &	  Saari	  2009).	  Essentially	   a	   paradigm	   is	   the	   lenses	   through	  which	   a	  phenomenon	   is	   seen	   in	   the	   society	   in	  general,	  policy	  frame	  is	  the	  way	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  portrayed	  in	  a	  political	  program	  or	  in	  the	  media	   for	   example	   and	   the	   study	   of	   agenda	   setting	   takes	   a	   look	   at	   whether	   and	   how	   this	  phenomenon	  is	  raised	  to	  the	  agenda	  in	  political	  programs	  and	  media.	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In	   this	   thesis	   ideas	   are	   studied	   through	   the	   framework	   established	  most	   particularly	   by	   Jal	  Mehta	   (2011)	  who	  views	   ideas	  as	  problem	  definitions	   and	  as	  policy	  solutions4.	  Mehta	  adapts	  the	  studies	  by	  Peter	  A.	  Hall5	  (1993)	  by	  approaching	  these	  ideas	  through	  cognitive,	  normative	  and	  functional	  dimensions	  of	  understanding.	  The	  cognitive	  level	  defines	  the	  problems	  (what	  is	  and	  what	   to	  do)	  while	   the	  normative	   level	  reflects	   the	  understanding	  of	   fairness	  and	  equity	  underlying	  the	  definitions	  on	  the	  cognitive	  level	  (what	  is	  good	  or	  bad	  about	  this	  in	  reference	  to	  what	  one	  ought	   to	  do).	  The	   two	  are	  connected	  at	   the	   functional	   level	  where	  a	  solution	   is	  formulated	  that	  provides	  the	  means	  for	  solving	  the	  problem	  and	  doing	  so	  in	  a	  way	  considered	  in	  line	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  fairness	  and	  equity.	  In	  his	  approach	  not	  only	  do	  ideas	  play	  a	  role	   in	   change	   in	  political	   institutions,	   but	   the	   change	   in	   ideas	   affect	   institutions.	   Following	  this	  logic	  change	  manifests	  itself	   in	  a	  causal	  relation,	  where	  new	  problems	  or	  challenges	  are	  countered	  with	  new	  ideas,	  based	  on	  which	  new	  institutions	  are	  established.	  Mehta’s	   understanding	   of	   problem	   definitions	   stems	   from	   social	   constructionism	   that	   sees	  social	  problems	  not	  as	  objective	  conditions	  but	  constructions	  established	  as	  such	   through	  a	  process	  of	  interaction	  between	  groups	  or	  individuals	  who	  claim	  that	  this	  particular	  condition	  is	   in	   fact	   a	   problem	   (Spector	   &	   Kitsuse	   1979).	   How	   problems	   are	   defined	   and	   why	   the	  problem	  is	  considered	  a	  problem	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  of	  understanding	  social	  realities,	  on	  the	  ideas	   that	   the	   actors	   hold	   and	   the	   public	   philosophies	   or	   paradigms	   that	   influence	   these	  understandings.	  In	  the	  narrowest	  sense,	  ideas	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  policy	  solutions	  (Mehta	  2011).	  With	  this	  logic,	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  an	  objectively	  identified	  problem	  and	  clear	  objectives	  to	  address	  this	  problem.	  Say,	  there’s	  too	  much	  poverty	  (a	  problem),	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	   reduce	   the	   level	   of	   poverty	   (an	   objective).	   	   The	   logic	   goes	   that	   there	   is	   a	   policy	   idea	   (a	  conditional	   cash	   transfer	   program)	   that	   provides	   the	   means	   for	   solving	   the	   problem	   and	  accomplishing	   the	   objectives.	   But	   as	   established	   earlier,	   problem	   definitions	   are	   results	   of	  different	  levels	  of	  understanding.	  To	  understand	  the	  process	  of	  why	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  a	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  third	  level	  in	  his	  framework	  is	  public	  philosophies	  that	  in	  his	  conceptualisation	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  zeitgeist,	  referring	  to	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  that	  are	  widely	  shared	  and	  not	  open	  to	  criticistm	  in	  a	  particular	  historical	  moment.	  The	  analysis	  of	  public	  philosophies	  or	  the	  zeitgeist	  is	  not	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  5	  In	  his	  study	  on	  economic	  policymaking	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  1970’s	  and	  80’s	  Hall	  (1993)	  approaches	  ideas	  through	  cognitive,	  normative	  and	  functional	  dimensions	  that	  together	  constitute	  a	  policy	  paradigm.	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ends	   up	   being	   implemented,	   it	   is	   vital	   to	   account	   for	   the	   roles	   ideas	   can	   play	   as	   problem	  definitions.	   	   Mehta	   continues	   that	   problem	   definitions	   are	   at	   the	   same	   analytical	   level	   as	  paradigms,	  but	  whereas	  paradigms	   tend	   to	  evoke	   the	  notion	  of	   a	   single	  dominant	   idea	   that	  governs,	   problem	   definitions	   evoke	   the	   fluid	   nature	   of	   constantly	   competing	   ideas	   that	  highlight	  different	  aspects	  of	  a	  given	  situation.	  (Mehta	  2011,	  31.)	  For	  an	  idea	  to	  become	  a	  policy	  solution,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  that	  needs	  a	  solution,	  and	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  problem,	  a	  certain	  phenomenon	  needs	  to	  be	  constructed	  as	  such.	  Spector	  and	  Kitsuse	  recommend	  that	  social	  problems	  be	  conceived	  and	  defined	  as:	  
“An	   activity	   by	   which	   groups	   identify	   “problems”	   which	   they	   claim	   to	   be	   harmful,	  
undesirable,	   unjust	   and	   in	   need	   of	   corrective	   attention.	  By	   this	   definition,	   any	  and	   every	  
problem	  claimed	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  by	  whatever	  group	  on	  whatever	  grounds	  would	  qualify	  
as	  subject	  matter	  for	  the	  study	  of	  social	  problems.	  A	  major	  consequence	  of	  this	  definition	  is	  
that	  a	  social	  problem	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  an	   	  “objective	  condition”	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  process	  of	  
interaction	   between	   claimants	   that	   is	   organized	   by	   what	   they	   claim	   to	   be	   “a	   problem”.	  (1979,	  ix-­‐x)	  	  	  Much	   of	   political	   argument	   is	   fought	   at	   the	   level	   of	   problem	   definition	   between	   these	  claimants.	   Problem	   definition	   is	   a	   contested	   process	   among	   actors	   with	   varying	   levels	   of	  power	   and	   persuasiveness.	   Framing	   is	   one	   element	   in	   a	   broader	   battle	   over	   problem	  definition,	  although	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  problems	  is	  different	   from	  framing.	  Framing	  and	  problem	  definition	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  both	  define	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  complicated	  situation	  by	  emphasizing	  some	  elements	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  others,	  but	  framing	  has	  been	  mostly	  employed	  as	  a	  term	  to	  describe	  how	  to	  package	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  set	  of	  ideas	  to	  win	  more	  adherents	  to	  ones	  position	  and	  the	  way	  a	  problem	  is	  framed	  has	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  types	  of	  policy	  solutions	  that	  will	  seem	  desirable,	  possible	  or	  relevant.	  (Beland	  2005,	  Cambell	  1998.)	  Those	  participating	  in	  framing	  and	  defining	  problems	  might	  not	  be	  aware	  they	  are	  doing	  so	  (media	  for	  example)	  and	  the	  competing	  claimants	  understanding	  of	  the	  issue	  may	  change	  during	  the	  course	  of	  debate.	  Problem	  definitions	  define	  the	  scope	  of	  possible	  policy	  solutions,	  but	  there	  are	  still	  multiple	  possible	  choices	  for	  policy	  solutions	  and	  the	  battle	  over	  problem	  definition	  needs	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  battle	  over	  policy	  solution	  these	  are	  analytically	  different,	  although	  interconnected	  processes.	  (Mehta	  2011.)	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Problems	   are	   neither	   objective	   nor	   fixed	   conditions.	  What	   is	   constructed	   as	   a	   problem	  has	  varied	  across	  different	  eras.	  	  To	  simplify	  complex	  historical	  conditions	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	  times	  problems	  were	  seen	  as	  plagues	  (famine,	  natural	  disasters)	  sent	  by	  natural	   forces	   and	  god	   that	  people	   just	  had	   to	   face.	  The	  problems	   in	   industrial	   societies	  were	   constructed	   as	   questions	   stemming	   from	   class	   conflict	   (the	   social	   question),	   aimed	   at	  social	  mobilisation	  and	  shaping	  the	  direction	  of	  “progress”.	  In	  societies	  organised	  around	  the	  welfare	  state	  attention	  was	  turned	  to	  structural	  and	  social	  problems	  (poverty,	  homelessness,	  disease,	  exclusion)	  that	  were	  identified	  and	  treated	  by	  professionals	  created	  for	  this	  purpose.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  with	  increasing	  uncertainty	  and	  realisation	  that	  it	  might	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  eradicate	  social	  problems	  for	  good,	  the	  discourse	  shifted	  from	  rational	  top-­‐down	  control	  to	  risk	  management.	  (Eräsaari	  2000.) The	  complexity	  of	  problem	  definitions	  means	  that	  even	   if	  say	  poverty	   is	  considered	  a	  social	  problem,	   the	   reasons	   for	   which	   it	   is	   considered	   a	   problem	   and	   the	   perceived	   reasons	   for	  poverty	   depend	   on	   the	   views	   held	   by	   the	   one	   doing	   the	   defining.	   The	   subjective	   nature	   of	  problem	  definition	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  comments	  by	  Kevin	  O’Leary.	  When	  the	  investor,	  writer	  and	  a	  television	  personality,	  was	  asked	  what	  he	  thought	  about	  the	  Oxfam	  study6	  stating	  that	  the	  richest	  85	  people	  in	  the	  world	  have	  equal	  wealth	  to	  the	  poorest	  3,5	  billion	  people,	  half	  of	  the	   global	   population,	   he	   responded	   “This	   is	   fantastic	   news	   and	   of	   course	   I	   applaud	   it7”.	  Although	  the	  comment	  was	  most	  likely	  made	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	  attention,	  it	  underlines	  the	  constructed	   nature	   of	   social	   problems.	   A	   stat	   that	   most	   would	   see	   as	   somewhat	   obscene	  represents	  the	  opposite	  to	  O’Leary.	  Through	  his	  lenses	  the	  stat	  should	  be	  celebrated	  since	  the	  people	   living	  in	  abject	  poverty	  will	  get	  motivated	  to	  try	  and	  accomplish	  what	  those	  85	  have	  accomplished.	   Problems	   are	   not	   objective	   conditions	   and	   even	   gross	   inequality	  may	  not	   be	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  by	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  consider	  structure	   to	  matter,	  and	  sees	  human	  agency	  as	  the	  only	  relevant	  factor	  in	  determining	  how	  much	  wealth	  one	  is	  able	  to	  acquire.	  Problem	  definitions	  define	  the	  potential	  possible	  policy	  choices,	  but	  within	  a	  given	  problem	  definition	   there	   are	   still	   multiple	   options	   for	   policies.	   (Mehta	   2011,	   33.)	   Regarding	   policy	  solutions	  the	  key	  question	  is	  why	  some	  ideas	  end	  up	  being	  implemented	  as	  policy	  and	  some	  do	  not?	  In	  his	  classic	  work	  Power	  of	  Economic	  Ideas:	  Keynesianism	  across	  Nations	  Peter	  A.	  Hall	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-­‐working-­‐for-­‐few-­‐political-­‐capture-­‐economic-­‐inequality-­‐200114-­‐summ-­‐en.pdf	  (Accessed	  25.1.2014)	  7	  http://www.businessinsider.com/kevin-­‐oleary-­‐inequality-­‐fantastic-­‐2014-­‐1	  (Accessed	  25.1.2014)	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(1989)	  distinguishes	   three	   conditions	   that	  need	   to	  be	  met	   if	   a	  policy	   idea	   is	   to	  be	  adopted:	  
policy	   viability,	  administrative	   viability	   and	  political	   viability.	   Hall	   (1989)	   demonstrates	   that	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  an	  idea,	  its	  estimated	  potential	  in	  solving	  a	  problem,	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  policy	  to	  be	  adopted.	  As	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  not	  determined	  simply	  by	  rational	  actors	  operating	   based	   on	   self-­‐interest,	   the	   best	   idea	   does	   not	   necessarily	   end	   up	   as	   the	   one	  implemented.	  Administrative	  feasibility	  and	  cost	  play	  a	  role	  as	  well	  as	  political	  considerations.	  Political	  viability	  can	  simply	  mean	  the	  policy	  idea	  with	  the	  strongest	  interest	  groups	  backing	  it.	  A	  good	   idea	  with	  a	   strong	  policy	   rationale	  might	  win	  over	  an	   idea	  with	  a	   strong	   interest	  group	  backing	   it,	  but	   this	  might	  require	  a	  powerful	  entrepreneur	  championing	  a	  convincing	  idea.	  A	   third	  scenario	  mixes	   these	   two:	  a	  new	  policy	   idea	  might	  create	  support	  and	  backing	  from	  strong	  interest	  groups,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  coalitions	  or	  by	  causing	  interest	  groups	  to	  see	  their	  interests	  from	  a	  different	  perspective.	  In	  chapter	  5.6	  I	  will	  take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  came	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  particular	  context.	  
“Among	  other	  things	  theory	  helps	  us	  to	  make	  connections	  between	  different	  social	  phenomena	  
and	   policies,	   put	   specific	   issues	   and	   policies	   in	   a	  wider	   context	   and	   question	   the	   assumptions	  
underlying	  social	  policies	  and	  political	  programmes”	  (Lister	  2010,	  3).	  This	  thesis	  takes	  focus	  on	  these	  assumptions	  and	  theories	  on	  two	  levels.	  The	  first	  being	  the	  level	  of	  agency	  and	  structure	  in	   the	  sense	  of	   interplay	  between	   individual	  human	  agency	   (in	   the	  sense	  of	  behaviour)	  and	  structural	  constrains	  and	  opportunities.	  The	  second	  being	  the	  level	  of	  welfare	  production,	  as	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  political	  battles	  regarding	  social	  policy	  are	  fought	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state,	  market	  and	  individuals/households	  should	  play	  in	  the	  production	  of	  social	  protection,	  education,	  healthcare	  and	  other	  social	  services.	  By	  taking	  a	  look	  at	  how	  a	  specific	  problem	  is	  defined	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  unpack	  some	  of	   the	  assumptions	  and	   theoretical	   foundations	  of	   the	  studied	  policy	  solution.	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3	  The	  concepts	  and	  contexts	  of	  the	  study	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  essential	  concepts,	  through	  which	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  understood	  in	  this	  thesis,	  while	  also	  outlining	  the	  social	  policy	  context	  of	  Latin	  America.	   I	   begin	   by	   taking	   a	   look	   at	   two	   social	   policy	   approaches	   that	   are	   linked	   to	   the	  formulation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  CCTs.	  First,	  chapter	  3.1	  discusses	  how	  during	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  social	   spending	  has	  gone	   from	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  cost	  and	  a	  hindrance	   to	  economic	  growth	   to	  being	  formulated	  as	  a	  productive	  element	  in	  it.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  the	  concept	  and	  theory	  of	  
social	   investment	   that	   is	   based	   on	  using	   social	   spending	   in	   a	  way	   that	   increases	   the	   human	  capital	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  thus	  improving	  their	  standing	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  and	  benefitting	  the	   society	   as	   a	   whole.	   	   The	   second	   perspective	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   reformulation	   of	   social	  spending,	   as	   it	   takes	   a	   look	   at	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   social	   protection	   to	   the	  development	   agenda.	   The	   concept	   of	   social	   protection	   is	   important	   to	   this	   thesis,	   because	  poverty	  reduction	  strategies	  in	  the	  development	  contexts	  are	  increasingly	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  protection	  and	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  generally	  conceived	  as	  social	  protection	  instruments.	   “Economic	   growth,	   human	   capital	   development	   and	   social	   protection	   are	  
increasingly	   seen	   as	   the	   three	   elements	   of	   national	   development	   strategies	   -­‐	   a	   three	   pronged	  
approach	  that	  increases	  national	  levels	  of	  welfare,	  raises	  economic	  productivity	  and	  strengthens	  
social	  cohesion”.	  (Barrientos	  &	  Hulme	  2008,	  3-­‐4.)	  The	  conceptual	  account	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  review	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  social	  policy	  in	   Latin	   America	   in	   chapter	   3.3	   and	   by	   an	   overview	   of	   contemporary	   social	   protection	  instruments	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3.4.	  This	  is	  done	  to	  account	  for	  the	  social	  policy	  context	  in	  which	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  were	  created	  and	  to	  outline	  the	  key	  differences	  from	  other	  comparable	  social	  protection	  instruments.	  
3.1	  The	  social	  investment	  perspective	  The	  notion	   that	  governments	  should	  use	  social	   spending	  as	  a	  means	   to	  enhance	   the	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  of	  their	  citizens	  has	  taken	  hold	  in	  European	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Latin	  American	  social	  policy	  approaches,	  penetrating	  policy	  formulation	  in	  both	  contexts.	  	  The	  online	  version	  of	  Oxford	  Dictionaries	  (Accessed	  20.3.2014)	  define	  human	  capital	  as	  the	  skills,	  knowledge,	  and	  
experience	  possessed	  by	  an	  individual	  or	  population,	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  value	  or	  cost	  to	  an	  
organization	  or	  country.	  Thus	  the	  basic	  rationale	  for	  investing	  in	  human	  capital	  accumulation	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is	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  benefit,	  when	  people	  are	  more	  skilled,	  able	  to	  find	  better	  positions	  in	  labour	  markets,	  and	  thus	  manage	  to	  support	  themselves	  and	  escape	  poverty.	  The	  re-­‐framing	  of	  social	  policy	  in	  development	  discourse	  is	  essentially	  a	  move	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  social	  policy	  as	  merely	  a	  cost	  for	  treating	  market	  failure	  or	  a	  luxury	  that	  could	  be	  afforded	  only	  after	  the	  economic	  growth	  had	  reached	  a	  certain	  level,	  to	  an	  idea	  of	  social	  policy	  as	  a	  productive	  element	  in	  economic	  policy	  and	  thus	  poverty	  reduction.	  (Andersson	  2005.)	  Researchers	   have	  widely	   considered	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   social	   spending	   as	   social	   investments	  (e.g.	   Morel,	   Palier	   &	   Palme	   2009;	   Vandenbroucke,	   Hemerijck	   &	   Palier	   2011;	   Jenson	   2009;	  Jenson	  &	  Saint	  Martin	  2006)	  has	  reached	  a	  similar	  status	  as	  the	  prevailing	  idea	  in	  social	  policy	  as	  keynesianism	  did	  from	  the	  post	  second	  World	  War	  years	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970’s,	  and	  later	  
neoliberalism	   after	  keynesianism.	  The	  claim	   that	  one	   idea	  has	  prevailed	  during	  a	  certain	  era	  does	   not	   imply	   that	   all	   countries	   and	   all	   regimes	   (have)	   adopted	   identical	   social	   policy	  objectives	  and	  programs	  across	  regimes.	   Jenson	  and	  Saint	  Martin	  explain	  this	  by	   identifying	  
convergence	   in	   policy	   visions,	   but	   divergence	   in	   policy	   implementation	   (2006,	   433),	   meaning	  that	   certain	   underlying	   theories	   and	   assumptions	   are	   increasingly	   similar,	   but	   the	   policy	  solutions	  created	  based	  on	  these	  theories	  and	  assumptions	  differ	  from	  each	  other.	  To	   understand	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   social	   investment	   perspective	   in	   today’s	   social	   and	  development	  policy	  and	  also	  in	  welfare	  theory	  and	  practice,	  we	  need	  to	  contrast	  the	  present-­‐day	  situation	   to	  past,	  particularly	   the	   to	   the	  critical	  historical	  moment	   that	   is	   considered	   to	  have	  brought	  the	  modern	  welfare	  state	  thinking	  to	  being.	  After	  19458,	  convergence	  occurred	  around	  a	  new	  paradigm,	  when	  the	  principles	  of	  Keynesian	  macroeconomics	  started	  to	  shape	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  most	  advanced	  industrial	  countries.	  While	  keynesianism9	  was	  promoted	  by	  some	  international	  organisations	  and	  the	  paradigm	  contained	  a	  wide	  consensus	  on	  a	  number	  of	   general	   principles	   about	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state,	   state–society	   relations,	   forms	   of	   policy	  intervention,	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   citizenship,	   each	   country	   and	   regime	   did	  keynesianism	   in	   its	   own	   way.	   (Jenson	   and	   Saint-­‐Martin	   2006.)	   While	   the	   welfare	   state	  development	  in	  Europe	  was	  influenced	  by	  Keynesian	  economic	  principles,	  Latin	  America	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Keynes	  originally	  formulated	  his	  ideas	  after	  the	  economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  1930’s.	  9	  Although	  the	  era	  from	  approximately	  1930’s	  and	  fifty	  years	  onwards	  has	  widely	  been	  labeled	  Keynesian,	  there	  were	  a	  myriad	  of	  voices	  calling	  for	  integration	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  and	  claiming	  that	  social	  policy	  was	  needed	  in	  achieving	  economic	  growth.	  In	  1932,	  Gunnar	  Myrdal	  argued	  that	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  old	  poor	  relief	  system,	  social	  policies	  were	  investments	  instead	  of	  costs	  as	  they	  serve	  as	  preemptive	  measures	  against	  social	  problems	  in	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  sphere	  (Myrdal	  1932,	  ref:	  in	  Andersson	  2005,	  7).	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under	   the	   influence	   of	   prebishianism.	   Raúl	   Brebish	   was	   the	   director	   of	   the	   Economic	  Commission	   for	   Latin	   America	   (ECLAC)	   whose	   structuralist	   economic	   theory10	  about	   the	  dependency	  of	   “peripheral”	  developing	  countries	   to	   the	  developed	  countries	  of	   the	   “centre”	  led	  to	   increased	  state	   involvement	   in	  search	   for	  “inward	  development”.	  With	  Prebish	  as	   the	  theoretical	   architect,	   ECLAC	   promoted	   a	   state	   led	   development	   strategy	   known	   as	   LA	  
Developmentalism	   (LAD),	   out	   of	   which	   emerged	   what	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Latin	  American	  Developmental	  Welfare	  State	  (LADWS)	  (Draibe	  &	  Riesco	  2007;	  Pollock	  2006).	  Social	  policy	  was	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  LADWS	  project	  from	  the	  beginning	  and	  was	  seen	  as	  an	   integral	   part	   of	   economic	   policy.	   The	   LADWS	   were	   consolidated	   during	   the	   1960s,	  resulting	   in	   widespread	   social	   policy	   thinking,	   which	   placed	   equal	   emphasis	   on	   economic	  development	   and	   social	   protection.	   The	   developmentalist	   project	   regarded	   the	   pursuit	   of	  universal	  welfare	  as	  good	  economic	  policy.	   (Draibe	  &	  Riesco	  2007,	  53.)	  The	  post-­‐war	  social	  policy	   systems	   in	   Europe	   and	   in	   Latin	   America	   were	   based	   on	   Keynesian	   and	   Prebishian	  principles	   and	   “Grounded	   in	  the	  shared	  objective	  of	  providing	  a	  measure	  of	  social	  security	  via	  
health,	   pensions,	   unemployment	   insurance	   and	   other	   programmes	   to	   the	   worker	   and	   his11	  
family”	   (Jenson	   2009,	   5).	   	   According	   to	   Draibe	   (2007,	   241)	   the	   Latin	   American	   model	   of	  developmentalist	  state	  ”was	  born	  out	  of	  the	  same	  process	  that	  generated	  keynesianism	  and	  the	  
welfare	  states”.	  A	   political	   and	   economic	   theory	   of	   neoliberalism	   emerged	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   early	   1980s,	  challenging	   and	   destabilizing	   the	   post	   1945	   social	   and	   economic	   policy	   model	   in	   Latin	  America	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   OECD	   countries.	   In	   Latin	   America	   the	   Washington	   Consensus	  reshaped	  economies	  and	  political	   institutions	  mainly	   through	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  and	   in	   the	   OECD	   there	   was	   a	   move	   away	   from	   the	   Keynesian	   and	   Prebishian	   economic	  perspectives	   	   (Jenson	   2009;	   Draibe	   &	   Riesco	   2007).	   The	   neoliberal	   theory	   sees	   that	  unleashing	  ones	  entrepreneurship	  and	  skills	  in	  an	  institutional	  framework	  defined	  by	  strong	  private	  ownership,	  free	  markets	  and	  free	  trade	  best	  advances	  the	  welfare	  of	  individuals.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  to	  create	  and	  protect	  this	  institutional	  framework,	  guaranteeing	  monetary	  stability	  and	  security	  through	  the	  institutions	  of	  military	  and	  police	  force.	  (Harvey	  2005.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Known	  as	  the	  Singer-­‐Prebish	  thesis,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Prebish	  and	  a	  German	  economist	  Hans	  Singer	  arrived	  at	  related	  conclusions	  more	  or	  less	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (Toye	  &	  Toye	  2003).	  	  11	  Around	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  welfare	  states	  the	  male-­‐breadwinner	  model	  was	  dominant.	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During	   the	  neoliberal	  era,	  mainstream	  economists	  criticized	  public	  social	   transfers	   financed	  through	   contributions,	   general	   taxes	   or	   public	   debt	   for	   their	   rising	   costs	   and	  unsustainable	  fiscal	  burden,	  financial	  instability	  and	  inefficiency,	  largely	  due	  to	  adverse	  incentives	  on	  labour	  supply,	  savings	  and	  investments	  (UNRISD	  2010,	  141).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Mkandawire	  (2005,	  4)	  demographic	  shifts	  and	  widespread	  unemployment	  led	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  there	  might	  be	  fiscal	   limits	   to	   universal	   provision.	   In	   this	   context	   social	   policy	   as	   a	   productive	   factor	   in	  economy	  was	  questioned	  and	  public	  spending	  was	  increasingly	  conceived	  as	  a	  key	  element	  in	  the	   economic	   crises.	   	   As	   the	   notion	   of	   productivity	   began	   to	   unfold,	   social	   policy	  was	   seen	  increasingly	  as	  a	  cost.	  (Andersson	  2005.)	  
3.1.1	  The	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  productive	  social	  policy	  In	  the	  European	  context	  the	  idea	  of	  social	  spending	  as	  investments	  emerged	  gradually	  in	  the	  1990s	   in	   response	   to	   fundamental	   societal	   changes	   (Vandenbroucke,	   Hemerijck	   &	   Palier	  2011,	  3)	  and	  culminated	  in	  1998,	  ten	  years	  before	  the	  Finnish	  Prime	  Minister	  Matti	  Vanhanen	  claimed	   to	   come	  up	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   ”third	  way”	  while	   on	   a	   skiing	   trip	   in	   Lapland,	  when	  Anthony	  Giddens	  famously	  articulated	  the	  principles	  of	  his	  Third	  Way	  in	  outlining	  a	  shift	  from	  the	   welfare	   state	   to	   the	   social	   investment	   state	   (Giddens	   1998).	   This	   metaphorical	   shift	  reflected	  an	  emerging	  consensus	  on	  change	   in	  social	  policy	   thinking	   that	  recalibrated	  social	  policy	  from	  a	  hindrance	  to	  economic	  development	  to	  a	  productive	  element	  in	  it.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	   “social	   investment	   state”,	   the	   reframing	  of	   social	  policy’s	   role	   in	  economic	  development	  has	   been	   captured	   in	   various	   metaphors	   and	   concepts	   emphasizing	   the	   redefined	   idea	   of	  social	  policy	  and	  the	  welfare	  state,	  such	  as	  the	  ”enabling	  state”	  (Gilbert	  1999),	  ”productivist	  welfare	  state”	  (Rudra	  2007)	  and	  the	  ”developmental	  welfare	  state”	  (Hemerjick	  2007).	  Giddens	   wasn’t	   the	   first	   to	   refer	   to	   public	   spending	   as	   investments12	  though.	   Perhaps	   the	  watershed	  moment	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  social	  investment	  perspective	  came	  from	  inside	  the	  OECD.	  OECD	  had	  held	  a	  firm	  position	  on	  welfare	  as	  a	  burden	  to	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  1980’s,	   but	   in	   the	   early	   1990’s	   this	   stance	   began	   to	   take	   a	   different	   form.	   In	   the	   1992	  ministerial	   conference	  OECD	  produced	   five	  new	  orientations	   for	   social	  policy,	  with	   the	   first	  being:	   “Non-­‐inflationary	   growth	   of	   output	   and	   jobs,	   and	   political	   and	   social	   stability	   are	  
enhanced	  by	  the	  role	  of	  social	  expenditures	  as	  investments	  in	  society”	  (quoted	  in	  Deacon	  1997,	  71).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  for	  example	  Commission	  for	  Social	  Justice	  (1994),	  OECD	  (1997),	  referenced	  in	  Lister	  (2010).	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The	  traditional	  welfare	  states	  developed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  old	  social	  risks	  in	  the	  era	  of	  the	  ”traditional”	   industrial	  model	   and	   centred	   around	   the	   challenges	   of	   unemployment,	   illness,	  disability	   and	   old	   age,	   typically	   the	  male	   breadwinner	   as	   a	   norm	   of	   social	   protection.	   The	  fundamental	   societal	   changes	   that	   have	   led	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   social	   investment	  approach	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  new	  social	  risks,	  such	  as	   lack	  of	  skills,	  of	   the	  post-­‐industrial	  labour	  markets	  with	  a	  decline	  of	  well-­‐paid	  and	  traditionally	  male	  industrial	  jobs,	  increase	  in	  low-­‐paid	  and	  often	  precarious	  service	  jobs	  and	  increasingly	  flexible	  labour	  markets	  requiring	  increasingly	   flexible	   skills.	   (Taylor-­‐Gooby	   2004;	   Jenson	   &	   Saint-­‐Martin	   2006;	   Esping-­‐Andersen	   1999.)	   According	   to	   Vandenbroucke,	   Hemerijck	   and	   Palier	   (2011,	   3)	   the	   central	  underlying	   objective	   of	   social	   investment	  perspective	   is	   the	   attempt	   to	   reconcile	   social	   and	  economic	  goals.	  The	  social	   investment	  perspective	  was	  developed	  with	  the	  dual	  ambition	  of	  1)	  modernizing	   the	  welfare	   state,	   so	   that	   it	  would	   better	   address	   the	   new	   social	   risks	   and	  needs	   structure	   of	   contemporary	   societies,	   and,	   2)	   ensuring	   the	   financial	   and	   political	  sustainability	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  while	  upholding	  a	  knowledge-­‐based	  economy.	  To	   Giddens	   this	  meant	  moving	   from	   the	   traditional	  welfare	   state	   that	  was	   concerned	  with	  passive	  and	  reactive	  welfare	  to	  the	  social	  investment	  state	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  active	  and	  proactive	  welfare	  (Andersson	  2005,	  12).	  The	  aforementioned	  divide	  holds	  an	  idea	  of	  good	  and	  bad	   social	   spending.	   In	   the	   language	   of	   New	   Labour,	   this	   meant	   that	   good	   spending	   is	  spending	  on	  investments	  such	  as	  education,	  health	  and	  rehabilitation	  while	  bad	  spending	  was	  paying	   unemployment	   benefits	   for	   people	   who	   should	   be	   at	   work	   (Tony	   Blair,	   quoted	   in	  Powell	  1999,	  21,	  ref:	  Andersson	  2005,	  12).	  	  It	  could	  be	  summarized	  that	  the	  social	  investment	  perspective	   recognises	   a	   legitimate	   role	   for	   state	   action,	   but	   only	   of	   a	   certain	   kind	   (Jenson	  2009).	  The	   idea	  of	   social	   spending	  as	   social	   investments	   is	   crystallized	   in	   the	   three	  notions	   Jenson	  and	  Saint-­‐Martin	  2006	  use	  to	  depict	  the	  currently	  prevailing	  idea13	  in	  social	  policy.	  First	  is	  the	  notion	   of	   learning	   as	   the	   pillar	   of	   the	   economies	   and	   societies	   of	   the	   future.	   This	   principle	  leads	   to	   significant	   policy	   attention	   to	   human	   capital,	   beginning	   with	   pre-­‐school	   children.	  
Second	   is	   an	  orientation	   to	   assuring	   the	   future	  more	   than	   to	   ameliorating	   conditions	   in	   the	  here	   and	   now;	   this	   leads	   to	   promotion	   of	   social	   spending	   designed	   to	   break	   the	  intergenerational	   cycle	   of	   poverty	   and	   a	   focus	   on	   children.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   idea	   that	  successful	   individuals	  enrich	  our	  common	   future	  and	   investing	   in	   their	  success	   is	  beneficial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  They	  refer	  to	  this	  prevailing	  idea	  as	  the	  LEGO-­‐paradigm.	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for	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  now	  and	  into	  the	  future,	  a	  vision,	  which	  easily	  leads	  to	  child-­‐centred	  policy	  interventions	  (Jenson	  &	  Saint-­‐Martin	  2006;	  Jenson	  2009).	  
3.1.2	  Rediscovering	  social	  policy	  in	  in	  the	  international	  development	  
discourse	  The	  change	   in	  welfare	   thinking	  extends	  beyond	   the	  borders	  of	   the	   “modern	  welfare	  states”.	  Faced	  with	  the	  challenges	  of	  growing	  global	  inequality	  and	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  Millennium	  Development	   Goals,	   the	   role	   of	   social	   policy	   has	   been	   rediscovered	   and	   reappraised	   in	   the	  international	  development	  discourse	  as	  well	  (Gough	  &	  Wood	  2004,	  1).	  	  International	   financial	   institutions	   have	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   reformulating	   the	  new	   approach	   to	   poverty	   reduction.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990’s	   the	   international	   financial	  institutions,	   specifically	  The	  World	  Bank	  (WB)	  and	  The	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  have	   increased	   their	   importance	   in	   setting	   the	   agenda	   for	   debates	   and	   formulation	   of	  development	  policy.	  These	  institutions	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  development	  funding.	  They	  offer	  loans	   that	   are	   conditioned	   on	   adopting	   their	   economic	   policies.	   They	   act	   as	   significant	  advisors	   to	   developing	   countries	   in	   nearly	   all	   policy	   fields.	   They	   conduct	   vast	   amounts	   of	  research,	   thus	   playing	   a	   central	   role	   in	   defining	   the	   content	   of	   the	   development	   discourse.	  (Von	  Bonsdorff	  	  2011,	  4.)	  During	   the	   neoliberal	   era	   the	   development	   discourse	   and	   the	   social	   policy	   interventions	   in	  developing	   countries	   focused	   largely	   on	   targeted	   social	   assistance	   for	   the	   poor	   and	  vulnerable,	   alleviating	   the	   adverse	   impacts	   of	   economic	   shocks	   and	   crises	   or	   catastrophic	  events	   (UNRISD	   2010,	   137).	   The	   shift	   from	   seeing	   social	   policy	   as	   a	   productive	   element	   in	  
development	  to	  having	  a	   residual	   role	   in	  poverty	  alleviation	   impacted	  how	  social	  policy	  was	  perceived	   in	   a	   development	   context.	   The	   preference	   for	   targeting	   reflects	   the	   residual	   role	  assigned	   for	   social	   policy,	   seen	   as	   an	   instrument	   for	   treating	   market	   failure	   (Mkandawire	  2005,	  7).	  These	   types	   of	   interventions	  were	   labelled	   social	   safety	   nets14	  and	  were	   introduced	   by	   the	  international	  donor	  organisations	  to	  plug	  the	  holes	  and	  alleviate	  the	  worst	  effects	  of	  structural	  
adjustment	  (Jenson	  2009,	  17).	  In	  the	  World	  Development	  Report	  (World	  Bank	  1990,	  cited	  in	  Devereux	   &	   Sabates-­‐Wheeler	   2004)	   social	   safety	   nets	   were	   considered	   an	   elemental	  instrument	   in	   fighting	   poverty,	   and	   were	   conceptualised	   as	   minimalist	   social	   assistance	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Social	  safety	  nets	  are	  sometimes	  used	  without	  the	  prefix	  social	  (read:	  safety	  nets)	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countries	  too	  poor	  and	  administratively	  weak	  to	  introduce	  comprehensive	  welfare	  programs.	  Targeted	  social	  assistance	  was	  considered	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  way	  to	  fight	  poverty	  by	  allocating	  scarce	  resources15	  to	  the	  “deserving	  poor”	  (Mkandawire,	  2005).	  While	  the	  1990s	  progressed	  the	   thinking	   on	   vulnerability,	   livelihoods,	   risk	   and	   the	  multi-­‐dimensional	   nature	   of	   poverty	  became	   more	   nuanced,	   resulting	   in	   increased	   criticism	   of	   the	   social	   safety	   nets	   approach,	  demoting	   them	   as	   residual	   and	   paternalistic,	   with	   often	   strict	   workfare16	  requirements.	  (Devereux	  &	  Sabates-­‐Wheeler	  2004.)	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  safety	  net	  approach	  was	  a	  result	  of	  UNICEF	  bringing	  out	  the	  negative	  social	  consequences	  of	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  by	  promoting	  ”adjustment	  with	  a	  human	  face”	  and	  succeeding	  in	  recalibrating	  the	  neoliberal	  position.	  Jenson	  elaborates:	  	  “While	   many	   critics	   made	   the	   –	   correct	   –	   point	   that	   this	   “social	   safety	   net	   approach,”	  
treated	   social	   policy	   only	   as	   a	   response	   to	   market	   failure,	   nonetheless	   it	   was	   a	   major	  
contribution	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  had	  to	  be	  tempered	  by	  concern	  
for	  their	  consequences	  for	  the	  “most	  vulnerable”	  (2009,	  16-­‐17).	  The	   productionist	   element	   of	   social	   policy	   started	   to	   return	   gradually	   among	   international	  organizations	   in	   the	   early	   and	   mid-­‐1990s	   around	   a	   set	   of	   objectives	   for	   international	  development.	   The	   goals	   that	   eventually	   became	   the	   Millennium	   Development	   Goals	   were	  expressed	  in	  agreements	  and	  resolutions	  of	  international	  conferences	  organised	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   1990s,	   with	   the	   most	   significant	   being	   the	   1995	   UN	   Social	  Summit	  in	  Copenhagen	  where	  the	  participant	  countries	  committed	  themselves	  to	  creating	  an	  economical,	  political,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  legal	  environment	  that	  will	  enable	  people	  to	  achieve	  social	  development;	   to	  eradicating	  poverty	   in	   the	  world	  and	  attaining	   the	  goals	  of	  universal	  and	   equitable	   access	   to	   quality	   education	   and	   healthcare,	   with	   the	   overarching	   purpose	   to	  eradicate	   poverty,	   promote	   full	   and	   productive	   employment	   and	   foster	   social	   integration17.	  These	  actions,	  although	  not	  promoting	  a	  comprehensive	  overhaul	  of	  social	  policy	  systems	  in	  the	   south,	   did	   revive	   the	   role	   of	   social	   policy	   and	   state	   action	   to	   achieve	   the	   development	  goals.	  (Deacon	  1997,	  87-­‐88.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  ”Fiscal	  constraint	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  led	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  budgetary	  
restraint	  …	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  global	  competition	  called	  for	  changes	  in	  tax	  policies	  and	  the	  need	  
to	  reduce	  “social	  wages”	  represented	  by	  social	  transfers”	  (Mkandawire	  2005,2).	  16	  The	  concept	  workfare	  is	  explained	  in	  chapter	  3.4.	  17	  See	  the	  full	  list	  of	  the	  10	  commitments	  in	  Deacon	  (1997,	  87-­‐88).	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Reviving	  the	  role	  of	  social	  policy	  and	  state	  action,	  coupled	  with	  a	  mission	  to	  eradicate	  poverty	  the	   concept	   of	   social	   protection	   started	   to	   appear	   on	   the	   development	   agenda	   of	   policy	  makers,	  academics	  and	  international	  organizations.	  The	  role	  of	  social	  protection	  was	  further	  highlighted	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  that	  have	  committed	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  international	  organizations	  to	  halve	  the	  amount	  of	  people	  living	  in	  extreme	  poverty	  come	  2015.18	  Interest	  in	  social	  protection	  among	  policy	  makers	  developed	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	   structural	   adjustment	   policies	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	   and	   especially	   their	   failure	   to	  promote	   growth	   and	   reduce	   poverty.	   (Barrientos	   &	   Hulme	   2008.)	   According	   to	   the	   United	  Nations	  Research	  Institute,	  Combating	  Poverty	  and	  Inequality	  (2010,	  137),	  social	  protection	  emerged	   from	   a	   context	   of	   structural	   adjustment	   policies,	   globalisation19	  and	   the	   Asian	  economic	  crisis	  of	  1997-­‐98,	  which	  exposed	  the	  limits	  of	  residual	  safety	  net	  responses.	  The	  World	   Bank	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   pushing	   social	   protection	   to	   the	   development	  agenda.	  An	  important	  “rare	  moment”	  took	  place	  in	  1995,	  when	  James	  D.	  Wolfensohn	  became	  the	  president	   of	   the	  World	  Bank	   (Voipio	   2009,	   342).	   Later,	   in	   a	   foreword	   to	   a	   book	  by	   the	  creator	   of	   PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades	   Santiago	   Levy,	   Wolfensohn	   stated	   ”When	   I	   became	  
president	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  1995,	  I	  was	  determined	  to	  put	  the	  goal	  of	  goal	  poverty	  reduction	  
at	  the	  front	  and	  center	  of	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  institution”	   (Wolfensohn	  2006,	  vii).	  With	   the	  WB	  chief-­‐economist	  Joseph	  Stiglitz,	  Wolfensohn	  changed	  the	  course	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  regarding	  development	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  (Voipio	  2009,	  342).	  Holzmann,	  Sherburne-­‐Benz	  and	  Tesliuc	  (2003)	  from	  The	  Social	  Protection	  Department	  of	  the	  World	   Bank	   outline	   the	  main	   triggers	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	   protection	   to	   the	  World	  Banks	   agenda.	   At	   the	   policy	   level,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   East	   Asian	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	  resulting	   realization	   that	   progress	   made	   on	   poverty	   reduction	   may	   be	   lost	   quickly	   under	  declining	   output	   and	   rising	   unemployment	   if	   appropriate	   social	   policy	  measures	   are	   not	   in	  place.	  The	  second	  policy	  level	  triggering	  the	  rethinking	  was	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  effects	  of	  globalisation.	   	  At	  a	  conceptual	  level,	  better	  understanding	  of	  poverty	  dynamics,	  especially	   its	  transmission	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  another,	  due	  to	  better	  data,	  and	  a	  review	  of	  the	  poverty	  policy	  approaches	  pushed	  the	  intellectual	  agenda.	  (ibid.	  3-­‐4.)	  Conceptually	   Amartya	   Sen’s	   (1985)	   capabilities	   approach	   was	   elemental	   in	   rearticulating	  poverty	   as	   a	   multidimensional	   phenomenon,	   not	   strictly	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   income	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml	  (Accessed	  3.12.2013)	  19	  The	  report	  uses	  the	  term	  global	  integration.	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poverty.	   Taking	   a	   cue	   from	   Drèze	   and	   Sen	   (1989)	   who	   emphasize	   protection	   as	   well	   as	  promotion	   in	   poverty	   reduction	   strategies,	   social	   protection	   programs	   are	   increasingly	  considered	   to	   include	   developmental	   aspects	   as	   well	   as	   pure	   poverty	   reduction.	   “Social	  
protection	  programmes	  are	  evolving	   to	   include	  elements	  of	  promotion	  as	  well	  as	  protection	  …	  
with	  the	  aim	  of	  tackling	  not	  only	  sharp	  declines	  in	  income,	  but	  also	  persistently	  low	  incomes	  and	  
their	   structural	   causes“	   (UNRISD	   2010,	   135).	   	   Poverty	   was	   increasingly	   understood	   as	   a	  condition	   beyond	   purely	   lack	   of	   income	   and	   a	   “transitional	   phenomenon”,	   as	   initially	  supposed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  others,	  but	  was	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  a	  structural	  effect	  of	  the	  New	   Economic	   Model	   (read	   neoliberalism),	   requiring	   closer	   attention	   to	   social	   assistance,	  primarily	  in	  the	  form	  of	  antipoverty	  measures	  and	  state	  programmes	  (Molyneux	  2007,	  8).	  The	   change	   is	   best	   explained	   in	   metaphorical	   terms.	   Metaphorically	   a	   social	   safety	   net	  constructs	  an	  idea	  of	  a	  trapeze	  artist	  performing	  for	  the	  audience	  and	  jumping	  from	  one	  place	  to	   another	  with	  a	  net	  placed	   conveniently	   just	   above	   the	   surface	   to	  prevent	   the	   artist	   from	  hitting	   the	  ground	   in	  case	  he/she	  happens	   to	   lose	  grip	  of	   the	   trapeze	  or	   the	   trapeze	   fails	   to	  function.	   The	   critics	   of	   the,	   often	   short-­‐term,	   safety	   nets	   were	   arguing	   for	   more	  comprehensive	  measures	   to	  both	  disrupt	   the	   fall	  and	  enable	   the	  artist	   to	  climb	  back	  on	   the	  trapeze.	  Although	  social	  safety	  nets	  were	  conceived	  as	  residual	  and	  insufficient	  forms	  of	  social	  assistance,	   their	   introduction	   nevertheless	   paved	   way	   for	   the	   realization	   that	   the	   trapeze	  artist	  will	  hit	  the	  ground	  hard	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  measures	  to	  disrupt	  the	  fall.	  
3.2	  Social	  protection	  as	  a	  policy	  approach	  The	   formulation	   of	   the	   social	   investment	   perspective	   as	   well	   as	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	  protection	   to	   the	   development	   agenda	   re-­‐legitimized	   state	   activity	   regarding	   poverty	  reduction,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  tackling	  persistently	  low	  incomes	  and	  their	  structural	  causes.	  As	   has	   been	   mentioned,	   poverty	   reduction	   strategies	   in	   the	   development	   contexts	   are	  increasingly	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   growth,	   human	   capital	   development	   and	   social	  
protection.	   Conditional	   cash	   transfers	   represent	   a	   new	   hybrid	   social	   protection	   model	  designed	   to	   contribute	   to	   all	   three	   objectives	   through	   combining	   different	   social	   policy	  elements.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   place	   social	   protection	   in	   wider	   social	   policy	  systems,	  outline	  the	  instruments	  used	  for	  social	  protection	  and	  link	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  CCTs	  to	  social	  protection.
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Although	  social	  protection	  emerged	  on	  the	  development	  agenda	  only	  recently,	  the	  instruments	  used	   for	   social	  protection	  have	  a	   long	  history	   in	   social	  policy	   systems	   (UNRISD	  2010,	  137).	  Social	  protection	  is	  a	  slippery	  concept	  that	  is	  often	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  social	  security	  and	  even	  social	  policy	  and	  the	  concept	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  various	  ways.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	   study	   I	  draw	   the	   limits	  of	   social	  protection	   to	  public20	  interventions,	  meaning	  primarily	  state	  action.	  The	  following	  conceptualisations	  of	  social	  protection	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  developed	  or	  developing	   countries	   specifically,	   but	   represent	   an	   ideal	   type	   of	   social	   policy	   and	   social	  protection	  schemes.	  As	  the	  chapter	  matures,	  focus	  will	  be	  shifted	  to	  social	  protection	  in	  Latin	  America,	   thus	   articulating	   the	   context	   for	   the	   emergence	  of	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  introducing	  two	  definitions	  of	  social	  protection.	  
“Social	  protection	  refers	   to	   the	  public	  actions	  taken	   in	  response	  to	   levels	  of	  vulnerability,	  
risk	   and	   deprivation	   which	   are	   deemed	   socially	   unacceptable	   within	   a	   given	   polity	   or	  
society” (Conway,	  De	  Haan	  &	  Norton	  2000,	  8).	  
”Protecting	   people	   from	   the	   vagaries	   of	   the	  market	   and	   life’s	   changing	   circumstances	   is	  
one	   of	   the	   main	   objectives	   of	   social	   policy.	   As	   a	   key	   component	   of	   social	   policy,	   social	  
protection	   is	   concerned	   with	   preventing,	   managing	   and	   overcoming	   situations	   that	  
adversely	   affect	   people’s	   wellbeing.	   It	   helps	   individuals	   maintain	   their	   living	   standard	  
when	  confronted	  by	  contingencies	  such	  as	  illness,	  maternity,	  disability	  or	  old	  age;	  market	  
risks,	   such	  as	  unemployment;	  as	  well	  as	   economic	   crises	  or	  natural	  disasters.”	   	   (UNRISD	  2010,	  135.)	  These	  definitions	  summarise	  social	  protection	  as	  one	  of	  the	  components	  of	  state-­‐led21	  social	  policy	  schemes,	   its	  purpose	   is	   to	  secure	  that	  people	  have	  the	  means	  to	  survive	   in	  situations	  where	   their	   livelihoods	   are	   under	   threat	   from	   expected	   or	   unexpected	   changes	   or	   are	  otherwise	   in	   a	   situation	   that	   is	   considered	   unacceptable	   in	   the	   given	   context.	   Various	  
instruments	   could,	   and	   have	   been,	   used	   to	   pursue	   the	   above-­‐described	   ends	   of	   social	  protection.	  I	  will	  proceed	  by	  describing	  the	  overall	  social	  policy	  scheme	  and	  social	  protections	  place	  in	  it,	  and	  continue	  to	  the	  instruments	  used	  for	  social	  protection.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  example,	  Shepherd	  and	  Barrientos	  (2007)	  use	  social	  protection	  to	  describe	  all	  interventions	  from	  public,	  private,	  voluntary	  organisations	  and	  social	  networks,	  to	  support	  communities,	  households	  and	  individuals,	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  prevent,	  manage,	  and	  overcome	  vulnerability.	  	  21	  In	  this	  thesis	  Social	  Protection	  refers	  to	  state-­‐led	  measures,	  as	  some	  social	  protection	  instruments	  could	  be	  market	  based.	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Social	   Protection	  makes	  up	   the	   overall	   social	   policy	   scheme	  of	   a	   given	   state	   along	  with	   the	  public	   provision	   of	   healthcare,	   education	   and	   other	   social	   services22 .	   In	   economic	   terms	  healthcare,	   education	   and	   other	   social	   services	   are	   supply-­‐side	   interventions	   by	   the	   state,	  while	   social	   protection	   measures	   are	   demand-­‐side	   interventions.	   The	   supply-­‐side	  interventions	  mean	  that	  the	  state	  supplies	  the	  society	  with	  a	  service,	  say	  public	  schools	  and	  public	   health	   clinics.	   The	   demand-­‐side	   interventions	   mean	   that	   the	   state	   provides	   the	  members	   of	   the	   society	   with	   means	   that	   enhance	   aggregate	   demand.	   The	   demand-­‐side	  interventions	  mostly	  take	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  monetary	  or	   in-­‐kind	  transfers	  from	  the	  state	  to	  households.	  	  In	  reality	  there	  is	  overlapping	  between	  the	  components.	  
Figure	  1.	  The	  overall	  social	  policy	  system.
	  
Sources:	  adapted	  from	  Ferreira	  and	  Robalino	  (2010);	  UNRISD	  (2010)	  and	  Barrientos	  (2011).	  Ferreira	  and	  Robalino	  (2010)	  distinguish	  two	  basic	  reasons	  why	  governments	  make	  transfers	  to	  households,	   those	  of	  risk	  management	  and	  poverty	  reduction.	  These	  are	   interrelated	  goals	  and	   different	   instruments	   contribute	   inevitably	   to	   both	   goals.	   As	   figure	   1.1	   shows,	   social	  protection	  measures	  are	  further	  divided	  to	  three	  different	  components:	  social	  insurance,	  social	  
assistance	   and	   labour	   market	   policies.	   The	   social	   insurance	   component	   is	   concerned	   with	  managing	   different	   types	   of	   risks	   and	   is	   funded	   by	   contributory	   schemes,	   providing	   the	  contributing	   persons	   an	   insurance	   against	   unexpected	   (illness,	   disability)	   or	   expected	  (maternity,	  old	  age)	  changes	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  earn	  a	  livelihood.	  It	  is	  therefore	  an	  instrument	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Some	  social	  services	  could	  be	  considered	  demand	  side	  interventions.	  
The	  Social	  policy	  system	  
Education	  (supply-­‐side)	   Healthcare	  (supply-­‐side)	   Other	  social	  services	  (supply-­‐side)	   Social	  protection	  (demand-­‐side)	  
Social	  insurance	  (contributory)	   Social	  assistance	  (non-­‐contributory)	   Labour	  market	  policies	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of	  consumption	  smoothing.	  The	  social	  assistance	  component	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  refers	  to	  non-­‐contributory	   monetary	   or	   in-­‐kind	   transfers	   to	   people	   not	   participating	   in	   formal	   labour	  markets	  or	  who	  are	  otherwise	  unable	  to	  earn	  a	   livelihood	  and	  who	  haven’t	  contributed	  to	  a	  social	  insurance	  scheme23.	  It	  is	  therefore	  an	  instrument	  of	  redistribution.	  (Ferreira	  &	  Robalino	  2010,	  UNRISD	  2010.)	  Many	   scholars24	  consider	   some	   kind	   of	   mix	   of	   labour	   market	   policies	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	  components	  of	  social	  protection.	  	  Although	  I	  have	  divided	  the	  components	  of	  social	  policy	  to	  
supply-­‐side	   and	   demand-­‐side	   interventions,	   labour	   market	   policies,	   while	   generally	   supply-­‐side	  interventions,	  share	  characteristics	  of	  both	  supply	  and	  demand-­‐side	  interventions.	  Focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  on	  the	  social	  assistance	  component,	  and	  labour	  market	  policies	  are	  not	  further	  dealt	  with	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Additionally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  terms	  contributory	  and	  non-­‐contributory	  refer	  to	  payroll	  contributions	  to	  social	  insurance	  schemes.	  But	  as	  Barrientos	  and	  Lloyd-­‐Sherlock	   point	   out, most	   beneficiaries	   do	  make	   some	   kinds	   of	   contributions	   to	   their	  economies	   and	   societies	   (2002,	   4).	   In	   Latin	   America	   the	   recently	   emerged	   focus	   on	   social	  protection	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  non-­‐contributory	  social	  assistance	  programs.	  Barrientos	   (2011)	   points	   out	   that	   in	   many	   European	   countries	   the	   social	   assistance	  component	   has	   a	   fairly	   residual	   role	   in	   social	   protection.	   Social	   insurance,	   labour	   market	  policies	  and	  other	  public	  services	  are	  supposed	   to	  provide	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  protection,	  thus	  making	  social	  assistance	  policies	  unnecessary.25	  	  He	  continues	  by	  mentioning	  that	  social	  assistance	   has	   a	   primary	   role	   in	   countries	   where	   labour	   policies	   are	   restricted	   to	   formal	  employment	   and	  basic	   services	   are	  highly	   fragmented	   and	   stratified,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  Latin	  America,	  where	  over	  half	  of	   the	  workforce	   is	  employed	   in	   the	   informal	  sector	  (Ferreira	  and	  Robalino	  2010,	  8).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  high	  labour	  informality,	  the	  social	  assistance	  component	  is	   emphasised	   (Gough	   &	   Wood	   et	   al.	   2004).	   When	   people	   work	   informally,	   they	   do	   not	  contribute	   to	   unemployment	   and	   pension	   funds	   and	   therefore	   are	   excluded	   from	   social	  insurance	   schemes.	   Labour	   informality	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   consolidated	   social	   assistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  	  UNRISD	  (2010)	  refers	  to	  this	  group	  as	  dependants.	  24	  For	  example:	  Barrientos	  &	  Hulme	  2008,	  Gentilini	  2005,	  UNRISD	  2010,	  Holzmann	  and	  Jorgensen	  (2001)	  25	  This	  holds	  true	  in	  theory	  at	  least.	  While	  Finland	  is	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  welfare	  states	  in	  Europe,	  in	  2011	  there	  were	  239	  212	  households	  and	  371	  898	  persons	  receiving	  municipal	  social	  assistance	  (Tanhua	  &	  Kiuru	  2013).	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component	  is	  an	  essential	  starting	  point	  in	  understanding	  the	  emergence	  of	  non-­‐contributory	  social	  assistance	  programs	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  in	  development	  contexts	  in	  general.	  
3.3	  The	  wave	  of	  social	  assistance	  instruments	  The	   extensiveness	   of	   informal	   economy	   is	   extremely	   important	   in	   understanding	   the	  emergence	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   and	   other	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   protection	  programs.	   In	   order	   to	   reach	   people	   who	   work	   informally	   and	   do	   not	   contribute	   to	   social	  insurance	  funds,	  new	  social	  protection	  instruments	  needed	  to	  be	  created.	  In	  the	  conditions	  of	  widespread	   informality	  and	  persistent	  poverty,	   the	  need	  to	  create	  policy	  solutions	   for	  these	  particular	  problems	  emerged,	  and	  as	  the	  UNRISD	  (2010)	  quote	  above	  stated,	  social	  protection	  programmes	  are	  evolving	  to	  include	  elements	  of	  promotion	  as	  well	  as	  protection,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	   tackling	   not	   only	   sharp	   declines	   in	   income,	   but	   also	   persistently	   low	   incomes	   and	   their	  structural	  causes.	  The	   emergence	   of	   social	   protection	   as	   a	   policy	   approach	   in	   the	   development	   agenda	   of	  governments	   and	   International	   Financial	   Institutions	   was	  manifested	   in	   a	   wave	   of	   notable	  social	   assistance	   programs	   being	   established	   in	   the	   least	   developed	   countries26	  and	   most	  notably	   in	   the	   BRICS27 	  countries	   and	   other	   big	   economies	   of	   the	   Global	   South28 .	   The	  implementation	  of	  new	  policies	  was	  not	  exclusively	  a	  Latin	  American	  phenomenon.	  In	  South	  Africa	  a	  Child	  Support	  Grant	  was	  implemented	  in	  2003,	  reaching	  8	  million	  children	  by	  2010.	  China	  established	  a	  Minimum	  Living	  Standards	  Scheme	  in	  the	  late	  1990’s,	  which	  reached	  22.4	  million	  people	  by	  2006.	  Indonesia’s	  program	  Bantuan	  Tunai	  Langsun	  was	  introduced	  in	  2005	  and	   in	   a	   year	   grew	   to	   reach	   19	  million	   households.	   India	   established	   a	   workfare	   program	  National	   Rural	   Employment	   Guarantee	   Scheme	   when	   it	   expanded	   an	   existing	   program	   to	  cover	  the	  entire	  country	  in	  2005,	  resulting	  in	  48	  million	  people	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  in	  2008.	  (Barrientos	  &	  Hulme	  2008;	  Hanlon	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Barrientos,	  Niño-­‐Zarazúa	  &	  Maitrot	  2010.)	  In	   Latin	   America	   the	   social	   protection	   instrument	   of	   choice	   has	   been	   conditional	   cash	  transfers.	  To	   further	   contextualize	  CCTs	  and	   locate	   them	   in	   the	  overall	   social	  policy	   system	  context,	  this	  chapter	  takes	  a	  look	  at	  other	  types	  of	  social	  assistance	  instruments.	  Ferreira	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Currently	  a	  list	  of	  the	  world’s	  48	  least	  developed	  countries	  (LDC)	  designated	  by	  the	  UN	  based	  on	  per	  capita	  income,	  human	  assets	  and	  economic	  vulnerability	  (UNCTAD	  Accessed	  19.5.2014).	  27	  BRICS	  (Brazil,	  Russia	  India,	  China,	  South-­‐Africa).	  28	  Such	  as	  Mexico,	  Indonesia	  and	  Bangladesh.	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Robalino	  have	  classified	  the	  social	  assistance	  instruments	  in	  contemporary	  Latin	  America,	  but	  the	  classification	  used	  here	  could	  be	  generalized	  to	  development	  contexts	  more	  widely.	  The	  following	  figures	  are	  based	  on	  the	  model	  they	  have	  outlined	  in	  their	  article	  Social	  protection	  in	  
Latin	   America	   –	   achievements	   and	   limitations	   (2010).	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   general	  understanding	   of	   the	   contemporary	   social	   assistance	   instruments,	   so	   that	   the	   studied	  phenomenon	   can	   be	   better	   understood	   and	   contextualized.	   The	   original	   figures	   of	   Ferreira	  and	   Robalino	   have	   been	   modified	   to	   include	   the	   most	   relevant	   instruments29	  of	   social	  assistance	  that	  are	  cash	  transfers,	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  and	  workfare.	  
Figure	  2.	  The	  overall	  social	  protection	  system.	  	  
	  	  
Source:	  adapted	  from	  Ferreira	  &	  Robalino	  2011.	  Cash	  transfers	  refer	  to	  direct	  monetary	  transfers,	  while	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  are	  transfers	  of	  pre-­‐specified	   goods	   such	   as	   food	   stamps	   or	   various	   subsidies.	   In-­‐kind	   transfers	   based	   on	   food	  programs	  were	  one	  of	   the	  main	   forms	  of	  social	  assistance	   in	  Latin	  America	  until	   the	  1970s,	  and	  are	  still	  in	  use	  in	  many	  countries.	  These	  programs	  usually	  take	  the	  form	  of	  soup	  kitchens,	  distribution	   of	   food	   or	   nutritional	   supplements	   for	   mothers	   and	   babies,	   food	   for	   work	  programs,	  food	  stamps	  and	  categorical	  programs	  for	  a	  specific	  target	  group	  such	  as	  free	  meals	  for	  children	  attending	  public	  schools.	  (Ferreira	  &	  Robalino	  2010,	  14.)	  Workfare	  usually	  refers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  I	  have	  determined	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  instruments	  based	  on	  the	  size,	  scope	  and	  incidence	  of	  the	  programs	  and	  their	  incidence	  as	  social	  protection	  instruments.	  
Social	  protection	  
Social	  insurance	  (contributory	   Social	  assistance	  (non-­‐contributory)	  
Cash	  transfers	   In-­‐kind	  transfers	   Workfare	  
	  	   28	  
to	   public	  works	   –programs,	  where	   the	   state	   or	   a	  municipality	   offers	   a	   small	   income	   in	   the	  form	  of	  a	  social	  assistance	  benefit	  in	  exchange	  for	  labour	  from	  the	  poor.	  In	  essence	  these	  are	  minimal	  cash	  transfers	  that	  are	  conditioned	  on	  working30.	  Workfare	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  cushion	  against	   unemployment	   by	   offering,	   often	   short-­‐term,	   monetary	   compensation	   for	   workers	  without	   formal	   social	   insurance	   measures	   against	   unemployment.	   Although	   workfare	  programs	  have	  a	  long	  history	  in	  developing	  countries,	  these	  programs	  became	  widespread	  in	  Latin	  America	   only	   in	   the	   1990s	   (ibid.	   16).	   In-­‐kind	   transfers	   and	  workfare	   programs31	  deal	  with	   relieving	   poverty	   in	   the	   present.	   They	   offer	   either	   food	   to	   eat,	   or	   a	   small	   monetary	  compensation	  in	  exchange	  for	  hard	  work	  so	  that	  people	  can	  overcome	  the	  short-­‐term	  effects	  of	  an	  economic	  crisis	  or	  a	  natural	  disaster	  acutely	  affecting	  their	  livelihoods.	  The	  social	  safety	  nets,	  described	  in	  chapter	  3.2,	  were	  mostly	  manifested	  in	  the	  form	  of	  workfare	  programs	  and	  in-­‐kind	  transfers.	  
Figure	  3.	  The	  variations	  of	  cash	  transfers.	  	  
	  	  
Source:	  adapted	  from	  Ferreira	  &	  Robalino	  (2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The	  most	  notable	  contemporary	  workfare	  program	  is	  arguably	  the	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  (NREGS)	  of	  India.	  	  31	  Breadlines	  are	  an	  example	  of	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  in	  Finland,	  while	  building	  the	  Riihimäki-­‐St.	  Petersburg	  railway	  during	  the	  hunger	  years	  would	  be	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  public	  works	  program	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Finnish	  social	  assistance	  measures.	  	  
Cash	  transfers	  
Conditional	  on	  behaviour 	  	  
CCTs	  
Conditional	  on	  behaviour	  and	  personal	  features	  
Child	  allowances	  
Conditional	  on	  personal	  features	  
Old	  age/	  disability	  pensions	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The	  third	  component	  of	  non-­‐contributory	  social	  assistance	  represents	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  poverty	   reduction	  and	  one	   that	  has	  been	   largely	  absent	   in	  Latin	  American	  social	  protection	  schemes.	   Non-­‐contributory	   cash	   transfers	   have	   emerged	   during	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   to	  benefit	   the	  widespread	   informal	  workforce.	   The	   old	   age	   pensions	   do	   not	   have	   behavioural	  conditions,	  whereas	  child	  allowances	  and	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  usually	  conditioned	  on	  predetermined	  behaviour.	  Ferreira	   and	  Robalino	   (2010)	   distinguish	   between	   two	   forms	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers,	  those	   that	   are	   conditional	   on	   certain	   kind	   of	   behaviour	   and	   those	   that	   are	   conditional	   on	  personal	   features,	   such	   as	   old	   age	   or	   disability,	   of	   the	   beneficiaries.	   Social	   pensions	   and	  disability	   pensions	   are	   examples	   of	   the	   latter.	   In	  most	   cases	   they	   are	   targeted	   to	   poor	   and	  indigent	  people	  and	  conditioned	  on	  people’s	  place	  in	  a	  lifecycle	  or	  personal	  features	  (old	  age,	  disabled	  and	  unable	  to	  work).	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  so-­‐called	  social	  pensions32	  have	  become	  an	  established	  way	  to	  reduce	  household	  poverty	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  high	  labour	  force	   informality	   rates,	   the	   LA	   countries	   have	   implemented	   non-­‐contributory	   pensions	   (for	  those	  who	   have	  worked	   in	   the	   informal	   sector,	  who	   have	   not	   “worked”	   at	   all	   (for	   example	  housewives),	  who	  lack	  working	  years	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  formal	  pensions	  or	  otherwise	  have	  not	  contributed	   to	   the	   formal	   pension	   schemes	   sufficiently.	   Some	   countries	   have	   opted	   for	  universal	   social	  pensions	   for	   everyone	  over	   a	   certain	   age	   (for	   example	  Bolivia),	  while	  most	  offer	  targeted	  pensions	  for	  those	  defined	  as	  poor	  of	  certain	  age	  combined	  with	  previous	  work	  history.	  One	  instrument	  that	  does	  not	  fit	  to	  the	  classification	  based	  on	  behaviour	  or	  personal	  features	  is	   child	  allowances,	   which	   are	   conditioned	   on	   both	   behaviour	   and	   having	   children.	   In	  most	  cases33	  child	   allowances	  are	  means	   tested	  and	   conditioned	  on	  both	  behaviour	  and	  personal	  features	   in	   a	   sense	   that	   the	   benefit	   is	   targeted	   to	   households	   with	   children,	   therefore	   the	  household	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  member	  who	  is	  a	  child,	  and	  the	  parents	  and	  children	  are	  under	  the	  same	  conditions	  than	  in	  most	  CCTs.	  The	  child	  allowances	  are	  often	  considered	  CCTs,	  since	  the	  essential	  elements	  in	  their	  design	  are	  similar.	  With	  a	  few	  distinct	  examples,	  all	  cash	  transfers	  are	  targeted	  to	  poor	  and	  indigent	  and	  are	  therefore	  means-­‐tested.	  (Ferreira	  &	  Robalino	  2010.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Although	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  theoretical	  perplexity,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  non-­‐contributory	  old	  age	  and	  disability	  pensions	  could	  be	  labelled	  non-­‐contributory	  social	  
insurance	  –programs	  as	  well,	  and	  are	  in	  many	  cases	  actually	  semi-­‐contributory.	  33	  The	  Bolivian	  program	  is	  universal	  to	  all	  public	  school	  students	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009).	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As	  will	  be	   further	  demonstrated	   in	  chapter	  3.4,	   the	  social	  assistance	  component	  was	   largely	  absent	   from	   the	   overall	   social	   protection	   schemes	   in	   Latin	   America	   until	   the	   late	   1990’s.	  Departing	   from	   the	  highly	   residual	   short-­‐term	  workfare	  programs	  and	  so	   called	   safety	  nets	  granting	   in-­‐kind	   transfers	   such	   as	   food	   stamps,	   most	   countries	   in	   LA	   have	   established	   a	  program	   that	   has	   come	   to	   constitute	   the	   social	   assistance	   component	   along	   with	   non-­‐contributory	   pensions	   and	   means-­‐tested	   child	   allowances.	   The	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  programs	  have	   combined	  a	   cash	   transfer	   interventions	   in	  human	  capital	  development,	   thus	  addressing	  poverty	   in	  a	  markedly	  different	   fashion	   that	  what	  had	  been	   the	  standard	  during	  the	  Keynesian/Prebishian	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Hailu	  and	  Veras	  Soares	  (2008)	  state	  that	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  are	  considered	  innovative	   for	   three	   reasons.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   related	   to	   their	   targeting	   mechanisms,	   the	  second	  one	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  beneficiaries	  are	  receiving	  cash	  rather	  than	  in-­‐kind	  transfers;	  and,	  the	   third	   and	   final	   reason	   is	   the	   conditionality	   of	   the	   transfers.	   CCTs	   use	   demand-­‐side	  interventions	   to	   directly	   support	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   programs	   by	   transferring	   cash,	  which,	  according	  to	  Rawlins	  and	  Rubio	  is	  “a	  marked	  departure	  from	  the	  traditional	  supply-­‐side	  
mechanisms	   such	   as	   general	   subsidies	   or	   investments	   in	   schools,	   health	   centers	   and	   other	  
providers	  of	  social	  services”	  (2003,	  3).	  There	  are	  no	  requirements	  of	  previous	  history	  of	  formal	  employment	   and	   all	   those	   with	   an	   income	   below	   the	   poverty	   threshold	   are	   categorically	  eligible	   for	   the	   benefits,	   thus	   representing	   a	   move	   away	   from	   the	   workfare	   and	   in-­‐kind	  transfers	   i.e.	   social	   safety	   nets.	   The	   policy	   model	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   will	   be	  addressed	  in	  chapter	  4.	  
3.4	  Historical	  take	  on	  social	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  Latin	  America	  has	  demonstrated	  social	  protection	  measures	  as	   long	  as	   the	  European	  states,	  but	  in	  the	  contemporary	  context	  the	  social	  policy	  system	  in	  general	  and	  social	  protection	  deal	  with	  somewhat	  different	  challenges	  and	  therefore	  different	  instruments	  have	  been	  created	  to	  tackle	   different	   policy	   objectives.	   Conditional	   cash	   transfers	  were	   created	   in	   the	   particular	  socio-­‐economic	   conditions	   of	   Mexico	   and	   Brazil,	   but	   the	   diffusion	   of	   the	   policy	   model	   to	  nearly34	  every	   Latin	   American	   country	   warrants	   an	   outlining	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   social	  policy	   context.	   I	   will	   briefly	   outline	   the	   major	   developments	   in	   social	   policy	   and	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  diffusion	  ot	  CCTs	  is	  further	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4.1.3	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protection	  measures	   in	   Latin	   America	   during	   the	   20th	   century	   to	   further	   contextualise	   the	  emergence	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  The	  social	  protection	  component	  in	  Latin	  America	  has	  historically	  been	  characterized	  by	  the	  predominance	   of	   social	   insurance	   policies	   and	   by	   a	  weak	   or	   largely	   absent	   social	  assistance	  sector.	   The	   evolution	   of	   social	   protection	   in	   Latin	   America	   started	   in	   the	   1920’s	   in	   Chile,	  Uruguay,	   Brazil,	   Argentina	   and	   Cuba.	   This	   group	   of	   pioneer	   countries	   started	   to	   develop	   a	  Southern	   European-­‐style	   system	   providing	   social	   insurance	   coupled	   with	   employment	  protection	  for	  the	  workers	  in	  the	  formal	  sector.	  Rest	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  countries	  initiated	  their	  social	  protection	  systems	  in	  1940’s,	  50’s	  and	  60’s.	  (Mesa-­‐Lago	  1991,	  2007.)	  During	  the	  consolidation	   of	   social	   protection	   systems	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   the	   European	   welfare	  states	   and	   the	  Latin	  American	  developmental	  welfare	   states	  (LADWS)	  were	   grounded	   in	   the	  shared	   objective	   of	   providing	   a	   measure	   of	   social	   security	   through	   health,	   pensions,	  unemployment	  insurance	  and	  other	  programmes	  to	  the	  worker	  and	  his	  family	  (Jenson	  2009).	  The	   backbone	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   developmentalist	   strategy	   was	   a	   trade	   and	   economic	  policy	  labelled	  Import	  Substitution	  Industrialisation	  (ISI),	  aimed	  at	  reducing	  the	  LA	  countries	  (periphery)	  dependency	  of	   the	  developed	  world	   (centre)	  by	   replacing	   foreign	   imports	  with	  domestic	  production.	  Approximately	  from	  the	  1930s	  up	  to	  the	  1980s	  late	  industrialising	  Latin	  American	   countries	   transformed	   their	   social	   and	   productive	   structures	   through	   state	   led	  industrialisation,	  incorporating	  the	  masses	  of	  peasants	  migrating	  to	  the	  cities	  to	  the	  dynamics	  and	  structures	  of	  urban	  market	  economies.	  (Draibe	  and	  Riesco	  2007.)	  Social	  policy	  was	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  LAWDS	  project	  from	  the	  beginning	  and	  social	  policy	  was	   seen	   as	   embedded	   in	   economic	   policy.	   Draibe	   and	   Riesco	   note:	   “An	   inclusive	   strand	  of	  
thinking	   in	   social	   policy,	   which	   placed	   equal	   emphasis	   on	   economic	   development	   and	   social	  
protection,	  became	  widespread	  in	  LA,	  especially	  during	  the	  1960’s…	  During	  this	  period,	  universal	  
welfare,	  mainly	   state	   provided,	  was	   regarded	   as	   good	   economic	   policy”.	   (2007,	   53.)	   Creating	  social	  protection	  measures	  was	  also	  important	  for	  political	  economy	  reasons.	   	  Support	  from	  formal	   sector	  workers	  was	   essential	   in	   sustaining	   the	   development	   strategy	   so	   providing	   a	  minimum	   level	   of	   protection	   for	   the	   workers	   was	   key	   to	   the	   political	   settlement,	   which	  provided	   stability	   for	   the	   model.	   (Barrientos	   &	   Hinojosa-­‐Valencia	   2009,	   8.)	   The	  industrialisation	  that	  started	  in	  the	  1930s,	  and	  was	  formalized	  as	  a	  development	  theory	  in	  the	  1950s	  after	  Prebish	  became	  the	  director	  of	  ECLAC,	  had	  created	  a	  growing	  urban	  population	  of	  the	  peasants	  migrating	   to	  urban	   industrial	   centres.	  New	   jobs	  were	  created	   in	   the	   industrial	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sector,	   while	   also	   destroying	   them	   in	   the	   traditional	   artisan	   industry.	   This	   led	   to	   growing	  levels	   of	   poverty	   within	   both	   urban	   and	   rural	   populations.	   (Thorp	   1998;	   Blouet	   &	   Blouet	  2002.)	  The	  focus	  on	  social	  insurance	  policies	  for	  formal	  sector	  workers	  and	  their	  families	  led	  to	   residual	   social	   assistance	   covering	   a	   limited	   amount	  of	   people	  outside	   the	   formal	   labour	  force.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s	  the	  Southern	  Cone35	  countries	  covered	  more	  that	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	   workforce	   in	   their	   social	   insurance	   schemes,	   while	   the	   poorest	   remained	   uncovered.	  	  (Barrientos	  &	  Hinojosa-­‐Valencia	  2009,	  8.)	  By	   the	   1980s	   Latin	   American	   countries	   had,	   in	   comparison	  with	   other	   developing	   regions,	  created	   longstanding	  and	   in	  some	  cases	  quite	  well	  developed	   formal	  social	  policy	  measures	  and	  programmes	  including	  three	  components	  of	  social	  protection:	  1.	   Occupationally	   stratified	   social	   insurance	   funds	   providing	   pensions,	   health	  insurance,	  unemployment	  and	  family	  benefits,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  housing	  loans.	  2.	   A	   series	   of	   employment	   protection	  measures	   and	   family	   wage	   supplements	  provided	  by	  the	  employer.	  3.	  An	  aspiration	  for	  universal	  provision	  of	  public	  education	  and	  healthcare.	  Each	   of	   these	   three	  welfare	  measures	   had	   elements	   of	   public	   (state)	   and	   private	   (market)	  provision	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   defined	   as	   purely	   either	   or.	   The	   social	   insurance	   funds	  were	   originally	   autonomous	   institutions	   but	   with	   a	   strong	   measure	   of	   state	   support	   and	  provision.	   Employer	   protection	   is	   and	   has	   been	   government	   mandated,	   but	   employer	  provided.	  The	   state	   also	   requires	   affiliation	   to	   social	   health	   insurance	   for	   the	   formal	   sector	  workers,	   but	   the	   employer	   can	   decide	   on	   the	   provider.	   One	   of	   the	   key	   features	   in	   Latin	  American	   social	   policy	   had	   been	   the	   intertwined	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   state,	  employers	  and	  private	  providers	  in	  formal	  social	  policy	  institutions.	  (Barrientos	  2004.)	  However,	  during	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  had	  borrowed	  heavily	  to	   finance	   their	   industrialisation	  projects.	   The	  oil-­‐boom	  of	   1973-­‐74	   generated	   a	   lot	   of	   free-­‐floating	  cash	  that	  was	  circulated	  through	  international	  banks,	  WB	  among	  others,	  and	  further	  moved	  as	  loans	  to	  growing	  economies	  in	  LA.	  In	  the	  late	  1970’s	  interest	  rates	  rose	  in	  Europe	  and	  USA	  creating	  a	  disfavourable	  exchange	   rate	   for	  LA	  countries	  and	   the	  accumulated	  debt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Argentina,	  Uruguay	  and	  Chile.	  Although	  in	  some	  definitions	  southern	  Brazil	  and	  Paraguay	  are	  included	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Southern	  Cone.	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became	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   pay	   back.	   In	   1982	  Mexico	   announced	   that	   it	   can	   no	   longer	  service	   its	   debt	   payments	   causing	   financial	   markets	   to	   lose	   faith	   in	   LA	   countries	   and	   the	  economy	  spiralled	   resulting	   in	  what	  has	  been	   labelled	   “the	   lost	  decade”.	  By	   the	   late	  1980’s,	  most	  Latin	  American	  countries	  were	  under	  structural	  adjustment	  programs.	  These	  programs	  required	  that	  to	  access	   loans	  governments	  should	  open	  their	  countries	  to	  free	  trade,	  reduce	  public	   expenditures	   and	   non-­‐inflationary	  monetary	   policies,	   a	   combination	   that	  many	   have	  argued	   to	  have	  caused	   impoverishment	  and	   further	   indebtedness	  of	  many	  of	   the	   “adjusted”	  countries.	  (Deacon	  1997,	  61.)	  The	  growing	  awareness	  of	   the	  social	  price	  of	   these	  policies	   led	   to	  several	  countries	  starting	  Social	   Investment	   Funds	   (SIF)	   with	   support	   from	   the	   World	   Bank	   (WB)	   and	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (IDB).	  SIF’s	  were	  theorised	  as	   temporary	  safety	  nets,	  based	  on	  demand	   driven	   projects,	   targeted	   to	   the	   poor	   and	   relying	   heavily	   on	   external	   funding.	  Although	   the	   SIF’s	   evolved	   over	   time	   towards	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   infrastructure	  development	   and	   creating	   access	   to	   social	   services,	   the	   results	   of	   SIF’s	   as	   safety	   nets	  were	  modest.	   (Stewart	   &	   Van	   Der	   Geest	   1995,	   ref:	   De	   Britto	   2004).	   By	   the	   early	   1990s	   social	  insurance	   coverage	   had	   declined	   significantly	   in	  most	   Latin	   American	   countries	   due	   to	   the	  combination	  of	  a	  rise	  in	  informal	  employment	  and	  unemployment	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  structural	  reforms	  (Mesa-­‐Lago	  &	  Márquez	  2007,	  361-­‐364).	  The	  neoliberal	  reforms	  in	  Latin	  America	  were	  originally	  introduced	  by	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  in	  the	   post	   coup	   d’etat	   Chile.	   Starting	  with	   the	   Chilean	   experiment	  with	   the	  Milton	   Friedman	  affiliated	   “Chicago	   boys”36	  in	   the	   mid	   1970s,	   one	   Latin	   American	   country	   after	   another,	  abandoned	  the	  developmentalist	  strategies	  and	  initiated	  liberal	  reforms.	  During	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  century,	  neoliberally	  inspired	  policy	  was	  put	  in	  place	  everywhere	  in	  LA,	  both	  as	  a	  new	  development	  strategy	  and	  a	  new	  social	  policy	  paradigm.	  (Draibe	  and	  Riesco	  2007,	  56.)	  The	   abandoning	   of	   LA	   Developmentalism	  meant	   redefinition	   of	   the	   state	   (public)	   -­‐	  market	  (private)	  relationship	  and	  social	  policies	  were	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  a	  productive	  element	  in	  the	  economy.	  Neoliberalism	  sees	   that	   the	  welfare	  of	   individuals	   is	  best	  advanced	  by	  unleashing	  the	  entrepreneurship	  and	  skills	  of	  individuals	  in	  an	  institutional	  framework	  defined	  by	  strong	  private	  ownership,	  free	  markets	  and	  free	  trade.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  to	  create	  and	  protect	  this	   institutional	   framework.	   	   It	  should	  guarantee	  monetary	  stability	  and	  guarantee	  security	  through	  the	  institutions	  of	  military	  and	  police	  force.	  (Harvey	  2005.)	  The	  ISI	  model	  did	  not	  fit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  A	  group	  of	  young	  economist	  men	  educated	  in	  Chicago	  under	  Milton	  Friedman.	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well	  with	  liberalisation	  of	  trade,	  investment	  and	  finance	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  export	  oriented	  growth	  models.	  Employment	  protection	  was	  weakened	  by	  labour	  market	  deregulation,	  social	  insurance	   began	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   individual	   savings	   and	   market	   provision,	   and	   private	  financing	  and	  provision	  of	  health	  and	  education	  was	  encouraged.	  (Gough,	  Wood	  et	  al.	  2004.)	  The	  neoliberal	  policies	  resulted	   in	   fundamental	  changes	   in	   the	  social	  policy	  systems	   if	  Latin	  America.	  Although	  the	  concept	  welfare	  state	  is	  rarely	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  countries	   outside	   the	   developed	   world	   in	   general,	   with	   notable	   exceptions	   of	   Draibe	   and	  Riesco	  (2007)	  and	  Mesa-­‐Lago	  (1991,	  2007),	  there	  have	  nevertheless	  been	  attempts	  to	  define	  the	   welfare	   regime/regimes	   in	   LA.	   Gough	   and	   Wood	   (2004)	   describe	   the	   Latin	   American	  welfare	   regime	   during	   the	   era	   of	   LADWS	   as	   mostly	   corporatist-­‐informal,	   thus	   resembling	  Southern	   Europe	   with	   extensive	   labour	   market	   regulation	   and	   clientelist	   social	   insurance	  programmes	  for	  the	  core	  labour	  force.	   	  Barrientos	   	  (2004)	  has	  found	  that,	   the	  aspiration	  for	  public	  universal	  provision	  of	  education	  and	  healthcare	  reflected	  the	  social	  democratic	  model	  in	  its	  developmental	  and	  equity	  features.	  The	  social	  insurance	  funds,	  employment	  protection	  and	   family	  benefits	   for	   the	   formal	  sector	  workers	  reflected	   the	  conservative	  welfare	  regime	  and	  the	  residual	  welfare	  provision	  of	  the	  liberal	  regime	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  inclusive	  state	   welfare	   provision,	   i.e.	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   integrated	   and	   comprehensive	   social	   assistance	  component.	  He	  continues	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  policies	  amounted	  to	  a	  regime	  shift	  to	  a	  liberal-­‐informal	   regime,	   reflecting	   the	   increasingly	   limited	   amount	   of	   people	   covered	   by	   social	  insurance	   policies	   and	   the	   high	   levels	   of	   labour	   informality	   i.e.	   people	  without	   any	   kind	   of	  social	  protection	  coverage.	  For	   half	   the	   population	   in	   half	   of	   Latin	   American	   countries	   of	   the	   region	   in	   the	   1990s	   the	  principal	   form	  of	   social	   protection	  was	   a	   safety	  net,	   created	   for	   emergency	   relief	   (food	   aid,	  primary	   health),	   family	   and	   kinship	   support,	   supplemented	   by	   the	   voluntary	   sector,	  comprising	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   (NGOs),	   church-­‐based	   relief	   and	   charitable	  organizations.	   (Molyneux	  2007,	  4.)	  However,	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	  1990s	  governments	  began	   to	   increase	   their	   social	   spending.	   Spending	   on	   education,	   health	   care	   and	   social	  protection	   rose	   from	   8.5	   per	   cent	   of	   GDP	   in	   1990-­‐91	   to	   11.4	   per	   cent	   in	   2006-­‐07	   (ECLAC	  2009),	   although	   that	   still	   amounts	   to	   less	   than	   half	   of	   OECD	   average.	   	   A	   major	   challenge	  regarding	  welfare	  provision,	  poverty	  and	  inequality	  in	  Latin	  America	  remains	  the	  part	  of	  the	  population	   that	   is	   not	   covered	   by	   social	   protection.	   	   Informal	   employment	   constitutes	   a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  non-­‐agricultural	  employment	  in	  Latin	  America,	  which	  means	  that	  a	  
	  	   35	  
significant	  proportion	  of	   the	  population	   is	  not	  contributing	   to	  a	  social	   insurance	  scheme.	  Of	  non-­‐agricultural	  employment,	  informal	  labour	  in	  Latin	  America	  ranges	  from	  39.8	  per	  cent	  in	  Uruguay	  to	  75.1	  per	  cent	   in	  Bolivia.	   (ILO	  2013.)	  Chapter	  3.3	  dealt	  with	  the	  social	  assistance	  programs	  that	  aim	  at	  tackling	  the	  poverty	  arising	  from	  the	  large	  levels	  of	  informality.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  explore	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers,	  a	  social	  assistance	  instrument	  that	  has	   become	   the	   prevailing	   policy	   model	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   increasingly	   in	   other	  development	  contexts.	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4.	  Conditional	  cash	  transfers	  as	  a	  social	  policy	  idea	  
This	   chapter	   deals	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   through	   the	   framework	  established	  in	  chapter	  2.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  theoretical	  principles	  and	  assumptions	  the	  programs	  are	  based	  on,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  uncovering	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  so	  appealing.	  Thus	  to	  unpack	  some	  of	  the	  assumptions	  and	  theories	  the	  chapter	  deals	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   on	   the	   two	   levels	   basing	   on	   Mehta’s	  theoretical	  distinction	  between	  idea	  as	  a	  policy	  solution	  and	  idea	  as	  a	  problem	  definition.	  First,	   I	   describe	   and	   assess	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   programs	   as	   a	   policy	   solution.	   Sub-­‐chapters	  from	  4.1	  through	  4.4	  aim	  at	  accounting	  for	  the	  CCTs	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  programs	  that	  have	  been	  created,	  the	  objectives	  that	  these	  programs	  have	  and	  also	  by	  asking	  what	  are	  the	  essential	  design	  features	  that	  make	  CCTs	  unique.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  taking	  a	  look	  at	  how	  the	  idea	  was	  institutionalised	  in	  Latin	  America	  through	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Mexican	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  programs	   and	   how	   the	   model	   created	   in	   those	   countries	   was	   embraced	   in	   Latin	   America,	  followed	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  basic	  design	  features	  and	  the	  concepts	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  approach	  and	  understand	  CCTs	  in	  earlier	  research.	  In	  chapter	  4.5	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  theories	  and	  assumptions	  within	  which	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  have	  been	  formulated	   and	   implemented	   and	   explore	   some	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   policy	   idea	   that	   has	  made	  it	  so	  widely	  appealing.	  
4.1	  What	  are	  conditional	  cash	  transfers?	  As	   was	   established	   in	   chapter	   3.4,	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   have	   been	   defined	   as	   means	  tested	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   assistance	   programs	   that	   combine	   a	  monetary	   transfer	  with	  interventions	  in	  human	  capital	  development.	  CCTs	  are	  designed	  to	  serve	  the	  double	  function	  of	  alleviating	  poverty	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  and	  to	  breaking	  the	  intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  in	   the	   long-­‐term.	   The	   recipients	   of	   the	   cash	   transfer	   agree	   to	   some	   behavioural	   conditions	  binding	   their	   children	   to	   actions	   considered	   to	   result	   in	   increased	   capacity	   to	   overcome	  poverty.	  Today	  there	  are	  numerous	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  increasingly	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   reflecting	   the	   local	   social,	   political	   and	   economic	  conditions,	   administrative	   capacity,	   perceived	   needs,	   priorities,	   and	   prior	   institutional	  structure.	   But	   although	   the	   size	   and	   technical	   details	  may	   vary	   significantly,	   the	   programs	  share	  three	  key	  features	  of	  a	  monetary	  transfer	  (generally	  favouring	  women	  as	  the	  recipients	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of	   the	   transfer),	   conditions	   on	   education	   and	   health	   and	   a	   targeting	  mechanism	   (De	   Britto	  2004;	  Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009;	  Hanlon	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Bastagli	  2009).	  The	   idea	   of	   conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   to	   the	   use	   of	   supply-­‐side	   services	   in	   the	   form	   of	  schooling,	   healthcare	   and	   nutrition	   has	   become	   a	   prevailing	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  persistent	   poverty	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   increasingly	   in	   development	   contexts	   in	   general.	  	  Beginning	   from	   the	   realization	   that	   poverty	   in	   development	   contexts	   is	   often	   a	   condition	  inherited	  from	  one’s	  parents	  and	  transmitted	  across	  generations,	   the	  objective	  of	  CCTs	   is	   to	  break	  this	  cycle.	  As	  all	  social	  policies	  reflect	  certain	  theories	  about	  human	  behaviour,	  and	  the	  role	   of	   the	   state,	   market	   and	   individuals	   in	   providing	   social	   protection	   (O’Brien	   &	   Penna	  1998),	   all	   implemented	   social	   policies	   also	   reflect	   certain	   political	   preferences.	   However,	  governments	  from	  left	  to	  right	  have	  been	  implementing	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  Latin	   American	   countries	   from	   Uruguay	   to	   Nicaragua,	   and	   the	   policy	   model	   keeps	   on	  spreading	  to	  other	  developing	  countries	  with	  different	  government	  ideologies,	  state	  capacity	  and	  domestic	  needs.	  It’s	  apparent	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  has	  been	  able	  to	  transcend	   ideological	   frontiers	   (Franzoni	   &	   Voorend	   2011,	   281).	   My	   argument	   is	   that	   as	  hybrid	  social	  protection	  programs	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policymakers	  based	  on	  the	  underlying	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  framed	  from	  different	  angles.	  As	  a	  policy	  idea	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  merge	  different	  social	  policy	  traditions	  and	  different,	   sometimes	  contradictory,	   theoretical	  principles.	  CCTs	  can	  be	   seen	  as	   representing	  
rights	   based	   social	   protection,	   residual	   and	   cost-­‐effective	   targeted	   social	   protection	   and	  economically	  productive	  social	  protection	  based	  on	  social	  investments.	  
4.2	  How	  the	  policy	  solution	  was	  institutionalised	  in	  Latin	  America	  The	  basic	  design	  and	  policy	  rationale	  for	  what	  became	  the	  standard	  CCT-­‐model	  was	  created	  in	  the	   particular	   contexts	   of	   Mexico	   and	   Brazil.	   Mexico	   was	   the	   first	   to	   launch	   a	   national	  program,	   but	   the	   first	   programs	   considered	   CCTs	   were	   established	   at	   a	   municipal	   level	   in	  Brazil.	   In	   1996,	   before	   the	   launching	   of	   PROGRESA,	   the	   Mexican	   Government	   had	   sent	   a	  delegation	   to	  Brazil	   to	   visit	   several	  municipal	   “Bolsa	  Escola”	  programs	   (Lindert	   et	   al.	   2006,	  12),	   so,	   the	   cities	   of	   Campinas	   and	   Brasília	   could	   be	   considered	   the	   birthplaces	   of	   the	  conditional	   cash	   transfer	  model37	  that	  has	   spread	  over	  Latin	  America	  and	  been	  exported	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Along	  with	  Mexico	  and	  Brazil,	  Bangladesh	  is	  considered	  as	  the	  third	  pioneer	  country	  of	  CCTs,	  although	  the	  basic	  CCT	  model	  that	  has	  spread	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  exported	  to	  other	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other	   developing	   contexts	   as	   well.	   But	   it	   was	   PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades	   and	   the	   Brazilian	  national	  CCTs	  Bolsa	  Escola	  Federal	  and	   later	  Bolsa	  Família	  that	  established	  the	  basic	  design	  and	   policy	   rationale	   that	   were	   later	   replicated	   in	   nearly	   all	   Latin	   American	   countries	   and	  exported	   to	   various	   countries	   outside	   of	   LA.	   Although	   there	   are	   certain	   differences	   in	   the	  design	   features	   of	   P-­‐O	   and	   BF,	   they	   are	   both	   premised	   on	   the	   same	   principles,	   and	   the	  essential	  design	  is	  the	  same.	  (Sugyama	  2011;	  Fiazbein	  &	  Schady	  2009;	  De	  Britto	  2004.)	  	  Sugyama	   (2011,	   255)	   notes	   that	   most	   supporters	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   in	   the	  international	  development	   community	  have	   treated	   the	  Brazilian	   and	  Mexican	  programs	  as	  largely	  comparable.	  Neither	  country	  has	  been	  given	  the	  honour	  of	  being	  the	  creator	  of	  CCTs.	  International	  development	  institutions	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  similarities	  between	  these	  programs	   and	   outcomes	   related	   to	   poverty	   alleviation	   and	   human	   capital	   development.	  Although	   there	   are	   nuances	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	   programs	   that	   vary	   significantly,	   they	   are	  grounded	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  and	  are	  considered	  comparable	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  account	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  CCT	  policy	  model	  and	  how	  it	  was	  embraced	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
4.2.1	  PROGRESA	  –	  Oportunidades	  Santiago	   Levy	  was	   an	   undersecretary	   in	  Mexico’s	   finance	  ministry	   in	   1995	  when	  President	  Ernesto	  Zedillo	  (1996-­‐2001)	  put	  him	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  team	  that	  would	  be	  entrusted	  to	  draft	  a	  plan	  to	  address	  extreme	  poverty	  in	  Mexico;	  and,	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  launching	  of	  PROGRESA	  in	  1997.	   Around	   the	   time	  Mexico	   was	   recovering	   from	   a	   so-­‐called	   tequila	   crisis,	   an	   economic	  crisis,	  which	  had	  led	  to	  growth	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  extreme	  poverty.	  One	  fifth	  of	  Mexicans	  lived	  in	  extreme	   poverty;	   of	   which	   40	   per	   cent	   were	   children.	   The	   available	   instruments	   to	   fight	  poverty	  were	  considered	  inefficient	  (food	  subsidies),	  the	  economic	  crisis	  limited	  the	  available	  resources	   for	   social	   spending	   and	   there	  was	   a	   great	   possibility	   that	   the	   number	   of	   people	  living	   in	  extreme	  poverty	  would	   increase	  due	   to	   the	  economic	  situation.	   (Levy	  &	  Rodríguez	  2005,	  1.)	  The	  extreme	  poverty	  was	  particularly	  strongly	  felt	  in	  rural	  Mexico	  where	  the	  infant	  mortality	   rate	   of	   the	   rural	   poor	   was	   156	   per	   cent	   higher	   than	   among	   the	   urban	   non-­‐poor	  (Levy	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  development	  contexts	  is	  credited	  to	  Mexico	  and	  Brazil.	  In	  1994,	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program	  was	  launched	  in	  Bangladesh.	  It	  provides	  a	  stipend	  and	  a	  tuition	  subsidy,	  is	  categorically	  targeted	  to	  girls	  from	  poor	  districts	  who	  have	  completed	  primary	  school	  and	  conditioned	  on	  school	  attendance	  and	  staying	  unmarried	  until	  the	  end	  of	  secondary	  school.	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009.)	  	  
	  	   39	  
Levy´s	  team	  launched	  a	  pilot	  program	  that	  differed	  from	  traditional	  Mexican	  social	  assistance	  programs	   in	   that	   it	   delivered	   a	   direct	   monetary	   transfer	   instead	   of	   in-­‐kind	   transfers,	   also	  requiring	   regular	  medical	   check	   ups	   from	   pregnant	   women,	   lactating	  mothers	   and	   infants.	  The	  pilot	  program	  identified	  the	  poor	  by	  using	  a	  database	  established	  for	  two	  programs	  that	  delivered	  milk	  and	  tortilla	  subsidies.	  It	  was	  decided	  that	  before	  the	  program	  could	  go	  national	  an	  educational	  component	  needed	  to	  be	  added.	  The	  program	  also	  needed	  better	  monitoring	  and	   inter-­‐agency	  coordination	  and	   there	  were	  difficulties	   targeting	   the	  most	  vulnerable.	   	  At	  this	   point	   one	   of	   the	   members	   in	   Levy’s	   team	   became	   interested	   in	   data	   on	   poverty	   and	  marginality	  produced	  and	  gathered	  by	  Jose	  Gómez	  de	  León	  at	  a	  federal	  agency	  responsible	  for	  Mexico’s	   population	   policies.	   Gómez	   de	   León,	   a	   former	   advisory	   to	   President	   Zedillo,	   was	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  team	  and	  it	  was	  his	  and	  Levy’s	  vision	  that	  ended	  up	  shaping	  PROGRESA	  to	  its	  final	  form.	  (Bate	  2004.)	  PROGRESA	   was	   designed	   to	   address	   the	   building	   of	   human	   capital	   through	   three	   key	  elements:	   education,	   health	   and	   nutrition.	   It	   would	   deliver	   the	   benefit	   in	   cash,	   expand	   the	  conditions	   and	  make	   women	   the	   recipients	   of	   the	   benefit.	   It	   would	   also	   deploy	   Gómez	   de	  León’s	   ranking	   system	   that	   would	   become	   an	   index	   of	   marginality	   that	   was	   the	   basis	   for	  targeting	   and	   allocation	   of	   the	   benefit	   to	   those	   that	   it	   was	   intended	   to.	   (Bate	   2004.)	   The	  program	  was	  also	  put	  under	  thorough	  nonpartisan	  evaluations	  to	  gather	  credible	  information	  and	  empirical	  proof	  of	  its	  effects.	  The	  evaluations	  were	  thought	  to	  improve	  transparency	  and	  extend	  the	  lifespan	  of	  the	  program.	  The	  International	  Food	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  (IFPRI)	  was	  entrusted	  to	  coordinate	  the	  first	  round	  of	  evaluations	  in	  1998	  (Lomelí	  2008,	  477).	  One	   objective	   was	   to	   create	   a	   transparent	   system	   for	   allocating	   the	   benefits.	   Political	  clientelism,	  in	  very	  basic	  terms,	  refers	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  selective	  benefits	  to	  individuals	  or	  clearly	  defined	  groups	   in	  exchange	   for	  political	   support	   (Hopkin	  2006,	  2).	   In	  Mexico	  and	   in	  Latin	  America	  in	  general,	  social	  assistance	  programs	  have	  served	  as	  and	  are	  often	  conceived	  as	   vote-­‐buying	  mechanisms	   for	   political	   parties	   and	   candidates	   and	   have	   been	   short	   lived,	  usually	  lasting	  no	  more	  than	  one	  administration	  and	  sometimes	  appeared	  as	  ad	  hoc	  programs	  just	   before	   elections.	   (Hopkin	   2006;	   Brusco,	   Nazareno	   &	   Stokes	   2004;	   Gough,	  Wood	   et	   al.	  2004).	  Jonathan	  Fox	  (1994)	  argues	  that	  the	  Mexican	  state’s	  hegemony	  has	  long	  been	  based	  on	  the	  successful	  clientelistic	  incorporation	  of	  the	  poor.	  The	  classic	  political	  bargain	  between	  the	  state	  and	   the	  society	   required	  official	   incorporation	  of	   social	  groups	  under	  state	   tutelage	   in	  exchange	  for	  access	  to	  social	  programs.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Pronasol,	   the	  predecessor	  of	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PROGRESA.	   It	   was	   accused	   of	   being	   a	   clientelistic	   vote-­‐buying	   vehicle	   for	   the	   Partido	  Revolucionario	  Institucional	  (PRI)	  that	  had	  governed	  Mexico	  since	  1929.	  To	   avoid	   the	   program	   being	   used	   for	   clientelistic	   purposes,	   the	   designer	   team	   aimed	   at	  establishing	  a	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐political	  system	  for	  allocating	  the	  benefits.	  The	  running	  of	  the	   PROGRESA	   was	   turned	   over	   to	   a	   new	   decentralized	   agency,	   the	   enrolment	   of	   the	  beneficiaries	  was	  to	  stop	  several	  months	  before	  general	  elections	  and	  no	  payments	  would	  be	  made	  before	  elections.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  benefits	  would	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  banks	  and	  a	  telegraph	  company,	  so	  the	  PROGRESA	  officials	  would	  not	  operate	  the	  cash.	  (He	  via	  de	  la	  Jabra	  2009;	  Bate	  2004.)	  PROGRESA	  originally	   covered	  0.3	  million	  households,	   but	   expanded	   to	   reach	  2.5	  million	  by	  2000.	   The	  program	  was	   continued	  by	   the	   administration	   of	   Zedillo’s	   successor	  Vicente	   Fox	  (2001-­‐2006)	   and	   renamed	  Oportunidadades	   in	   2002	  while	   expanding	   it	   to	   reach	   5	  million	  households.	   Originally	   PROGRESA	   targeted	   poor	   rural	  municipalities	   with	   fewer	   that	   2500	  inhabitants,	  but	  with	  the	  expansion	  and	  name-­‐change	  the	  program	  was	  first	  extended	  to	  cover	  small	  urban	   locations	  and	   finally	   all	  urban	  areas.	   (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009;	   Soares,	  Ribas	  &	  Osório	   2007.)	   In	   2012	   Oportunidades	   benefitted	   6.5	   million	   households	   of	   which	   700,000	  households	  were	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  Food	  Support	  Program	  (Programa	  de	  Apoyo	  Alimentario	  -­‐	  PAL),	  which	  was	   integrated	   to	  Oportunidades	   in	  2010	  and	  operates	   in	  marginalized	  areas	  with	   no	   access	   to	   education	   or	   health	   services	   (Oportunidades.	   A	   Human	   Development	  Program,	  Accessed	  5.10.2013).	  The	  target	  group	  of	  the	  program	  is	  the	  extremely	  poor	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  is	  done	   in	   three	   stages.	   An	   index	   of	   marginality	   is	   used	   to	   select	   certain	   municipalities	   with	  varying	   levels	   of	   marginality.	   After	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   municipalities	   a	   means	   test38	  is	  conducted	   to	   discover	   the	   poverty	   levels	   of	   the	   households	   within	   the	   marginalised	  municipalities.	  Finally	  the	  communities	  with	  potential	  beneficiaries	  are	  asked	  for	  feedback	  to	  confirm	  eligibility.	   (Soares,	  Ribas	  &	  Osório	  2007;	  Alvarez,	  Devoto	  &	  Winter	  2007.)	   In	   other	  words,	  1)	  a	  geographic	  area	  is	  identified	  to	  be	  poor,	  but	  since	  not	  everyone	  in	  the	  area	  is	  poor	  by	  default,	  so,	  2)	  an	  externally	  set	  criteria	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  the	  poor	  in	  the	  selected	  area,	  and,	  finally,	  3)	  the	  neighbours	  are	  asked	  whether	  those	  identified	  as	  poor	  are	  actually	  poor.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Oportunidades	  uses	  a	  proxy	  means	  test,	  which	  will	  be	  further	  defined	  in	  chapter	  4.3.1.	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With	  its	  main	  focus	  on	  education,	  Oportunidades	  aims	  its	  actions	  at	  encouraging	  enrolment,	  continuance	   and	   regular	   school	   attendance	   of	   beneficiary	   children	   and	   adolescents	   by	  awarding	   educational	   grants	   and	   economic	   resources	   for	   school	   supplies.	   Educational	  promotion	   occurs	   through	   a	   monthly	   fee	   of	   145-­‐925	   pesos39	  (8.2-­‐56.5	   euros)	   per	   child	   or	  adolescent	   depending	   on	   the	   education	   level	   and	   gender,	  with	   the	   amount	   increasing	   each	  year	  and	  girls	  receiving	  slightly	  more	  than	  boys	  starting	  from	  secundaria,	  normally	  entered	  at	  age	  1240.	  	  The	  grant	  is	  conditioned	  on	  school	  enrolment,	  school	  attendance	  and	  health	  check-­‐ups.	   Additional	   educational	   support	   include	   a	   grant	   to	   purchase	   school	   supplies	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   each	   cycle	   for	   elementary	   school	   students,	   and	   annually	   for	   middle	   and	   high	  school	   students.	   Oportunidades	   also	   grants	   a	   saving	   account	  with	   a	   4044	   peso	   (229	   euro)	  deposit	   for	   the	   beneficiary	   students	  who	   finish	   their	   bachelor’s41	  degree	   before	   turning	   22	  years	  old,	  through	  one	  of	  it’s	  components	  called	  Jóvenes	  con	  Oportunidades42.	  While	  the	  other	  educational	  grants	  are	  conditioned,	  Jóvenes	  con	  Oportunidades	  merely	  provides	  an	  economic	  incentive	   with	   a	   grant	   received	   upon	   graduation.	   (Oportunidades.	   Introduction,	   Accessed	  5.10.2013;	  Oportunidades.	  A	  Human	  Development	  Program,	  Accessed	  5.10.2013.)	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  benefits	  linked	  to	  education,	  Oportunidades	  grants	  a	  child	  benefit	  for	  every	  child43	  from	   0	   to	   9	   years	   old	   to	   promote	   proper	   nutrition	   and	   development.	   There	   is	   also	  nutritional	   supplements	   for	   all	   infants	   between	   6	   and	   23	   months	   old,	   undernourished	  children	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  24	  to	  59	  months	  old	  and	  pregnant	  or	  breastfeeding	  women	  and	  an	   additional	   transfer	   to	   help	   protect	   households	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   hikes	   in	   global	   food	  prices.	  The	  program	  also	  grants	  a	  cash	  transfer	  for	  each	  member	  of	  a	  beneficiary	  household	  70	  years	  or	  older.	  Basic	  health	  care	  is	  promoted	  through	  communal	  educative	  workshops	  for	  teenagers.	  (Oportunidades.	  A	  Human	  Development	  Program,	  Accessed	  5.10.2013.)	  Today	  all	  beneficiaries	  receive	  their	  benefits	  through	  a	  bank	  account.	  The	  cash	  transfers	  are	  delivered	  via	  debit	  and	  pre-­‐paid	  cards	  controlled	  by	  fingerprints	  linked	  to	  a	  savings	  account.	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  December	  2010.	  40	  At	  the	  Oportunidades	  website	  (Oportunidades.	  Introduction,	  Accessed	  5.10.2013)	  secundaria	  is	  translated	  as	  junior	  high,	  roughly	  corresponding	  with	  the	  Finnish	  term	  yläaste.	  41	  In	  México	  Educación	  media	  superior.	  42	  A	  wordplay	  with	  a	  double	  meaning:	  Youth	  with	  opportunities	  or	  youth	  with	  the	  program	  Oportunidades.	  43	  Maximum	  3	  per	  household.	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The	   direct	   cash	   transfers	   are	   paid	   every	   two	  months	   to	   female	   heads	   of	   households44.	   The	  compliance	   to	   the	   program’s	   conditions	   is	   verified	   by	   a	   state	   coordination	   agency,	   which	  provides	   forms	   to	   the	   state	  education	  and	  health	  agencies,	  which	  pass	   them	  on	   to	   the	   local	  service	  providers	  responsible	  for	  filling	  in	  the	  compliance	  information.	  Forms	  are	  returned	  to	  the	  state	  coordination	  agency,	  which	  compiles	  the	  information	  and	  passes	  it	  on	  to	  the	  national	  coordination	  agency	  in	  charge	  of	  generating	  the	   list	  of	  beneficiaries	  and	  amounts	  to	  be	  paid	  each	   period.	   The	   program	   is	   administered	   through	   the	   Secretariat	   for	   Social	   Development,	  national	   and	   state	   coordination	   agencies	   of	   the	   program	   and	   education	   and	   health	   service	  providers.	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009.)	  
4.2.2	  Bolsa	  Familía	  	  The	   concept	   of	   CCTs	   first	   emerged	   in	   policy	   debates	   in	   Brazil	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	  1990s.	  The	  early	  policy	  debates	  reflected	  widespread	  beliefs	  that	  the	  society	  is	  in	  “debt	  to	  the	  poor”	   and	   consisted	   of	   proposals	   to	   provide	   a	  minimum	   income	   and	  of	   the	   realization	   that	  poverty	   reduction	   strategies	   need	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   symptoms	   (low	   current	   incomes)	   and	  address	  the	  underlying	  structural	  sources	  of	  poverty.	  (Lindert,	  Linder,	  Hobbs	  &	  De	  La	  Briére	  2007,	   10.)	   The	   political	   and	   academic	   atmosphere	   in	   Brazil	  was	   readied	   for	   CCT	   programs	  through	  two	  concrete	  events.	  The	  passing	  of	   the	  1988	  Constitution	  paved	  the	  way	  to	  a	  new	  social	   protection	   paradigm	   in	   Brazil,	   establishing	   the	   country’s	   first	   targeted	   benefit	   in	   the	  form	  of	  the	  Benefício	  de	  Prestação	  Continuada	  (BPC),	  a	  minimum	  wage	  benefit	   for	  elderly	  or	  disabled	   people	   living	   in	   poverty.	   The	   next	   step	   came	   in	   December	   1991	  when	   the	   Senate	  approved	  a	  minimum	  income	  programme,	  authored	  by	  Senator	  Eduardo	  Suplicy.	  His	  proposal	  was	  basically	  a	  basic	  income	  grant	  to	  all	  Brazilians	  over	  25	  years	  of	  age	  with	  an	  income	  under	  a	   certain	   level.	   This	   in	   turn	   constituted	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   social	   protection	   debate	   in	  Brazil,	  recognising	  poverty	  as	  a	  serious	  problem,	  one	  that	  should	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  state.	  (Soares	  2012,	  2.)	  	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  CCT	  Bolsa	  Familía	  differ	  from	  the	  Mexican	  experience	  in	  that	  the	  federal	   BF	  was	   the	   result	   of	   combining	   pre-­‐existing	   CCTs	   to	   form	   a	   national	   program.	   The	  experimenting	  with	  CCTs	  began	  at	   the	   local	   government	   level	   and	   the	  Brazilian	   conditional	  cash	  transfer	  model	  lacks	  clear-­‐cut	  creators,	  although	  the	  credit	  for	  coming	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  female	  head	  of	  household	  the	  benefit	  is	  paid	  to	  a	  male	  head	  of	  household.	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often	   given	   to	   Cristovam	   Buarque	   from	   the	   Partido	   dos	   Trabalhadores	   (PT).	   Cristovam	  Buarque	  had	  proposed	  the	  idea	  in	  the	  1986	  meetings	  held	  at	  the	  Núcleo	  de	  Estudos	  do	  Brasil	  
Contemporâneo	   in	   the	   University	   of	   Brasília.	   	  In	   1994	   as	   a	   candidate	   for	   governor	   of	   the	  Federal	  District	  of	  Brazil	  (Brasília)	  he	  proposed	  introducing	  a	  minimum	  income	  for	  families	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  keep	  their	  children	  in	  schools.	  After	  winning	  the	  election	  he	  announced	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Bolsa	  Escola	  program	  during	  his	  first	  week	  as	  governor	  in	  January	  1995.	  (Suplicy	  2013.)	  Although	  Buarque	  is	  often	  considered	  the	  first	  to	  implement	  a	  Brazilian	  CCT,	  there	  has	  been	  vivid	  debate	  about	  the	  “paternity”	  of	  Brazilian	  CCTs	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  press	  with	  links	  to	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  by	  economist	   José	  Márcio	  Camargo	  and	   to	  a	  policy	  document	  produced	  by	  Buarque	  in	  1994.	  (Lindert	  et	  al.	  2007.)	  The	  Brazilian	  experiment	  with	  CCTs	  started	  at	  the	  local	  government	  level	  in	  1995	  when	  three	  different	   programs	   were	   established	   independently	   in	   the	   cities	   of	   Campinas,	   Brasília	   and	  Riberão	  Preto.	  All	  three	  programs	  were	  targeted	  to	  households	  with	  children	  under	  the	  age	  of	  15	   and	   conditioned	   on	   school	   attendance.	   During	   the	   following	   years	   numerous	   CCT	  programs	   were	   launched	   in	   various	   Brazilian	   cities	   and	   in	   1998	   the	   federal	   government	  started	   supporting	   poor	   municipalities	   that	   implemented	   programs	   with	   educational	  conditions	  through	  a	  program	  Bolsa	  Criança	  Cidadã.	  (Soares	  2012.)	  The	  first	  program	  implemented	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  Program	  a	  de	  Erradicação	  do	  
Trabalho	  Infantil	  45	  (Program	  to	  end	  Child	  Labour,	  PETI),	  which	  had	  been	  created	  in	  1996	  and	  was,	  as	   its	  name	  suggests,	  concentrated	  on	  the	  eradication	  of	  child	   labour.	  PETI	  was	  strictly	  targeted	  to	  school	  age	  children	  of	  families	  with	  an	  income	  below	  a	  predetermined	  level.	  It	  was	  ran	   by	   The	   Social	   Assistance	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Federal	   Government,	   and	   required	   that	   the	  children	  do	  not	  work	   and	   attend	   school.	   In	   2001,	  Bolsa	  Criança	  Cidadã	  was	   transformed	   to	  create	   Bolsa	   Escola	   Federal.	   It	   was	   ran	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   and	   like	   PETI,	   was	  conditioned	  on	  school	  attendance	  and	  targeted	  to	  children	  of	  families	  with	  an	  income	  below	  a	  predetermined	  level.	  The	  third	  program	  Bolsa	  Alimentação	  soon	  followed.	  It	  was	  conditioned	  on	  medical	   check-­‐ups	   for	  pregnant	  women,	  breastfeeding	   for	  mothers	  and	   immunisation	  of	  young	  children.	  The	  program	  was	  targeted	  to	  families	  with	  under	  school-­‐age	  children	  under	  six	  years	  old.	  The	   fourth	  programme	  Cartäo	  Alimentaçäo	  was	  created	   in	  2003	  and	  offered	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  PETI	  was	  semi-­‐incorporated	  to	  Bolsa	  Família,	  incorporating	  the	  same	  information	  system	  (Cadastro	  Único)	  and	  the	  same	  amount	  as	  subsidy,	  but	  in	  localities	  where	  child	  labour	  is	  common,	  the	  Jornada	  Ampliada,	  one	  of	  the	  comonents	  of	  PETI,	  that	  provided	  support	  for	  schools	  to	  provide	  after	  school	  activities,	  was	  continued.	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subsidy	  for	  families	  with	  an	  income	  below	  half	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage.	  The	  transfer	  lasted	  for	  six	  months,	  it	  didn’t	  have	  conditions	  regarding	  school	  attendance	  or	  health	  check-­‐ups,	  but	  the	  transfer	  had	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  food.	  Final	  piece	  of	  the	  future	  Bolsa	  Família	  structure	  was	  Auxilio	  Gás,	  an	  unconditional	  program	  created	  to	  subsidize	   the	  price	  of	  cooking	   fuel.	   (Soares	  Veras,	  Ribas	  &	  Osório	  2007;	  Soares	  2012.)	  Bolsa	  família	  was	  created	  in	  2003	  to	  merge	  and	  organise	  these	  federal	  CCTs	  of	  various	  federal	  institutions	  with	  different	  objectives	  and	  target	  groups.	  Each	  program	  had	  its	  own	  financing,	  implementing	   agency,	   conditionalities	   and	   information	   systems,	   and	   the	   overlapping	   of	   the	  programs	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   information	   exchange	   resulted	   in	   drastic	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	  errors.	   The	   creation	   of	   a	   single	   national	   database	   of	   information	   called	   Cadastro	   Único	   (A	  single	   registry)	   in	   2001	  made	   possible	   the	  merging	   of	   these	   programs	   and	   the	   creation	   of	  Bolsa	  Família.	   (Soares,	  Sergei	  et.	   al	  2007.)	  By	  merging	   these	   four	  programs,	  BF	  already	  had	  established	   the	  objectives	  of	  eradication	  of	   child	   labour,	   improving	  school	  attendance	  rates,	  improving	  the	  health	  of	  mothers	  and	  small	  children	  and	  reducing	  poverty.	  The	  merging	  of	  the	  programs	  also	  led	  to	  Bolsa	  Família	  being	  conditioned	  on	  school	  attendance,	  immunisation	  and	  health	  check-­‐ups.	  Although,	  after	   the	  merging	  of	   the	  existing	  programs,	   the	  managing	  of	  BF	  takes	   place	   at	   the	   federal	   level,	   many	   aspects	   of	   its	   implementation	   are	   carried	   out	   at	   the	  municipal	  level	  by	  Brazil’s	  5,564	  municipalities	  (Lindert	  et	  al.	  2007).	  When	   BF	   was	   established	   in	   2003	   it	   benefitted	   6,7	   million	   households	   through	   the	   four	  programs	   that	   made	   up	   the	   new	   program.	   In	   the	   three	   years	   that	   followed,	   the	   coverage	  reached	  11	  million	  households;	  a	  target	  set	  in	  2003.	  	  Bolsa	  Família	  has	  eligibility	  criteria,	  but	  not	  ordering	  criteria.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  criteria	  are	  public,	  households	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  set	  eligibility	  criteria	  are	  deemed	  eligible	  but	  end	  up	  not	  being	  beneficiaries.	  This	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  11	  million	  household	  quota,	  which	  means	  that	  new	  households	  may	  enter	  the	  program	  only	  when	  already	  enrolled	  households	  leave.	  (Soares	  2012.)	  BF	   provides	   a	   monthly	   cash	   transfer	   to	   poor	   households	   (poverty	   is	   defined	   as	   monthly	  income	   between	   77	   and	   154	   reales	   per	   capita),	   and	   extremely	   poor	   households	   (extreme	  poverty	  is	  defined	  as	  household	  per	  capita	  income	  up	  to	  77	  reales)	  (Bolsa	  Família,	  Decree	  n.	  8.232,	  Accessed	  17.5.2014).	  The	  benefits	   include	  a	  basic	  benefit	   for	   the	  extremely	  poor	  and	  variable	   benefits,	   a	   smaller	   amount	   for	   each	   child	   and	   pregnant	  woman,	   for	   the	   extremely	  poor	  and	  poor.	  The	  money	  is	  transferred	  through	  a	  debit	  card	  distributed	  to	  the	  beneficiaries	  monthly.	   As	   in	   Oportunidades,	   the	   money	   is	   distributed	   to	   the	   women.	   Bolsa	   Família	   also	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includes	   various	   additional	   benefits	   and	   services	   implemented	   differently	   in	   each	  municipality.	   These	   include	   programs	   concentrating	   on	   adult	   literacy,	   labour	   market	  opportunities	  and	  microcredit.	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009;	  Soares	  Veras	  et	  al.,	  2007.)	  The	  recipients	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  following	  conditions	  regarding	  health:	  for	  children	  aged	  0–6:	   vaccine	   schedules,	   regular	  health	   check-­‐ups	   and	  growth	  monitoring.	   For	  pregnant	   and	  lactating	   women:	   prenatal	   check-­‐ups,	   postnatal	   check-­‐ups	   and	   participation	   in	   educational	  health	   and	   nutrition	   seminars	   offered	   by	   local	   health	   teams.	   The	   conditions	   on	   education	  include:	   school	   enrolment	   of	   all	   children	   aged	   6–15	   and	   youth	   aged	   15–17,	   daily	   school	  attendance	  of	  at	   least	  85	  per	  cent	  each	  month	  and	  participation	  in	  parent-­‐teacher	  meetings.	  The	  compliance	  is	  monitored	  at	  the	  municipal	  level,	  from	  where	  the	  information	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  ministries,	  the	  bank	  and	  the	  Bolsa	  Família	  administration.	  Bolsa	  Família	  is	  administered	  by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Social	   Development,	   in	   cooperation	   with	   the	   ministries	   of	   Health	   and	  Education,	  the	  Caixa	  Econômica	  Federal46,	  the	  municipalities,	  state	  governments	  and	  control	  agencies.	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady,	  2009;	  Soares	  Veras	  et	  al.	  2007.)	  In	   comparison	   with	   the	   Mexican	   program,	   Bolsa	   Família	   has	   been	   less	   evaluated	   and	   less	  referenced	   in	   research,	   although	  plenty	  has	  been	  written	  of	   the	  Brazilian	   experiments	  with	  CCTs	  as	  well.	  One	  of	  the	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  programs	  is	  the	  monitoring	  of	  the	   conditions,	   as	   BF	   does	   not	   control	   the	   conditions	   as	   rigorously	   as	   P-­‐O.	   In	   Mexico,	   the	  compliance	  is	  verified	  and	  the	  cash	  transfer	  may	  be	  suspended	  if	  the	  household	  or	  one	  of	  its	  members	  does	  not	   comply	  with	   the	   requirements.	   In	  Brazil,	   if	   a	  household	   fails	   to	   fulfil	   the	  conditions,	   the	  program	   sends	   a	   social	  worker	   to	   check	  on	   the	  household	   and	   see	  whether	  something	  could	  be	  done	  to	  improve	  their	  situation	  in	  this	  regard.	  Fiszbein	  and	  Schady	  (2009,	  6)	   note	   that	   BF	   puts	  more	   emphasis	   on	   redistribution,	  where	   P-­‐O	   is	  more	   concerned	  with	  human	   capital	   formation.	   Due	   to	   these	   differences	   Bastagli	   (2009)	   concludes	   that	   the	  underlying	   motivation	   for	   PROGRESA	   –	   Oportunidades	   was	   human	   capital	   accumulation,	  whereas	  Bolsa	   Família	   is	   based	  on	   the	   idea	   of	   universalism,	   defined	   as	   a	  minimum	   level	   of	  income	   or	   consumption	   granted	   as	   a	   right	   by	   the	   state	   to	   all	   citizens	   and	   residents	   of	   a	  country	  (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990).	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  A	  government	  owned	  Brazilian	  bank.	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4.2.3	  How	  Latin	  America	  embraced	  the	  idea	  Following	  the	  launching	  of	  PROGRESA,	  the	  basic	  model	  for	  CCTs	  began	  to	  spread	  rapidly	  with	  one	  country	  after	  another	  adopting	  the	  policy	  model,	  and	  by	  2008	  Venezuela	  and	  Cuba	  were	  the	   only	   Latin	   American47	  countries	   without	   a	   national	   CCT.	   The	   positive	   reviews	   of	   both	  PROGRESA	   and	   Bolsa	   Escola	   were	   particularly	   important	   in	   raising	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  policy	  model	  and	  broadening	  its	  exposure	  (Sugyama	  2011).	  The	  early	  evaluations,	  academic	  analysis	   and	   the	   studies	   conducted	   by	   the	   international	   financial	   institutions,	   and	   in	   the	  Mexican	  case	  IFPRI	  (see	  Lomelí	  2008)	  produced	  broad	  evaluations	  with	  positive	  results.	  They	  generally	  considered	  that	  CCTs	  achieve	  their	  goals	  and	  especially	  the	  early	  literature	  provided	  by	   the	  World	   Bank	   praised	   the	   CCT	   programs	   as	   being	   nothing	   short	   of	   “a	  magic	   bullet	   in	  development”	  (see	  Adato	  and	  Hoddinott	  2007).	  The	  literature	  claims	  that	  the	  programs	  work	  well,	  the	  conditions	  are	  justified	  and	  the	  programs	  are	  targeted	  properly	  (Rawlings	  &	  Rubio	  2003,	   IEG	  2011).	  The	  distribution	  of	  published	  reports	  on	  PROGRESA’s	  outcomes	   furthered	  the	  notion	  that	  Mexico	  had	  developed	  a	  model	  program	  (Sugyama	  2011,	  263).	  The	  development	  policy	   community	  was	  especially	   excited	  about	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	  and	  promoted	   them	  widely48	  (Jenson,	  2009,	  460).	  This	  was	  particularly	   the	  case	  with	   Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (IDB)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  WB	  had	  a	   role	   in	   formulating	   the	   idea	   of	   CCTs.	   Fenwick	   (2013,	   147)	   notes	   that	   the	   Brazilian	   ex-­‐President	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  has	  stated	  in	  a	  televised	  interview	  that	  the	  basic	  idea	  of	  combining	  short-­‐term	  poverty	  alleviation	  with	   long-­‐term	  human	  capital	   investment	  came	  from	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  during	  the	  1980s	  following	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  discourse.	  Moreover,	  for	  example	  Santiago	  Levy,	  the	  creator	  of	  P-­‐O,	  is	  a	  former	  World	  Bank	  economist.	  Although	   PROGRESA	   and	   Bolsa	   Escola	   were	   initially	   designed	   and	   financed	   without	   the	  involvement	   of	   the	   international	   financial	   institutions,	   their	   subsequent	   expansion	   was	  financed	  through	  loans	  from	  IFI’s.	  In	  2001	  the	  IDB	  approved	  the	  biggest	  loan	  in	  its	  history	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Latin	  American	  countries	  are	  considered	  the	  Spanish	  or	  Portuguese	  speaking	  countries	  situated	  in	  South-­‐,	  Central-­‐	  or	  North	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  Outside	  of	  this	  definition,	  out	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  Gayana,	  Haiti,	  Belize	  and	  Suriname	  had	  not	  implemented	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program,	  whereas	  Jamaica	  (left)	  and	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	  (centre-­‐left)	  had.	  (Sugyama	  2011,	  Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009.)	  48	  The	  Mexican	  and	  Brazilian	  experiments	  with	  the	  policy	  model	  also	  received	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  publicity	  from	  internationally	  renowned	  news	  sources	  and	  high-­‐level	  opinion-­‐makers.	  United	  Nations	  Secretary	  General	  Kofi	  Annan	  and	  the	  former	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  	  	  	  	  were	  among	  the	  advocates	  for	  CCTs.	  During	  the	  ‘Dakar	  World	  Education	  for	  All’	  forum	  in	  2000,	  Kofi	  Annan	  gave	  a	  speech	  suggesting	  that	  Bolsa	  Escola	  should	  be	  considered	  around	  the	  world	  (Missão	  Criança	  2001,	  7,	  as	  cited	  in	  Sugyama	  2011,	  263).	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support	   the	   expansion	   of	   Mexico’s	   PROGRESA	   to	   urban	   areas,	   a	   process	   that	   involved	  changing	   the	  name	  of	   the	  program	   to	  Oportunidades.	  A	   large	  part	   of	   the	  programs	   created	  after	  the	  initial	  success	  of	  these	  two	  programs	  used	  loans	  from	  IDB	  and	  WB.	  (Handa	  &	  Davis	  2006)	   In	   addition	   to	   loans	   and	   research	   the	   IFI’s	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   organizing	  meetings	  and	  conferences49	  about	  CCTs	  that	  connected	  policy-­‐makers	  from	  various	  countries.	  (Sugyama	  2011,	  262.)	  
Table	  1.	  The	  implementation	  of	  national	  CCTs	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  
Country/Year	   Program	   Presidents	  political	  position	  
Mexico/1997	   PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades	   Centre-­‐right	  
Honduras/1998	   Programa	  de	  Asignación	  Familiar	   Centre	  
Colombia/2000	   Familias	  en	  Acción	   Centre-­‐right	  
Costa	  Rica/2000	   Superemonos	   Centre-­‐right	  
Nicaragua/2000	   Red	  de	  Protección	  Social	   Right	  
Brazil/2001	   Bolsa	  Escola	  Federal/Bolsa	  Família	   Centre	  
Chile/2002	   	   Chile	  Solidario	   Centre-­‐left	  
Ecuador/2003	   Bono	  de	  Desarollo	  Humano	   Centre-­‐left	  
Argentina/2004	   Programa	  Familias	   Centre-­‐left	  
Dominican	  Republic/2005	   Solidaridad	   Centre	  
El	  Salvador/2005	   Red	  Solidaria	   Right	  
Paraguay/2005	   Red	  de	  Promoción	  y	  Protección	  Social	   Right	  
Peru/2005	   Juntos	   Centre-­‐right	  
Uruguay/2005	   Plan	  de	  Asistencia	  Nacional	  a	  la	  Emergencia	  Social	   Centre	  
Bolivia/2006	   Bono	  Escolar	  –	  Juancito	  Pinto	   Left	  
Panama/2006	   Red	  Oportunidades	   Centre-­‐left	  
Guatemala/2008	   Mi	  Familia	  PROGRESA	   Right	  	  
Sources:	  Sugyama	  2011;	  Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009.	  The	   programs	   have	   been	   adopted	   regardless	   of	   the	   political	   orientation	   of	   the	   national	  governments.	   Sugyama	   (2011,	   258)	   demonstrates	   that	   governments	   from	   left,	   centre-­‐left,	  centre-­‐right	  and	  right	  have	  implemented	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Mexico	   and	   Brazil	   shared	   similar	   human	   development	   indices	   when	   PROGRESA	   and	   Bolsa	  Escola	  were	  created,	  however,	  the	  subsequent	  wave	  of	  CCT	  implementation	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  distinctly	   more	   developed	   countries	   such	   as	   Costa	   Rica,	   Uruguay	   and	   Chile	   as	   well	   as	   in	  relatively	  underdeveloped	  countries	  such	  as	  Nicaragua	  and	  Bolivia.	  (ibid.	  257-­‐258.)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  These	  conferences	  have	  included	  Mexico	  (2002),	  Brazil	  (2004)	  and	  Turkey	  (2006).	  In	  2007	  Costa	  Rica	  hosted	  a	  	  “Latin	  American	  Meeting	  on	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programmes	  (CCTs)	  from	  a	  Human	  Rights-­‐Based	  Approach”.	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Unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  CCTs	  through	  domestic	  factors,	  Sugyama	  (2011)	  as	  well	  as	  Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  (2011)	  refer	   to	  new	  professional	  norms	  as	   the	  explaining	  variable	   in	  the	   spread	   of	   CCTs.	   The	   norms	   are	   created	   in	   an	   epistemic	   community	   gathered	   around	  shared	  understanding	  of	   problem	  definitions	   and	  possible	   solutions.	   They	   cite	  Haas	   (1989)	  who defines	  an	  epistemic	  community	  as	  a	  “Specific	  community	  of	  experts	  sharing	  a	  belief	  in	  a	  
common	   set	   of	   cause	   and	   effect	   relationships	   as	   well	   as	   common	   values	   to	   which	   policies	  
governing	   these	   relationships	  will	  be	  applied”	   Based	   on	   their	   analysis	   they	   show	   that	   only	   a	  small	   group	   of	   actors,	   top-­‐ranking	   officials	   and	   policy	   experts,	   both	   domestic	   and	   those	  affiliated	   with	   IFI’s,	   have	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   policy	   formulation	   in	   Latin	   America.	   They	  continue:	  	  “While	   there	   are	   many	   actors	   involved	   in	   policy-­‐making,	   these	   usually	   operate	   under	   a	  
much	   smaller	   number	   of	   agendas,	  which	   give	  way	   to	   epistemic	   communities,	   namely,	   to	  
powerful	  agreements	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  at	  hand	  as	  well	  as	  the	  desirable	  
solutions	  to	  take	  care	  of	   these	  problems.	  The	  more	  successful	  epistemic	  communities	  are,	  
the	  better	  they	  are	  at	  socializing	  actors	  into	  their	  professional	  norms	  and	  the	  more	  difficult	  
it	  is	  to	  alter	  their	  policy	  prescriptions.”	  (Franzoni	  &	  Voorend	  2011,	  282).	  	  Their	  take	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  community	  has	  been	  very	  successful	  and	  share	  the	  perception	  of	  Jenson	  (2009)	  and	  Sugiyama	  (2011)	  that	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  have	  converged	  around	   expert	   ideas	   on	   the	   problems	   and	   the	   desirable	   solutions,	   leading	   to	   a	   new	   set	   of	  professional	  norms	  around	  anti-­‐poverty	  and	  developmental	  policy,	  that	  are	  further	  reinforced	  through	  funding	  agreements	  	  (ibid.	  281).	  Essentially	   this	  means	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   has	   become	   the	   norm	   in	  poverty	  reduction	  strategies	  in	  Latin	  America,	  which	  has	  been	  adopted	  in	  countries	  regardless	  of	   their	   ideological	   and	   socio-­‐economical	   situations.	  Although	   the	   substantive	   content	  of	   an	  idea,	  its	  estimated	  potential	  in	  solving	  a	  problem,	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  policy	  to	  be	  adopted	  (see	  chapter	  2.2	  on	  Hall	  1993.),	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political	  actors	  and	  policymakers.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  uncover	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  enable	  CCTs	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policymakers	  and	  governments,	   the	   following	   chapters	   4.3	   and	   4.4	   reviews	   some	   of	   the	   key	   features	   of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  and	  questions	  surrounding	  them,	  while	  chapter	  4.5	  deals	  with	  the	  policy	  idea	  summarizing	  the	  key	  findings	  and	  exploring	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  idea	  so	  appealing.
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4.3	  The	  essential	  features	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  As	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  model	  has	  spread	  to	  nearly	  each	  Latin	  American	  country.	  The	  combination	  of	   targeted	  social	  assistance,	  social	  investment,	  rights-­‐based	  provision	  and	  conditions	  makes	  CCTs	  a	  hybrid	  idea	  in	  social	  policy	  that	   could	   be	   framed	   from	   various	   different	   angles	   and	   various	   different	   features	   could	   be	  emphasized	   in	   designing	   a	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   program.	   	   The	   basic	   design	   that	   was	  established	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Brazil	  and	  became	  the	  policy	  model	  that	  was	  emulated	  across	  Latin	  America,	   is	   based	   on	   providing	   a	   direct	  monetary	   transfer	   instead	   of	   in-­‐kind	   transfers	   and	  addressing	   the	   building	   of	   human	   capital	   through	   education	   and	   health50.	   Female	   heads	   of	  households	   were	   made	   the	   recipients	   of	   the	   benefit	   that	   was	   paid	   via	   debit	   and	   pre-­‐paid	  cards.	  The	  program	  design	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  a	   transparent	  and	  non-­‐political	   system	   for	  allocating	  the	  benefits,	  so	  a	  monitoring	  system	  and	  evaluations	  were	  put	  in	  place.	  	  This	  policy	  model	  is	  considered	  innovative	  for	  three	  reasons.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  related	  to	  their	  targeting	  mechanisms,	  the	  second	  one	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  beneficiaries	  are	  receiving	  cash	  rather	  than	   in-­‐kind	   transfers;	   and,	   the	   third	   and	   final	   reason	   is	   the	   conditionality	   of	   the	   transfers.	  (Hailu	   and	   Veras	   Soares	   2008.)	   As	   these	   elements	   in	   the	   program	   design	   are	   essential	  regarding	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers,	   this	   chapter	   will	   deal	   with	   some	   of	   the	  questions	   surrounding	   targeting	   and	   the	   form	  of	   the	   benefit.	   In	   this	   thesis	   conditionality	   is	  considered	  to	  be	   the	  premise	  of	  conditional	  cash	   transfers,	   therefore	  chapter	  4.3	  deals	  with	  conditions	  exclusively.	  
4.3.1	  The	  targeting	  In	  designing	  a	  social	  assistance	  program	  the	  policymakers	  need	  to	  decide	  who	  are	  to	  be	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  benefit.	  Essentially	  this	  comes	  down	  to	  deciding	  whether	  the	  benefit	  will	  be	  
universal	  or	  targeted	  to	  a	  certain	  group	  of	  people.	  Universal	  social	  protection	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  minimum	   level	  of	   income	  or	  consumption	  granted	  as	  a	   right	  by	   the	  state	   to	  all	   citizens	  and	  residents	  of	  a	  country.	  It	  aims	  at	  guaranteeing	  a	  decent	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  all,	  making	  social	  services	   and	   a	   basic	   income	   accessible	   to	   the	   entire	   population.	   As	   a	   normative	   principle,	  universalism	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   social	   citizenship	   including	   social	   rights	  alongside	  civil	  and	  political	  liberties.	  (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990.)	  The	  preference	  for	  targeting	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Although	  some	  programs	  are	  focused	  solely	  on	  education	  or	  on	  the	  combination	  of	  education	  and	  health.	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depicted	   as	   the	   counterpart	   for	   universalistic	   social	   policy,	   although	   welfare	   regimes	  generally	  consist	  of	  both	  universalistic	  and	  targeted	  policies.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  universalism	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  era	  that	  has	  been	  depicted	  as	  the	  era	  of	  Keynesian	  welfare	  states	  (addressed	   in	   chapter	   3.1),	   while	   the	   rise	   of	   neoliberal-­‐inspired	   social	   policy	   saw	   a	   turn	  towards	  targeted	  social	  policies	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s	  in	  developed	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  (Mkandawire	  2005).	  Molyneux	   (2007)	   sees	   that	   this	   turn	   led	   to	   the	   launching	   of	   “new	   social	   policy”	   in	   Latin	  America,	  based	  on	  the	  neoliberal	  prescriptions	  of	  privatization,	  decentralization	  and	  targeted	  measures.	   Regarding	   social	   protection	   this	   meant	   placing	   more	   emphasis	   on	   individual	  responsibility	   and	   creation	   of	   safety	   nets;	   referring	   to	   the	   highly	   residual	   short-­‐term	   social	  assistance	  programs,	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  in-­‐kind	  transfers,	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  amount	  of	  people.	  The	   arguments	   for	   targeting	   usually	   depart	   from	   the	   notion	   that	   it	   is	   an	   effective	   way	   for	  allocating	   scarce	   resources,	   whereas	   universalism	   is	   considered	   expensive	   (Mkandawire	  2005).	   	   Regarding	   social	   assistance	   programs	   targeting	   refers	   to	   limiting	   the	   scope	   of	  beneficiaries	   through	   means	   tests,	   income	   tests,	   behavioural	   requirements	   and	   status	  characteristics	  for	  example	  (see	  Gilbert	  2001).	  If	  the	  program	  eligibility	  is	  made	  universal	  (on	  the	  grounds	  of	  equity	  and/or	  rights),	  making	  the	  service	  available	  to	  all	  people,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  inclusion	  errors,	  meaning	  that	  people	  who	  do	  not	  need	  the	  benefit	  could	  receive	  it,	  i.e.	  there	  will	  be	  “non-­‐deserving”	  beneficiaries.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  the	  eligibility	  is	  based	  on	  a	  pre-­‐established	  criteria	  and	  a	  selection	  procedure,	  this	   increases	   the	  probability	   that	   “deserving”	   individuals	  are	  excluded,	   thus	  resulting	   in	  an	  exclusion	   error.	   Thus	   targeting	   essentially	   refers	   to	   procedures	   designed	   to	   concentrate	  
provision	  on	   those	   individuals	  who	  are	  deserving	  or	  needy	   (Ahmad,	   Dréze,	   Hills	   &	   Sen	   1991,	  27).	  Against	   this	   backdrop	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   considered	  innovative	   for	   their	   targeting	   mechanisms,	   referring	   to	   the	   method	   used	   to	   select	   the	  beneficiaries,	  not	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  being	  targeted.	  What	  is	  innovative	  about	  these	  mechanisms	  is	  the	  aim	  to	  avoid	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  errors	  by	  combining	  different	  ways	  to	  determine	  the	  eligibility	   of	   the	   potential	   beneficiaries	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   targeting	   is	   carried	   out	   at	   the	  household	   level	   instead	  of	  targeting	  entire	  communities.	  Another	  aspect	  regarding	  targeting	  that	  separates	  the	  CCT’s	  from	  the	  preceding	  targeted	  social	  assistance	  programs	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  people	  included	  as	  beneficiaries.	  In	  comparison	  with	  the	  residual	  ad-­‐hoc	  safety	  nets,	  the	  11	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million	   households	   included	   in	   Bolsa	   Família	   and	   6.5	  million	   in	  Oportunidades	   represent	   a	  clearly	  more	  inclusionary	  type	  of	  targeting	  than	  the	  earlier	  safety	  nets.	  The	  process	   of	   targeting	   in	  CCTs	   is	   usually	   carried	  out	   through	  one	  or	   two	   complementary	  methods	  via	  criteria	  established	  by	  the	  programs	  themselves.	  This	  is	  usually	  done	  through	  a	  poverty	   threshold	   established	   for	   this	   particular	   purpose.	  Hanlon	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   identify	   five	  targeting	  methods	   for	   selecting	   the	  beneficiaries	  of	   a	   social	   assistance	  program	   that	   are:	  1)	  
Categorical:	   beneficiaries	   are	   selected	  based	  on	   their	   personal	   features	   (see	   chapter	  3.3).	  A	  certain	  group,	  for	  example	  children,	  older	  people	  and	  adults	  with	  disabilities,	  is	  categorically	  included.	  2)	  Geographic:	  entire	  poor	  communities	  are	  identified	  and	  all	  members/households	  of	  the	  community	  are	  categorically	  included	  as	  beneficiaries	  3)	  Household	  or	  individual	  means	  
test:	   the	   poor	   are	   identified	   by	   an	   external	   means	   test	   that	   uses	   wealth,	   income	   or	   non-­‐material	  assets,	  such	  as	  education	  to	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  need	  for	  the	  household/individual.	  	  4)	   Community	   based	   targeting:	   neighbours	   decide	   who	   are	   the	   most	   needy/	   deserving	   to	  receive	   the	   benefit	   in	   their	   neighbourhood/community.	   5)	   Self-­‐selection:	   used	   in	   many	  workfare	  programs,	  where	  work	  is	  guaranteed	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  and	  those	  who	  are	  in	  need	  and	  wish/feel	   the	  need	   to	  participate	  may	  do	   so.	   In	   reality	  all	  programs	   include	  an	  element	   of	   self-­‐selection,	   since	   even	   a	   universal	   benefit	   requires	   that	   the	   potential	  beneficiaries	  take	  up	  the	  benefit.	  The	   most	   commonly	   used	   methods	   in	   CCT	   programs	   are	   geographic	   targeting	   and	   proxy	  means	   tests,	   usually	   used	   simultaneously	   (Fiszbein	   and	   Schady	   2009).	   A	   proxy	  means	   test	  refers	   to	   a	   targeting	  mechanism	   that	   is	   used	   to	  determine	   the	   socioeconomic	   situation	  of	   a	  household	  based	  on	  criteria	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  not	  purely	  income,	  but	  also	  observations	  of	  household	  characteristics	  such	  as	  observable	  assets,	  the	  location	  and	  quality	  of	  its	  dwelling,	  its	  ownership	  of	  durable	  goods,	  demographic	  structure	  of	   the	  household,	  and	   the	  education	  and,	   possibly,	   the	   professions	   of	   adult	   members.	   Using	   a	   proxy	   means	   test	   requires	   less	  information	  than	  true	  means	  testing,	  and	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  possibility	  of	  fluctuating	  household	  income	  levels.	  (Alvarez,	  Devoto	  &	  Winter	  2007.)	  For	  example,	  Oportunidades	  uses	  community-­‐level	   geographic	   targeting	   to	   minimize	   the	   errors	   of	   excluding	   the	   poor	   who	  should	   be	   eligible	   for	   the	   program	   as	   well	   as	   household-­‐level	   proxy-­‐means	   tests	   to	   limit	  including	   the	   non-­‐poor	   in	   the	   program.	   The	   targeting	   procedure	   begins	   by	   identifying	  marginalised	   communities	   using	   an	   index	   of	   marginality	   (see	   chapter	   4.1.1),	   which	   is	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  access	  to	  basic	  goods	  and	  services	  at	  the	  community	  level.	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The	   second	   step	   is	   to	   select	   households	   for	   participation	   based	   on	   data	   collected	   in	   a	  household	  census	  within	  the	  community.	  Observable	  household	  assets	  are	  used	  as	  indicators	  of	  relative	  wealth.	  A	  proxy	  means	  test	  is	  then	  calculated	  and	  households	  above	  a	  certain	  cut	  off	  point	  are	  considered	  eligible	  for	  the	  benefit	  (Alvarez	  et	  al.	  2007.)	  Even	  when	   there	   are	  multiple	   “filters”	   to	  determine	   the	   eligibility,	   sometimes	  non-­‐poor	   are	  included	  and	  poor	  are	  excluded.	  While	  conducting	  research	  on	  Oportunidades,	  Alvarez	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  found	  two	  factors	  that	  may	  result	  in	  an	  inclusion	  error	  and	  two	  that	  may	  result	  in	  an	  exclusion	  error.	  	  The	  first	  inclusion	  error	  was	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  wealth	  index	  is	  at	  best	  and	  approximation51	  of	  income	  and	  may	  allow	  the	  inclusion	  of	  non-­‐poor	  households.	  	  
The	   second	   inclusion	   error	   they	   found	   was	   related	   to	   the	   improvement	   of	   the	   household’s	  situation.	  The	  program	  had	  been	  running	   for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  so	  some	  of	   the	  households	  may	  have	  benefitted	  from	  the	  program	  in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  could	  be	  considered	  poor.	  
The	  first	  exclusion	  error	  was	  related	  to	  geographic	  targeting.	  When	  targeting	  the	  marginalised	  communities,	  the	  poor	  who	  happen	  to	  live	  in	  better	  off	  communities	  may	  have	  been	  missed,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  program.	  Alvarez	  et	  al.	  continue	  that	  new	  poor	  households	  may	  also	   form	   in	   communities	   after	   the	   beneficiaries	   have	   already	   been	   selected,	  meaning	   they	  have	  been	   left	  out.	  The	  second	  exclusion	  error	  had	  to	  do	  with	   the	  conditions	  of	   the	  program.	  Dropping	  out	  of	  the	  program	  may	  occur	  if	  the	  conditionalities	  place	  unreasonably	  high	  costs	  on	   the	   poor	   households,	   making	   them	   unable	   to	   receive	   the	   transfer,	   because	   they	   cannot	  meet	   the	   conditions,	   thus	   making	   the	   very	   households	   that	   the	   program	   tries	   to	   target	  ineligible.	  (ibid.)	  The	   universalism	   –	   targeting	   dichotomy	   can	   be	   challenging	   in	   practice.	   Bastagli	   (2009)	  concludes	  that	  the	  underlying	  motivation	  Bolsa	  Família	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  universalism,	  defined	  as	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	   income	  or	  consumption	  granted	  as	  a	  right	  by	   the	  state	   to	  all	  citizens	  and	   residents	  of	   a	   country	   (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990).	  However,	  Lindert	   et	   al.	   (2007)	  demonstrate	   that	   Bolsa	   Família	   is	   based	   on	   eligibility	   criteria	   and	   not	   ordering	   criteria,	  meaning	  that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  be	  eligible	   for	  Bolsa	  Família,	  but	  not	   included	   in	   the	  program.	  Lindert	   et	   al.	   refer	   to	  Medeiros,	   Britto	   and	   Soares	   (2008),	  who	   describe	  Bolsa	  Família	  as	   a	  quasi-­‐right,	   because	   of	   the	   eligibility	   criteria.	   In	   practice,	   new	   beneficiaries	   may	   not	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Although	  the	  World	  Bank	  refers	  to	  its	  objective	  nature	  as	  one	  of	  the	  strenghts	  of	  proxy	  means	  testing	  (Worldbank.	  Proxy	  Means	  Testing,	  Accessed	  3.3.2014).	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included	  if	  old	  beneficiaries	  do	  not	  leave	  the	  system.	  As	  the	  program	  guarantees	  rights-­‐based	  social	  assistance	   for	  all	  who	  meet	   the	  criteria,	   those	  who	  should	  be	   included	  based	  on	  their	  eligibility,	   but	   who	   are	   excluded	   based	   on	   the	   program	   being	   unable	   to	   absorb	   more	  beneficiaries	   until	   the	   old	   ones	   leave	   the	   program	   are	   prevented	   from	   exercising	   their	  citizenship	   rights.	   	  There	  have	  even	  been	   reports	  of	   families	   suing	   the	  government	  because	  they	  have	  been	  excluded,	  although	  they	  have	  been	  eligible,	  and	  winning.	  (ibid.)	  	  The	   critical	   commentators	   of	   CCTs	   often	  base	   their	   arguments	   on	   targeting	   and	   conditions,	  claiming	  that	  the	  programs	  are	  only	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  targeted	  residual	  safety	  nets	   	  (see	  Sojo	   2007,	   Lomelí	   2008).	   Narrowly	   targeted	   social	   policy	   interventions	   are	   seen	   as	   costly,	  difficult	   to	   administer,	   politically	   vulnerable	   and	   producing	   segmented,	   uncoordinated	  welfare	   systems	   (UNRISD	   2010).	   Additionally,	   targeting	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   stigmatic	   for	   the	  beneficiaries	   (Hanlon	   et	   al.	   2010,	   148),	   while	   means	   testing	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   to	  generate	  a	   lack	  of	  trust,	  social	  divisions	  and	  feelings	  of	  envy	  and	  exclusion	  among	  those	  not	  selected	  (Molyneux	  2007,	  27).	  
4.3.2	  The	  benefit	  One	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  separate	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  from	  the	  earlier	  safety	  nets	  is	  the	  fact	   that	   beneficiaries	   are	   receiving	   cash	   rather	   than	   in-­‐kind	   transfers.	   As	   has	   been	  demonstrated	   in	   chapter	   3.3,	   the	   move	   from	   in-­‐kind	   transfers	   to	   direct	   cash	   transfers	   is	  essentially	  a	  move	   from	  food	  stamps,	  vouchers	  and	  general	  subsidies	   to	  money.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  cash	  transfers	  as	  opposed	  to	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  cash	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  stimulating	  demand	   in	   the	   economy	   while	   providing	   means	   for	   investment	   and	   start	   up	   capital.	   Poor	  people	  spend	  their	  money	  locally,	  cash	  provides	  “a	  form	  of	  insurance”	  to	  allow	  the	  households	  to	  save,	  invest	  and	  take	  more	  risks	  regarding	  their	  livelihoods,	  because	  they	  can	  depend	  on	  a	  steady	   monetary	   transfer.	   (Hanlon	   et	   al.	   2010,	   31-­‐32.)	   Additionally,	   cash	   over	   in-­‐kind	  transfers	   give	   households	   discretion	   over	   the	   use	   of	   the	   benefit	   and	   avoids	   the	   creation	   of	  secondary	   markets	   and	   price	   distortions52 .	   This	   is	   more	   cost-­‐effective	   and	   allows	   the	  policymakers	  to	  adjust	  the	  level	  of	  transfer	  over	  time.	  (Rawlins	  2004,	  7.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Subsidizing	  a	  food	  item	  or	  providing	  it	  to	  the	  beneficiaries	  has	  the	  possible	  effect	  of	  altering	  maket	  prices	  for	  that	  (and	  other)	  food	  items	  (Rawlins	  2004),	  and	  the	  benefits	  do	  not	  necessarily	  go	  to	  those	  that	  need	  them,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Mexico	  prior	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  PROGRESA	  (Levy	  &	  Rodríguez	  2005).	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Allocating	   the	   benefit	   in	   cash	   instead	   of	   in-­‐kind	   transfers	   is	   an	   important	   element	   in	   the	  program	  design	   in	   terms	  of	   investments	   in	  education	  as	  well.	  The	  usual	   coping	  strategy	   for	  economic	   shocks	   among	   poor	   households	   is	   the	   intensification	   of	   female	   and	   children’s	  participation	   in	   the	   labour	   market.	   Both	   might	   end	   up	   leading	   to	   school	   drop-­‐outs,	   either	  because	  the	  child	  starts	  working	  to	  gain	  an	  extra	  income	  for	  the	  household	  or	  because	  older	  children	  must	   be	   pulled	   out	   of	   school	   to	   look	   after	   younger	   siblings	  while	   the	   parents	   are	  working	  (IDB	  2000;	  referenced	  in	  De	  Britto	  2004,	  8).	  If	  a	  household	  considers	  education	  to	  be	  of	   less	   importance	   than	   the	   child’s	   potential	   earnings,	   a	   household	  may	  make	   a	  decision	   to	  pull	  a	  child	  from	  school.	  This	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  term	  opportunity	  cost.	  In	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  child	  could	  either	  work	  or	  go	  to	  school,	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  going	  to	  school	  is	  the	  projected	  loss	  of	  earnings	  (Rawlins	  &	  Rubio	  2003).	  Going	  to	  school	  may	  be	  expensive,	  as	  there	  are	  direct	  costs	  to	  education,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  school	  fees,	  uniforms	  and	  supplies	  as	  well	  as	  transportation	  costs,	  which	  the	  poor	  households	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  cover,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  for	  going	  to	  school	  instead	  of	  working.	  To	  offset	  these	  costs,	  some	  programs	  have	  set	  the	  benefit	  to	  accommodate	  the	  direct	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  child	  schooling.	  In	  some	  countries	  the	  benefit	  is	  adjusted	  based	  on	  age	  and	  gender	  of	  the	  children/adolescents.	  In	  Mexico	  and	  Colombia	  the	  educational	  subsidies	  are	  notably	  higher	   from	  primary	   to	  secondary	  school,	  a	  stage	  where	  dropout	  rates	   increase	  (or	  continuation	  rates	  decrease)	  sharply.	  The	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  direct	  costs,	  may	  be	  higher	  for	  these	  older	  children	  due	  to	  increased	  school	  supplies	  and	  possible	  increase	  in	  earnings.	  (Handa	  and	  Davis	  2006;	  Rawlins	  &	  Rubio	  2003.)	  If	   the	  opportunity	   cost	  of	   schooling	   is	   compensated,	   the	  household	  does	  not	   lose	   the	   short-­‐term	  benefit	  that	  a	  child’s	  day’s	  work	  would	  provide,	  and	  the	  projected	  human	  capital	  gains	  from	  going	  to	  school	  instead	  of	  working	  improves	  the	  household’s	  economic	  situation	  in	  the	  long	   run.	   Thus	   the	   child	   who	   studies	   eventually	   enters	   the	   labour	   market	   in	   different	  conditions	  than	  her/his	  parents,	  and	  ends	  up	  breaking	  the	  intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  if	  the	  sole	  reason	  for	  the	  children	  not	  going	  to	  school	  to	  gain	  human	  capital	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  their	  poverty	  and	  the	  need	  to	  meet	  immediate	  needs,	  then	  no	   conditions	   would	   be	   needed	   to	   get	   them	   to	   attend	   class,	   simply	   compensating	   the	  opportunity	  cost	  would	  be	  sufficient.	  However,	   the	  cash	  transfer	  is	  conditional	  on	  children’s	  school	  attendance.	  This	  raises	  a	  question	  about	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  conditions.	  This	  question	  is	  further	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
	  	   55	  
4.4	  The	  conditions	  As	   the	  name	  of	   the	  benefit	   system	  suggests,	   the	  essential	  element	   in	   the	   idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  conditioned.	  Without	  conditions,	  the	  programs	  would	  be	  means	  tested	  social	  assistance	  programs	  –	  a	  targeted	  form	  of	  basic	  income.	  The	  conditions	  bridge	   the	   two	   objectives	   of	   alleviating	   poverty	   in	   the	   present	   and	   breaking	   the	  intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  in	  the	  future.	  Simply	  put,	  governments	  are	  paying	  people	  to	  take	   their	   children	   to	   school	   and	   health	   check	   ups.	   Conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   on	   human	  capital	  interventions	  raises	  interesting	  questions	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  steering	  people	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  policymakers	  wish	  them	  to	  act.	  All	  social	  assistance	  programs	   include	  conditions	   to	  an	  extent.	  All	  programs	  require	  at	   least	  some	   form	   of	   registration	   and	   registration	   requires	   registration	   documents.	   This	   condition	  alone	  can	  be	  problematic	   for	  potential	  applicants	   in	  developing	  countries.	  (Barrientos	  2011,	  16.)	   The	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   programs	   take	   conditionality	   further.	   In	   CCTs	   the	  beneficiaries	  must	   conform	   to	   certain	   predetermined	   requirements,	   usually	   regarding	   their	  children’s	   schooling,	   health	   and	   nutrition.	   Sometimes	   a	   component	   of	   information	  transmittance	  is	  added,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  passing	  information	  about	  proper	  nutrition	  and	  so	  on53.	  The	  most	  essential	  conditions	   for	   the	  program	  performance	  are	   the	  ones	  related	   to	  children’s	   schooling.	   	   At	   the	   individual	   level	   there	   is	   an	   interplay	   of	   characteristics	   that	  increase	  the	  possibilities	  of	  falling	  and	  remaining	  in	  poverty,	  with	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  having	  identified	   schooling	  as	   the	   strongest	   correlated	  variable	   (Behrman,	  Gaviria	  &	  Székely	  2001;	  CEPAL	  2002,	  fer:	  Handa	  &	  Davis	  2006).	  Conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   conditioned	   on	   certain	   kind	   of	   behaviour.	   Therefore	   the	  requirements	   should	   be	   viewed	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  what	   kind	   of	   behaviour	   is	   required	   and	  from	  whom?	  	  Two	  types	  of	  conditions	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  behavioural	  conditions	  in	  social	   assistance	   programs	   in	   a	   development	   context:	   1)	   work	   requirements	   (workfare	  programs)	   and	   2)	   human	   capital	   development	   conditions	   (Barrientos	   2011).	   Conditions	  regarding	   adult	   participation	   in	   workfare	   programs	   in	   exchange	   for	   minimum	   social	  assistance	  are	  based	  on	  different	  kind	  of	   theoretical	  principles	   than	  conditioning	  an	   income	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  An	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  sessions	  or	  activities	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Mexican	  program	  	  Oportunidades	  and	  are	  called	  Platícas	  (discussions),	  where	  information	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  groups	  of	  mothers.	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transfer	   on	   children’s	   school	   attendance.	   The	   work	   requirements	   treat	   market	   failure	   and	  alleviate	  poverty	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  Work	  requirements	  imply	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  in	  debt	  to	  society	   and	   must	   compensate	   the	   received	   assistance,	   thus	   echoing	   worry	   about	   welfare	  dependency.	   Conditioning	   a	   monetary	   transfer	   on	   developing	   the	   human	   capital	   of	   the	  beneficiary	   household’s	   children	   through	   school	   attendance	   proposes	   seemingly	   a	   much	  lighter	  set	  of	  conditions,	  but	  why	  is	  the	  cash	  transfer	  conditioned?	  If	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  school	  attendance	  were	  covered,	  why	  wouldn’t	  the	  poor	  take	  their	  children	  to	  school	  if	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest?	  Why	  not	  simply	  give	  money	  to	  the	  poor,	  as	  Hanlon	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  suggest?	  This	   chapter	   continues	   by	   outlining	   the	   rationale	   for	   conditions	   from	   four	   different	   angles,	  those	  of	  paternalism,	  social	  efficiency,	  rights	  and	  political	  economy.	  Finally,	  arguments	  against	  conditions	  are	  discussed.	  	  
4.4.1	  Paternalism	  The	   fact	   that	   a	   social	   assistance	   program	   is	   conditioned	   makes	   it	   paternalistic	   by	   default.	  Although	   paternalism	   usually	   evokes	   negative	   connotations	   all	   across	   the	   ideological	  spectrum	   for	   limiting	   the	   freedom	  of	   individuals,	   paternalism	  has	  been	  on	   the	   rise	   through	  increased	   influence	   of	   behavioural	   economics	   in	   social	   sciences	   (Standing	   2011).	   The	  argument	   for	   paternalism	   starts	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   human	   beings	   are	   not	   rational	  agents	  and	  might	  behave	  contrary	  to	  their	  own	  interests,	  thus	  it	   is	   justified	  to	  steer	  them	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  beneficial	  to	  them	  and	  to	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  a	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  Research	   Report	   (2009),	   Fiszbein	   and	   Schady	   conceptualise	   this	   argument	   as	   the	  
microfoundations	  of	  paternalism.	  The	  information	  that	  people	  hold	  about	  the	  expected	  returns	  of	   investments	   in	   health	   and	   education	   may	   be	   imperfect	   and	   persistent	   and	   result	   in	  shortsightedness	   (myopia)	   regarding	   decisions	   between	   short-­‐term	   and	   long-­‐term	   gains.	  Therefore,	  even	  if	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  going	  to	  school	  is	  covered,	  it	  is	  not	  guaranteed	  that	  a	  child	  attends	  class,	  because	   the	  parents	  may	  not	  value	  schooling,	   they	  might	  prefer	   to	   send	  boys	  to	  school	  but	  have	  girls	  do	  domestic	  work	  instead,	  or	  they	  might	  have	  some	  other	  reason	  to	  not	  consider	  education	  for	  their	  children	  to	  be	  important.	  There	  may	  also	  be	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  within	  households,	  either	  between	  parents	  or	  parents	  and	  their	  children.	  These	  conflicts	  may	  result	  in	  “incomplete	  altruism”	  i.e.	  parental	  decisions	  that	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  what	  the	  child	  would	  have	  chosen	  for	  him/herself.	  Fiszbein	  and	  Schady	   (2009)	   suggest	   that	   if	   the	   problem	   was	   only	   missing	   information	   on	   the	   positive	  returns	   from	   schooling,	   then	   providing	   the	   information	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   education	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directly	   could	   solve	   the	   problem.	   They	   point	   to	   two	   different	   situations	   where	   this	   is	   not	  possible	  though.	  First,	  incorrect	  beliefs	  may	  be	  self-­‐reinforcing.	  Second,	  people	  may	  not	  think	  they	   need	   information	   that’s	   been	   passively	   provided	   for	   them.	   If	   people	   hold	   misguided	  beliefs	   and	   the	   policymakers	   think	   they	   know	  better	  what	   is	   good	   for	   them,	   paternalism	   is	  justified.	  The	   behavioural	   conditionality	   is	   linked	   to	   behavioural	   economics	   and	   libertarian	  paternalism,	  which	   is	  based	  on	  a	  proposition	   that	  people	  will	  not	  make	  ”the	  right	  choice”	   if	  not	  steered	  to	  do	  so	  (Standing	  2011,	  27).	  The	  basic	  principle	  of	  libertarian	  paternalism	  is	  that	  people	   often	  make	   decisions	   that	   are	   not	   in	   their	   or	   their	   children’s	   best	   interest,	   so	   they	  should	  be	  steered	  to	  make	  better	  decisions	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  ”an	  architecture	  of	  choice”.	  The	  architecture	  of	  choice	  needs	  to	  be	  such	  that	  people	  are	  persuaded	  to	  make	  the	  choice	  the	  policymakers	  see	  as	  the	  ”correct	  one”.	  (ibid.)	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  advocates	  of	  ”nudging”	  people	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  beneficial	  to	  themselves	  and	  to	  the	  society,	  libertarian	  paternalism	  is	  an	  approach	  that	  preserves	  freedom	  of	  choice	  but	  that	  authorizes	  both	  private	  and	  public	  institutions	  to	  steer	  people	  in	  directions	  that	  will	  promote	  their	  welfare.	  This	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  realisation,	  based	  on	  research	  by	  psychologists	  and	  economists,	   that	  empirical	  evidence	  doesn’t	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  individuals	  make	  rational	  choices.	  (Thaler	  &	  Sunstein	  2002.)	  
4.4.2	  Social	  efficiency	  Conditionality	  has	  been	  justified	  as	  means	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  investment	  on	  human	  capital	  produces	   the	   desired	   results.	   The	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   society	   as	   a	  whole	  benefits	  from	  accumulated	  human	  capital	  and	  healthier	  population	  among	  other	  things,	  but	   people	  might	   not	   take	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   society	   into	   account	  while	  making	   decisions	  about	   children’s	   schooling	   and	   healthcare.	   Fiszbein	   and	   Schady	   (2009,	   64)	   refer	   to	   this	  justification	  as	  the	  social	  efficiency	  argument.	  It’s	  based	  on	  the	  realization	  that	  investments	  in	  human	  capital	  generate	  positive	  externalities.	  	  If	  parents	  do	  not	  take	  these	  into	  account	  when	  making	   decisions	   regarding	   their	   children’s	   education	   and	   healthcare,	   then	   the	   aggregate	  
(market	   equilibrium)	   level	   of	   human	   capital	   in	   society	   will	   be	   inefficiently	   low.	   Healthy	  population	   has	   positive	   side	   effects,	   while	   increased	   education	   results	   in	   increased	   human	  capital	   and	   could	   have	   spillover	   effects	   in	   reduction	   of	   crime,	   violence	   and	   related	   social	  issues.	  In	  itself,	  the	  fact	  that	  investments	  in	  human	  capital	  produce	  externalities	  is	  not	  enough	  to	   justify	   conditions.	   The	   underlying	   assumption	   here	   is	   justified	   earlier	   in	   relation	   to	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paternalism.	  The	  policymakers	  do	  not	  entirely	  trust	  the	  beneficiaries	  to	  generate	  these	  human	  capital	  externalities	  without	  steering	  them	  to	  do	  so	  through	  conditions.	  One	   element	   in	   considering	   externalities	   that	   conditioning	   might	   generate	   is	   related	   to	  socialisation	   of	   the	   beneficiaries.	   This	   argument	   for	   conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   could	   be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  cultural	  argument.	   In	  his	   influential	  book	  Beyond	  Entitlement,	   Lawrence	  Mead	  (1986)	  highlights	   the	  potential	   that	   social	  protection	  programs	  have	   in	  setting	  norms	  for	   the	   public	   functioning	   of	   citizens.	   He	   argues	   that	   paternalism,	   i.e.	   imposing	   conditions,	  should	  be	  used	  as	  means	  to	  instil	  shared	  values	  into	  the	  beneficiaries.	  He	  suggests	  that	  more	  authoritative	   social	   policy	   could	   provide	   means	   for	   socialisation.	   Referring	   to	   the	   United	  States,	  his	  basic	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  obligations	  and	  workfare	  requirements	  attached	  to	  welfare	   benefits	   in	   the	   U.S	   is	   a	  message	   undermining	   social	   integration	   and	  work	   ethic.	  Mead	  elaborates:	  “Even	  more	  than	  income	  and	  opportunity,	  they	  [the	  beneficiaries]	  need	  to	  face	  
the	   requirements,	   such	   as	  work,	   that	   true	   acceptance	   in	   American	   society	   requires.	   To	   create	  
those	   obligations,	   they	  must	   be	  made	   less	   free	   in	   certain	   senses	   rather	   than	  more.”	   (ibid.	   4.)	  Mead’s	  argument	  is	  consistent	  with	  libertarian	  paternalism	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  negative	  freedom54	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  normative	  principle	  that	  should	  be	  fostered,	  but	  this	  freedom	  can	  be	  tempered	  with	  if	  it	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  society	  at	  large55.	  	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  internalize	  the	  values	  of	  a	  given	  society,	  the	  beneficiaries	  need	  to	  be	  steered	  to	  do	  so.	  
4.4.3	  Rights	  Analysing	   conditionality	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   freedom	   evokes	   an	   interesting	   aspect	  regarding	  rights.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  conditions	  purely	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  state	  imposing	  something	   on	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   a	   CCT	   program,	   then	   we	   observe	   loss	   of	   freedom,	  paternalism	   and	   distrust	   in	   people.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   from	   a	   perspective	   emphasizing	  positive	  freedom,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  observe	  that	  the	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  the	  parents	  are	  in	  fact	   securing	   the	   citizenship	   rights	   of	   their	   children,	   their	   right	   to	   education,	   health	   and	  alimentation.	  The	  logic	  goes	  that	  limiting	  negative	  freedom	  in	  the	  present	  is	  justified	  if	  it	  leads	  to	   more	   positive	   freedom	   in	   the	   future	   via	   the	   obtained	   human	   capital	   enabling	   the	  beneficiary	  children	  more	  equal	  opportunities	  in	  a	  society.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  perspective	  when	  analysing	  the	  conditions.	  The	  conditions	  imposed	  on	  the	   beneficiaries,	   are	   in	   fact	   a	   guarantee	   of	   their	   children’s’	   right	   to	   education	   and	   health	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Used	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  defined	  by	  Isiah	  Berlin	  (1969).	  55	  Which	  effectively	  makes	  libertarian	  paternalism	  an	  oxymororon.	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services.	  This	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  means	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  parents	  might	  not	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  guarantees	   the	   children’s	   rights.	   In	   the	   developing	   world,	   many	   inequalities	   are	   inherited	  from	  ones’	  parents.	  In	  Latin	  America,	  poverty,	  as	  well	  as	  educational	  levels	  and	  occupational	  status	  are	  transmitted	  intergenerationally	  and	  social	  mobility	  is	  highly	  limited,	  with	  schooling	  being	   the	   strongest	   indicator	   of	   ones’	   future	   socioeconomic	   standing	   (Behrman,	   Gaviria	   &	  Székely	   2001).	   These	   are	   situations	   over	   which	   an	   individual	   has	   no	   control	   of,	   thus	   the	  conditions	   are	   imposed	   as	   a	   means	   to	   level	   the	   playing	   field	   in	   terms	   of	   guaranteeing,	   or	  outright	   forcing,	   the	   right	   to	   education	   and	   healthcare	   to	   those	   whose	   parents	   for	   some	  reason	  would	  not	  guarantee	   that	   right	   for	   them,	   thus	  guaranteeing	   that	   the	  children	  do	  not	  replicate	   their	  parents	  educational,	  occupational	  and	  socioeconomical	  status	  as	  an	   inherited	  condition.	  
4.4.4	  Political	  economy	  Public	   support	   for	   social	   protection	   programs	   is	   highly	   important	   for	   the	   politicians	   and	  policymakers.	   Non-­‐contributory	   social	   assistance	   programs	   are	   funded	   from	   general	   tax	  revenue,	   meaning	   the	   taxpayers	   are	   paying	   the	   social	   assistance	   of	   the	   beneficiaries,	   thus	  further	   emphasizing	   the	   need	   for	   policy	   legitimacy.	   In	   addition	   to	   seeing	   the	   behavioural	  conditions	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   social	   efficiency	   and	   rights,	   conditionality	   has	   been	  deemed	  as	  the	  component	  that	  legitimises	  CCTs	  by	  turning	  the	  undeserving	  poor	  to	  deserving	  poor	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  general	  public.	  	  Bastagli	  (2009)	  considers	  that	  some	  voters	  may	  object	  to	  unconditional	  “handouts”,	  but	  may	  be	  less	  averse	  to	  “rewards”	  to	  “deserving”	  poor	  people	  who	   are	   investing	   in	   the	   education	   of	   health	   of	   their	   children.	   In	   majority	   of	   the	   Latin	  American	  CCTs	  the	  rewarding	  of	  the	  deserving	  poor	  is	  done	  through	  a	  “contract”	  between	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  state/program.	  The	  notion	  that	  CCT	  programs	  constitute	  a	  new	  form	  of	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  beneficiaries	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  co-­‐
responsibilities	  instead	  of	  conditions	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009,	  60-­‐61).	  Fiszbein	  and	  Schady	  (2009,	  50)	  suggest	  that	  decisions	  regarding	  policymaking	  involve	  a	  lot	  of	  different	   actors	   and	   processes,	   and	   conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   on	   “good	   behaviour”	   may	  create	  the	  necessary	  amount	  of	  public	  support	  for	  the	  policy.	  They	  continue	  that	  conditional	  cash	   transfers	  may	  be	   seen	  as	  part	  of	   a	   social	   contract	  whereby	  society	   (through	   the	   state)	  supports	   those	   poor	   households	   that	   are	   ready	   to	  make	   the	   effort	   to	   “improve	   their	   lives”,	  thus	   making	   them	   the	   deserving	   poor.	   The	   experience	   from	   Brazil	   supports	   the	   view	   of	  conditions	   as	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   creating	   public	   support.	   Lindert	   and	  Vincencini	   report	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that	  human-­‐capital	  conditionalities	  have	  played	  a	  political	  role	  in	  enhancing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  cash	  transfers	  in	  public	  debate.	  	  
“This	  legitimizing	  role	  seems	  to	  derive	  from	  diverse	  views	  about	  the	  role	  of	  conditionalities	  
in	   the	   “social	   contract.”	   Specifically,	   they	   are	   viewed	   as	   promoting	   long-­‐run	   impacts,	  
establishing	   incentives	   for	   investments	   in	  human	  capital,	   building	   credibility	   for	   transfer	  
programs	  by	  reducing	  concerns	  about	  “assistencialismo”	  (welfare	  dependency,	  clientelism),	  
and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  helping	  the	  poor	  take	  up	  their	  basic	  citizens’	  rights	  to	  social	  services.	  
Without	  proper	  monitoring,	  however,	  that	  legitimacy	  can	  be	  called	  into	  question.”	   (2010,	  10.)	  
	  It	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   that	  besides	   giving	   the	   CCTs	   political	   legitimacy,	   conditioned	   cash	  transfers	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  less	  paternalistic	  than	  cash	  transfers	  without	  conditions	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009).	  The	  beneficiaries	  may	  feel	  that	  by	  complying	  with	  the	  requirements	  aimed	  at	  building	   human	   capital	   of	   their	   children,	   they	   are	   contributing	   to	   the	   society,	   instead	   of	  merely	  receiving	  “hand-­‐outs”.	  
4.4.5	  The	  arguments	  against	  conditions	  The	   critics	   of	   conditions	   argue	   that	   poor	   people	   are	   perfectly	   capable	   of	   making	   rational	  choices	  regarding	  their	  own,	  and	  their	  families,	  lives.	  The	  arguments	  against	  paternalism	  are	  essentially	   the	   same	   as	   the	   arguments	   supporting	   paternalism.	   The	   difference	   seems	   to	   be	  that	  the	  advocates	  of	  conditionality	  see	  paternalism	  as	  justified,	  whereas	  the	  critics	  consider	  paternalism	   to	   be	   categorically	   unethical.	   Hanlon,	   Barrientos	   and	   Hulme	   argue	   for	   simply	  giving	  money	  to	  the	  poor,	  no	  strings	  attached:	  
	  “Conditions	  exist	  because	  of	  an	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  assumption	  that	  poor	  people	  do	  not	  act	  in	  the	  
best	  interests	  of	  themselves	  and	  their	  children	  and	  must	  be	  pressured	  to	  do	  so”	  (2010,	  137).	  Guy	  Standing	  joins	  Hanlon	  et	  al.	  in	  criticizing	  the	  conditions.	  He	  claims	  that:	  	  ”Advocates	   of	   CCTs	   (henceforth,	   conditionalists)	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   persuade	  
people	   to	   behave	   responsibly,	   particularly	   towards	   their	   children	   …	   that,	   without	   being	  
pushed,	   people	   would	   choose	   to	   behave	   irresponsibly.	   Behind	   the	   conditionality	   lies	   the	  
simple	   premise	   that	   the	   policy	   makers	   know	   what	   is	   best	   for	   those	   targeted	   for	   cash	  
transfers.”	  (2011,	  18.)	  
	  	   61	  
Whether	   conditions	   are	   considered	   ethically	   sustainable	   or	   not,	   there	   are	   other	   factors	   to	  consider	   when	   making	   decisions	   regarding	   the	   requirements	   of	   CCTs.	   One	   element	   of	  conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   is	   that	  monitoring	   compliance	  with	   the	   conditions	   is	   relatively	  costly.	   For	   example,	   in	   Oportunidades	   monitoring	   conditionality	   represents	   about	   18	   per	  cent56	  of	  the	  total	  programme	  costs.	  Handa	  and	  Davis	  (2006)	  suggest	  that	  if	  conditionality	  is	  primarily	  viewed	  as	  a	  way	  of	  ensuring	  public	   support	   for	   the	  programs,	   then	  monitoring	  of	  compliance	   could	   be	   either	   eliminated	   or	   be	   done	   in	   the	   least-­‐costly	   manner.	   However,	  experience	  from	  Brazil	  implies	  otherwise.	  Lindert	  and	  Vincencini	  (2010,	  74)	  found	  that public	  debate	   about	   Bolsa	   Família	   emphasized	   not	   only	   the	   role	   of	   conditionalities	   in	   ensuring	  political	  support	  for	  the	  program,	  but	  also	  the	  need	  for	  credible	  monitoring	  of	  compliance	  to	  maintain	   that	   legitimacy. On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   conditions	   of	   Bolsa	   Familía	   are	   not	   as	  uncompromisingly	  monitored	  as	   in	  PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades	   for	  example.	  The	   compliance	  with	  the	  conditions	  is	  monitored,	  but	  in	  a	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  the	  program	  sends	  a	  social	  worker	  to	  help	  the	  household	  meet	  its	  commitments	  before	  taking	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  reducing	  and	  finally	  discontinuing	  the	  payment,	  whereas	   in	  P-­‐O	  non-­‐compliance	   leads	  to	  a	  decreased	  benefit	  and	  eventually	  suspension	  of	  the	  benefit	  entirely.	  (Barrientos	  2011.)	  Conditions	   also	   increase	   the	   administrative	   burden	   of	   CCT	   programs	   on	   teachers,	   parents,	  health	   care	  workers	   and	   other	   possible	   service	   providers	   (Hanlon	   et	   al.	   2010).	   The	   service	  providers	   play	   a	   key	   role	   regarding	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   programs.	   Achieving	   the	   human-­‐capital	  goals	  of	  CCT	  programs	  requires	  adaptation	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  services,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  this	   means	   that	   governments	   will	   have	   to	   provide	   services	   where	   there	   have	   been	   none	  before.	   In	  others,	   the	  quality	  of	   these	  services	  needs	   to	  be	   re-­‐examined.	  Some	  governments	  have	  responded	  by	  offering	  monetary	  incentives	  to	  providers	  of	  health	  and	  education	  services	  for	  good	  performance.	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009,	  24-­‐25.)	  This	  aspect	  is	  increasingly	  important	  since	  the	  results	  show	  that	  school	  enrolment	  has	  increased,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  better	  performance	   in	   the	   classroom.	  Although	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	   this	   is	   because	  of	   a	  lack	   of	   competent	   teachers,	   inadequate	   cognitive	   skills	   of	   the	   children	   who	   have	   suffered	  extreme	  poverty	  or	  lack	  of	  orientation	  into	  studying.	  (Hanlon	  et	  al.	  2010,	  316.)	  Fiszbein	  and	  Schady	  (2009)	  acknowledge	  that	  some	  economists	  might	  find	  conditions	  to	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  households.	  They	  suggest	  that	  economists	  could	  think	  that	  there	  may	  be	   two	   kinds	   of	   disadvantages	   in	   attaching	   conditions	   to	   cash	   transfers.	   First,	   some	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  In	  2006.	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households	  in	  most	  need	  might	  find	  the	  conditions	  too	  costly,	  say	  that	  they	  live	  too	  far	  away	  from	   the	   health	   clinic	   or	   they	   cannot	   afford	   to	   lose	   the	   work	   provided	   by	   their	   children.	  
Second,	  by	  pushing	  poor	  households	  to	  do	  something	  that	  they	  would	  not	  if	  not	  pushed	  could	  result	  in	  imposing	  costly	  distractions	  on	  people	  who	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  the	  best	  thing	  for	  their	  families.	  They	  might	  know	  how	  bad	  the	  local	  school	  is,	  so	  they	  find	  it	  better	  not	  to	  waste	  time	  there.	  One	  element	  of	  conditionalities	  remains	  a	  question	  mark:	  are	  the	  conditions	  really	  needed	  to	  achieve	   the	   human	   capital	   gains	   that	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   set	   out	   to	   achieve?	   Is	   the	  human	   capital	   of	   the	   children	   increasing?	   Unfortunately	   there	   are	   very	   few	   unconditional	  income	   transfer	   programmes,	   so	   a	   comparative	   perspective	   between	   conditional	   and	  unconditional	   programmes	   is	   not	   possible.	   The	   arguments	   promoting	   conditions	   and	   the	  arguments	   promoting	   unconditionality	   are	   more	   or	   less	   entirely	   based	   on	   theoretical	   and	  ideological	  preference	  and	  slight	  empirical	  hints.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  PROGRESA-­‐Oportunidades,	  De	  Brauw	   and	  Hoddinott	   (2007)	   found57	  that	   conditions	   had	   no	   effect	   regarding	   enrolment	   in	  primary	   school.	   However,	   conditions	   had	   considerable	   impact	   in	   terms	   of	   entry	   into	   lower	  secondary	   school.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   sample	   size	   in	   the	   study	  was	  not	   large	  enough	   to	  draw	  far-­‐reaching	   conclusions.	   The	   basic	   income	   experiments	   in	   Namibia	   and	   India	   have	   given	  promising	  results,	  but	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  experiments	  is	  not	  comparable	  to	  national	  CCTs.	  	  The	  South	   African	   Child	   Support	   Grant	   was	   an	   unconditional	   means	   tested	   income	   transfer	   to	  households	  with	  children	  up	  to	  17	  years	  of	  age	  with	  specific	  policy	  commitment	  not	  to	  attach	  any	  behavioural	  requirements,	  and	  the	  evaluations	  gave	  positive	  results	  on	  school	  attendance.	  Yet	  in	  2010	  the	  program	  introduced	  conditions	  on	  children’s	  education.	  (Lund	  2011.)	  By	  the	  time	  of	   this	   research	  no	  data	   from	  a	  possible	  behavioural	   change	  had	  been	  published	   from	  South	  Africa..	  	  
4.5	  The	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  
This	  chapter	  has	  explored	  the	  origins	  and	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  The	  aim	  has	  been	  to	  unpack	  some	  the	  underlying	  theories	  and	  assumptions	  behind	  the	  design	  features	  of	   the	  policy	  solution.	  CCT	   is	  a	  hybrid	  social	  policy	   idea	   that	  combines	  rights	  based	  social	  protection,	  cost-­‐effective	  targeted	  social	  protection	  and	  economically	  productive	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  The	  study	  was	  conducted	  using	  a	  group	  of	  PROGRESA	  beneficiaries	  who	  accidentally	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  form	  needed	  to	  monitor	  their	  children’s	  attendance	  at	  school	  as	  a	  peer	  group.	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protection	   based	   on	   social	   investments.	   This	   combination	   has	   appealed	   to	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  political	   actors	   and	   policymakers	   across	   Latin	   America	   and	   is	   being	   exported	   to	   other	  developing	   regions.	   In	   explicit	   terms	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   provide	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  problem	   of	   persistent	   poverty,	   understood	   as	   a	   problem	   that	   is	   transmitted	  intergenerationally	   from	   parents	   to	   their	   children.	   CCTs	   provide	   a	   cash	   transfer	   to	   reduce	  poverty	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  condition	  that	  transfer	  to	  behaviour	  that	  is	  thought	  to	  break	  the	  intergenerational	   cycle	   of	   poverty.	   It	   has	   been	   claimed	   that	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   have	  become	   the	   prevailing	   idea	   on	   the	   anti-­‐poverty	   and	   development	   agenda.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	  chapter	   is	   to	   summarize	   the	   key	   findings	   regarding	   the	   policy	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	  transfers	  and	  exploring	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  idea	  so	  appealing.	  
4.5.1	  The	  centre	  of	  gravity	  How	  policies	   are	  perceived	  depends	  on	   the	   context	   in	  which	  we	  view	   them.	  The	   shift	   from	  
keynesianism	   to	   neoliberalism	   tilted	   the	   ideological	   centre	   of	   gravity	   radically	   from	   left	  (understood	   here	   as	   keynesianism)	   to	   right	   (understood	   here	   as	   neoliberalism),	   thus	  changing	  the	  way	  social	  policy	  and	  social	  protection	  was	  viewed	  in	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	   international	   financial	   institutions.	   The	   centre	   of	   gravity,	   i.e.	   the	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  conditional	  cash	  transfers,	  was	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  non-­‐contributory	  social	   assistance	   component	   was	   absent	   from	   national	   social	   protection	   strategies,	   as	   only	  residual,	   clientelistic	   and	   short-­‐term	   ”emergency”	   assistance	   existed.	   Therefore,	   in	  contextualizing	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  as	  a	  policy,	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  should	  not	  be	  the	  Scandinavian	  welfare	  state	  or	  a	  universal	  basic	  income	  framework,	  but	  the	  present	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  policy	  is	  implemented.	  In	  other	  words:	  	  
“The	  counterfactual	   to	  a	  CCT	   is	  not	  an	  automatic,	   transparent,	  unconditional	  cash	  grant	  
seen	   as	   a	   citizen’s	   entitlement	   …	   but	   instead	   a	   myriad	   of	   ad	   hoc	   and	   mostly	   in-­‐kind	  
transfers,	   intermediated	   through	   various	   service	   providers,	   nongovernmental	  
organizations,	  and	  local	  governments”	  (Fiszbein	  &	  Schady	  2009,	  63).	  Against	   this	   background,	   CCTs	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   step	   towards	   a	  more	   universal	   and	   rights-­‐based	   provision	   by	   filling	   a	   vacuum	   in	   the	   overall	   social	   policy	   scheme.	   With	   the	   social	  protection	   component	   relying	   on	   contributory	   social	   insurance	   and,	   until	   the	   recent	  developments,	  the	  social	  assistance	  instruments	  being	  highly	  residual	  and	  based	  on	  workfare	  and	   in-­‐kind	   transfers,	   the	   CCTs	   add	   a	   missing	   component	   to	   the	   overall	   scheme.	   The	  developments	  during	   the	  past	   two	  decades	   	   (see	   chapter	  3)	  have	   recalibrated	   the	   centre	  of	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gravity	  to	  a	  direction	  where	  the	  state	  action	  in	  the	  social	  sphere	  is	  re-­‐legitimized,	  but	  focused	  on	   productive	   ”investments”.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   accumulating	   human	   capital	   through	   state	  imposed	  conditions	  brings	  up	  an	  interesting	  angle	  to	  problem	  definition,	  i.e.	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  poverty.	  
4.5.2	  The	  root	  causes	  of	  poverty	  Human	   agency	   and	   structure	   are	   essential	   points	   of	   departure	   in	   examining	   a	   social	   policy	  idea.	   Intergenerational	  poverty	  has	  been	   identified	  as	   the	  explicit	  problem	   that	  needs	   to	  be	  solved	   and	   the	   means	   for	   solving	   the	   problem	   depend	   on	   how	   the	   problem	   is	   conceived.	  	  Theories	   of	   poverty	   usually	   approach	   poverty	   as	   a	   result	   of	   either	   individual	   or	   structural	  failings.	  Social	  policy	  used	  to	  focus	  on	  structure,	  which	  resulted	  in	  looking	  for	  the	  causes	  for	  social	  problems	  in	  economic	  institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  labour	  market),	  social	  institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  welfare	  state)	  and	  political	  institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  government).	  Through	  this	  type	  of	  analysis	  poverty	  would	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  resulting	  from	  inequalities	  in	  the	  social	  structure.	  Attributing	  cause	  for	  social	  problems	  or	  peoples’	  situations	  to	  people	  themselves	  was	  seen	  as	  ”blaming	  the	  victim”.	  (Deacon	  and	  Mann,	  1999.)	  Through	  this	  kind	  of	  understanding	  poverty	  is	   seen	   as	   resulting	   from	   structural	   causes.	   Unjust	   society	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   economic	  opportunities	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  causes	  for	  poverty.	  A	   revival	   of	   interest	   on	   human	   agency	   changed	   the	   focus	   from	   structure	   to	   individual	  behaviour	   and	   choices	   (Deacon	   and	  Mann	  1999).	   This	   shift	   involved	   an	   increased	   focus	   on	  welfare	   dependency	   and	   the	   aim	   of	   changing	   people’s	   behaviour	   instead	   of	   focusing	   on	  responding	  to	  poverty	  and	  inequality	  through	  changing	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources.	  (Deacon	  and	   Mann	   1999,	   423.)	   Placing	   more	   emphasis	   on	   individual	   responsibility,	   behaviour	   and	  choices	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ”new	  social	  policy”	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Molyneux	  2007).	  	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  unemployment,	  and	  therefore	  poverty,	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  individual’s	  lack	  of	   skills	   to	   compete	   in	   the	   labour	  market,	   not	   from	   inequalities	   in	   the	   labour	  market	   itself.	  	  However,	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   ”new	   social	  policy”,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  social	  investment	  perspective.	  This	  implies	  that	  state	  action	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  social	  protection	  is	  legitimized	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  change	  individual	  behaviour	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  society	  as	  well	  as	  addressing	  some	  structural	   inequalities	  in	  the	  name	  of	  rights,	  such	  as	  children	  inheriting	  persistent	  and	  structural	  poverty	  from	  their	  parents.	  On	   one	   hand,	   the	   interest	   in	   human	   agency	   and	   the	   aim	   to	   change	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	  beneficiaries	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  distrust	  in	  people	  in	  managing	  their	  own	  situations,	  but	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on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  social	  contract	  based	  on	  co-­‐responsibilities	  engages	  the	  beneficiaries	  in	  managing	   their	   own	   situations.	   This	   again	   uncovers	   an	   understanding,	   that	   if	   people	   are	  steered	   in	   the	  right	  direction	  (by	  conditions)	   their	  situations	  will	   change.	  Children	  will	  gain	  human	  capital	  and	  move	  out	  of	  poverty.	  According	  to	  this	  view	  people	  are	  not	  inherently	  lazy	  or	   low	   talented,	   and	  can	  be	   “taught”	   to	  behave	  properly.	  This	  echoes	   the	  early	  20th	   century	  ethos	   of	   nation-­‐building	   through	   “enlightenment	   of	   the	   people”,	   that	   in	   Finland	  manifested	  itself	  in	  many	  women’s	  organizations	  that	  aimed	  at	  educating	  the	  people,	  expecting	  the	  people	  to	  change	  according	  to	  the	  information	  provided	  (Sulkunen1986).	  
4.5.3	  Rights	  perspective	  and	  the	  economic	  perspective	  The	  intergenerational	  poverty	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  violation	  of	  basic	  citizenship	  rights,	  as	  the	  Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   does	   (UN	   General	   Assembly	   1948).	   It	   states	   that	  everyone,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  society,	  has	  the	  right	  to	  social	  security58,	  to	  social	  protection59,	  and	  that	  everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  a	  standard	  of	   living	  adequate	  for	  the	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  himself	   and	  of	   his	   family,	   including	   food,	   clothing,	   housing	   and	  medical	   care	   and	  necessary	  social	   services,	   and	   the	   right	   to	   security	   in	   the	   event	   of	   unemployment,	   sickness,	   disability,	  widowhood,	  old	  age	  and	  other	   lack	  of	   livelihood	   in	  circumstances	  beyond	  her/his	  control60.	  	  The	  choice	  of	  supporting	  people	  living	  in	  poverty	  financially	  to	  guarantee	  their	  basic	  rights	  is	  a	   choice	   reflecting	   the	   normative	   understanding	   that	   poverty	   is	   wrong	   because	   poverty	  results	   in	  people	  not	  being	  able	  to	   fulfil	   these	  basic	  necessities.	  Although	  CCTs	  are	  targeted,	  they	  generally	  provide	  a	  benefit	  to	  all	  below	  a	  certain	  income	  limit	  regardless	  of	  their	  current	  or	  past	   labour	  market	  participation	  or	  whether	   they	  have	   children	  or	  not.	  As	  Franzoni	   and	  Voorend	  note,	  the	  formation	  of	  human	  capital	  could	  appeal	  to	  supporters	  of	  universal	  social	  policy	  as	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  necessary	  step	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  right	  (2011,	  281).	  Second,	  intergenerationally	  transmitted	  poverty	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  economic	  issue.	  The	  fact	  that	   the	   state	   considers	   that	   it	   should	   guarantee	  basic	   rights	   to	   the	   citizens	  means	   that	   the	  poor	  need	  to	  be	  financially	  supported.	  The	  more	  there	  are	  people	  living	  in	  poverty,	  the	  more	  money	   needs	   to	   be	   spent.	   Therefore	   poverty	   needs	   to	   be	   reduced	   in	   order	   to	   relieve	   the	  financial	   burden	   on	   the	   state	   and	   to	   guarantee	   basic	   citizenship	   rights.	   Conditional	   cash	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Article	  22.	  59	  Article	  23.	  60	  Article	  25.	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transfers	   are	   designed	   to	   do	   just	   that,	   while	   cash	   transfers	   in	   general	   contribute	   to	   the	  economy	  directly	  in	  the	  form	  of	   increased	  immediate	  consumption	  and	  through	  the	  positive	  externalities	   of	   increased	  human	   capital	   in	   the	   future	   (Hanlon	   et	   al.	   2010).	   In	   other	  words,	  lack	  of	  human	  capital	   is	   identified	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  poverty	  that	  repeats	   itself	   from	  one	  generation	   to	   another.	   The	   focus	   on	   human	   capital	   accumulation	   links	   CCTs	   to	   the	   social	  investment	  perspective.	  In	  order	  to	  decrease	  the	  financial	  burden	  in	  the	  future	  by	  having	  less	  people	   dependent	   on	   the	   state	   and	   by	   having	   a	   more	   skilled	   workforce,	   the	   state	   invests	  money	   on	   the	   poor	   households,	   so	   that	   the	   children	   of	   those	   households	   would	   generate	  positive	  returns	  by	  not	  replicating	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  parents.	  The	  income	  transfer	  to	  the	  poor	   becomes	   a	   social	   investment	   by	   conditioning	   the	   transfer	   to	   increasing	   the	   human	  capital	  of	  the	  beneficiary	  household’s	  children.	  As	   demonstrated	   in	   chapter	   3.3,	   Rawlins	   and	   Rubio	   (2003,	   3)	   state	   that	   conditional	   cash	  transfers	   represent	   a	  marked	   departure	   from	   the	   traditional	   supply-­‐side	  mechanisms.	   While	  this	  is	  the	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  direct	  cash	  transfer	  as	  opposed	  to	  social	  spending	  centred	  on	  schools	  and	  health	  services,	  CCTs	  nevertheless	  contain	  an	  important	  supply-­‐side	  mechanism	  in	   terms	   of	   the	   labour	   market.	   By	   investing	   in	   the	   human	   capital	   of	   the	   beneficiary	  household’s	  children,	  the	  state	  is	  implicitly	  increasing	  the	  labour	  supply	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  through	  education	  and	  better	  health,	  the	  children	  will	  be	  more	  skilled	  and	  will,	  for	  one,	  enter	  the	  formal	  labour	  market	  in	  the	  future	  and	  do	  so	  with	  an	  increased	  skill	  set.	  
4.5.4	  The	  social	  contract	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   innovative	   aspect	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   regarding	   the	   political	  legitimacy	   of	   the	   programs	   is	   that	   the	   programs	   have	  managed	   to	   frame	   the	   rather	   simple	  arrangement	  of	  receiving	  cash	  and	  keeping	  the	  children	  at	  school	  and	  taking	  them	  to	  a	  health	  clinic	  once	  in	  a	  while,	  to	  represent	  a	  new	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  citizens.	  From	  a	  more	  universalistic	  (and	  perhaps	   leftist)	  perspective	  CCTs	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  residual	  and	   paternalistic	   safety	   nets	   (see	   Lomelí	   2008;	   Standing	   2011)	   representing	   neoliberal	  prescriptions	  of	  privatization,	  decentralization	  and	  targeted	  measures.	  From	  a	  point	  of	  view	  emphasizing	   individual	   responsibility	   and	   limited	   state	   action	   regarding	   social	   protection	  (perhaps	  the	  neoliberal	  and	  right-­‐wing	  perspective),	  CCTs	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  too	  generous	  and	  creating	   distorting	   labour	   incentives	   and	   welfare	   dependency.	   However,	   CCTs	   manage	   to	  appeal	   to	   both	  perspectives.	  Manifested	   in	   the	  use	   of	   the	   term	   co-­‐responsibilities,	   the	   social	  contract	  places,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  equal	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  on	  the	  beneficiaries	  as	  well	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as	  the	  state,	  thus	  managing	  to	  emphasize	  the	  rights	  enough	  to	  be	  attractive	  to	  the	  advocates	  of	  more	   universal	   and	   inclusive	   social	   protection,	   and	   the	   responsibilities	   enough	   to	   be	  attractive	  to	  those	  that	  consider	  that	  social	  assistance	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  considered	  the	   deserving	   poor.	   Through	   different	   lenses,	   different	   meanings	   can	   be	   attached	   to	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs.	  Although	   CCT	   implementation	   has	   taken	   place	   in	   countries	   from	   left	   to	   right,	   the	   socialist	  countries	  Venezuela	  and	  Cuba	  have	  not	  adopted	  them	  and	  the	  Bolivian	  program	  differs	  from	  the	   “basic”	   CCT	   model	   in	   that	   although	   it	   is	   conditioned	   on	   school	   attendance,	   it	   is	  categorically	  targeted	  to	  all	  children	  attending	  public	  schools	  up	  to	  grade	  six,	  which	  makes	  it	  practically	  universal.	  	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  CCTs,	  although	  implemented	  by	  various	  centre-­‐left	  governments,	  are	  too	  reliant	  on	  “market	  principles”	  (see	  Rawlins	  &	  Rubio	  2003,	  3)	  to	  be	  embraced	   by	   socialist	   countries.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   even	   though	   CCTs	   are	   consistent	  with	  market	  principles	  and	  the	  “new	  social	  policy”	  (Molyneux	  2007),	  they	  have	  been	  established	  by	  a	   large	   number	   of	   progressive	   governments	   critical	   and	   eager	   to	   undermine	   neoliberal	  reforms	  (Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  2011,	  292).	  Lindert	   and	   Vincencini	   (2010,61)	   elaborate	   that	   in	   Brazil,	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	  transfers	   has	   been	   embraced	   across	   the	   political	   spectrum;	   however,	   the	   rhetoric	   among	  politicians,	  academics	  and	  journalists	  in	  public	  debate	  emphasizes	  differing	  views	  of	  the	  role	  CCTs	  play	   in	   the	   social	  contract	   in	   society.	   From	  one	  perspective,	   its	   been	   emphasized	   that	  society	  holds	  a	  historical	  debt	  to	  the	  poor	  and	  state	  led	  social	  assistance	  is	  needed	  to	  pay	  that	  debt.	  According	  to	  this	  view	  conditionalities	  help	  the	  poor	  take-­‐up	  their	  basic	  universal	  rights	  to	  education	  and	  health,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  CCTs	  help	  break	  the	  inter-­‐generational	  transmission	  of	   poverty	   in	   a	   structural	   manner.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   others	   have	   emphasized	   the	  responsibility	  of	   the	  beneficiaries	   themselves	   in	  overcoming	  poverty.	  From	   this	  perspective	  conditionalities	  are	  seen	  as	  “contracts”	  or	  “incentives”	  that	  go	  beyond	  simple	  “cash	  handouts”	  by	  requiring	  the	  poor	  to	  do	  their	  part	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  improve	  their	  lives	  by	  investing	  in	  their	  children’s	  education	  and	  health,	  and	  by	  doing	  so	  break	  the	  intergenerational	  transmission	  of	  poverty	  –	  or	  face	  penalties.	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   cash	   transfer	   is	   conditioned	  may	   appeal	   to	   the	   right	   as	  making	   the	   poor	  responsible	   for	   their	   situation,	   whereas	   the	   left	   might	   see	   that	   the	   conditions	   protect	   the	  rights	  of	  the	  children	  and	  levels	  the	  playing	  field	  for	  them	  in	  the	  future.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	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right	  might	  see	  the	  targeting	  a	  cost-­‐efficient	  way	  to	  reward	  the	  deserving	  poor,	  whereas	  the	  left	  might	  see	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  programs	  as	  representing	  inclusive	  non-­‐contributory	  provision.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  hybrid	  social	  protection	  instruments	  consistent	  with	   “market	   principles”	   (Rawlins	   &	   Rubio	   2003)	   and	   “new	   social	   policies”	   based	   on	  neoliberal	  prescriptions	  (Molyneux	  2007),	  while	  simultaneously	  “symbolically	  embedded	  in	  a	  rights-­‐based	   framework”	   (Fenwick	   2013,	   148)	   and	  promoting	   social	   investments	   in	   human	  capital.	   Depending	   on	   the	   context,	   each	   aspect	   could	   be	   emphasized	   in	   legitimizing	   a	   CCT	  politically,	  thus	  making	  them	  potentially	  appealing	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political	  actors.	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5	  Case	  Argentina	  
This	   thesis	   represents	   primarily	   a	   theoretical	   policy	   study	   tradition,	   where	   a	   case	   study	   is	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  concrete	  and	  more	  micro-­‐perspective	  to	  the	  theme	  for	  research.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  studied	  idea	  is	  manifested	  in	  concrete	  terms.	  The	  mission	  is	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  study	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  and	  examine	  how	  a	  particular	  conditional	  cash	   transfer	  program	  came	  to	  be	   implemented,	  while	  accounting	   for	   the	  policy	  solution	  in	  more	  detail.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  case	  study	  research	  strategy	  and	  a	  description	  of	  how	  the	  case	  study	  was	  conducted.	  I	  continue	  by	  outlining	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  program	  Ciudadania	   Porteña	   –	   Con	   Todo	   Derecho	   (CP)	   was	   created	   by	   providing	   an	   overview	   of	  Argentinian	   social	   policy	   and	   social	   protection,	   then	   continuing	   to	   the	   political	   background	  and	  context	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  launching	  of	  CP.	  The	  latter	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  deal	  with	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  as	  a	  policy	  solution	  and	  takes	  a	  look	  at	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  in	  Buenos	  Aires.	  
5.1	  How	  was	  Ciudadañia	  Porteña	  studied	  as	  a	  case	  Laine,	  Bamberg	   and	   Jokinen	   (2007)	  describe	   case	   study	   research	   as	   a	   research	   strategy.	   	  A	  case	   study	   is	   a	   particular	  way	   of	   doing	   research,	   not	   a	  methodology	   in	   itself.	   A	   case	   study	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  research	  strategy,	  which	  can	  consist	  of	  various	  research	  methods	  and	  materials.	  As	  a	  research	  strategy,	  case	  study	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  objective	  to	  depict	  the	  studied	  phenomenon	   comprehensively.	   Based	   on	   existing	   literature	   Laine,	   Bamberg	   and	   Jokinen	  (2007)	   state	   that	   most	   case	   studies	   could	   be	   characterized	   by:	   1)	   Their	   holistic	   nature,	  meaning	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  subject	  2)	  Having	  interest	  in	  social	  processes	  3)	  The	  use	   of	   various	  methods	   and	   data	   sources	   4)	   The	   use	   of	   earlier	   research	   5)	   The	   ambiguity	  between	  the	  case	  and	  the	  context.	  Hartley	  crystallizes	  this	  in	  stating	  that:	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  “Case	   study	   research	   consists	   of	   detailed	   investigation,	   often	  with	   data	   collected	   over	   a	  
period	  of	  time,	  of	  phenomena,	  within	  their	  context.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
context	  and	  processes,	  which	  illuminate	  the	  theoretical	  issues	  being	  studied.	  In	  a	  case	  study	  
the	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  isolated	  from	  its	  context	  but	  is	  of	  interest	  precisely	  because	  the	  aim	  
is	   to	   understand	   how	   behaviour	   and/or	   processes	   are	   influenced	   by,	   and	   influence	   that	  
context.”	  (2004,	  324.)	  In	  using	  case	  study	  as	  a	  research	  strategy,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  context	  and	  how	  the	   studied	   phenomenon	   fits	   in	   it.	   Eräsaari	   (2007,	   149)	   suggests	   that	   understanding	   a	  phenomenon	  contextually	  means	  that	  it	  is	  pertinent	  to	  a	  certain	  context	  or	  a	  result	  of	  a	  certain	  chain	   of	   events	   and	   that	   this	   connection	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   account	  when	   analysing	   the	  phenomenon.	  The	  essential	  thing	  is	  that	  the	  description	  is	  not	  assumed	  to	  portray	  universal	  causalities,	   but	   to	   describe	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   its	   local	   context	   (Alasuutari	   1999),	   and	   the	  basis	  for	  describing	  a	  phenomenon	  locally	  is	  to	  connect	  it	  to	  a	  wider	  framework.	  Another	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  context	  is	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  case	  and	   the	  object	   of	   study.	  Empirical	   research	   is	   always	   research	  about	   a	   case,	   but	   the	  case	   in	  case	   study	   differs	   from	   typical	   empirical	   research	   in	   that	   it	   usually	   refers	   to	   a	   specific	  organisation,	  community,	  a	  city,	  a	  state,	  a	  civilization,	  a	  household,	  course	  of	  events	  or	  even	  an	  individual.	   For	   example,	   when	   evaluating	   the	   impacts	   of	   a	   basic	   income	   grant	   initiative	   in	  India61,	   the	   research	   team	   conducted	   case	   studies	   at	   the	   village	   and	   household	   levels.	   To	  comprehensively	  analyse	  the	  effects	  that	  the	  basic	  income	  grant	  had	  in	  the	  municipalities	  in	  which	   it	  was	   implemented,	   the	   researchers	   conducted	   case	   studies	  where	   an	   entire	   village	  was	  the	  case	  and	  others	  where	  a	  household	  was	  the	  case,	  while	  the	  object	  of	  research	  in	  both	  cases	  were	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  basic	  income	  grant.	  (Dawala	  2014.)	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  case	  and	  the	  object	  of	  the	  research.	  The	  object	  refers	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  the	  
case	   represents,	   while	   the	   case	   is	   a	   case	   of	   something.	   Laine	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   describe	   this	  difference	  using	  John	  Walton’s	  (1992,	  ref:	  Laine	  et	  al.)	  case	  study	  as	  an	  example.	  Walton’s	  case	  was	  a	  peasant	  rebellion	  in	  California	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  while	  the	  object	  of	  his	  study	  was	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  the	  local	  authorities	  and	  the	  civil	  society.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  case	  works	  as	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  a	  certain	  phenomenon	  (Peltola	  2007).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  A	  basic	  income-­‐project	  organized	  by	  India’s	  Self	  Employed	  Women’s	  Association	  (SEWA).	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A	  researcher	  conducting	  a	  case	  study	  often	  makes	  use	  of	  various	  methods,	  perspectives	  and	  sources	   of	   data.	   The	   strategy	   of	   collecting	   various	   forms	   of	   data	   in	   various	  ways	   has	   been	  described	  as	   triangulation.	   Laine	  et	  al.	   (2007)	  differentiate	  between	  data-­‐,	  method-­‐,	   theory-­‐	  and	   researcher	   triangulation	   in	   case	   study	   research	  meaning	   that	   the	   studied	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  approached	  using	  a	  number	  of	  different	  types	  of	  data,	  different	  methods	  to	  analyse	  that	  data,	  varying	   theoretical	   frameworks	  and	  concepts	  and/or	  various	  researchers	  studying	   the	  phenomenon	   from	   different	   perspectives.	   The	   data	   and	   method	   triangulation	   are	  interconnected	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  used	  methods	  determine	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   methods	   naturally	   require	   different	   data	   and	   different	  approaches.	  As	  in	  all	  social	  science	  research,	  the	  researchers	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  and	  its	  phenomena	   directs	   the	   way	   a	   case	   study	   is	   carried	   out.	   	   Therefore	   the	   choices	   in	   data,	  methods	   and	   theory	   are	   essentially	  questions	  of	   philosophy	  of	   science	   (Häikiö	  &	  Voionmaa	  2007,	  45).	  	  Researchers	  are	  not	  just	  recording	  the	  reality	  objectively;	  what	  we	  know	  is	  shaped	  and	  moulded	  while	  we	  investigate	  (Cosgrove	  &	  Domosh	  1993,	  ref:	  Häikiö	  &	  Voionmaa	  2007).	  The	   theoretical	   framework	   chosen	   before	   or	   during	   the	   research	   shapes	   the	   knowledge	  sought	  through	  a	  case	  study,	  while	  the	  option	  of	  using	  a	  certain	  theoretical	  framework	  differs	  according	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  studied	  and	  the	  research	  questions	  used	  (Peuhkuri	  2007,	  147).	  As	  is	  common	  in	  a	  case	  study	  research	  strategy,	  I	  collected	  my	  data	  in	  several	  different	  ways.	  I	  was	   interested	   in	   the	   way	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   communicates	   its	   goals	   and	   outlines	   of	   the	  program,	   therefore	   the	  website	   of	   CP	  was	   chosen	   as	   one	   of	   the	  main	   sources	   of	   data.	   The	  second	  primary	  source	  of	  data	  consists	  of	   two	   interviews	  conducted	  with	  1)	   the	  director	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  Pablo	  Pucciarelli	  and	  2)	  the	  former	  co-­‐director	  and	  the	  coordinator	  of	  the	  Information,	   Monitoring	   and	   Evaluation	   Unit	   of	   the	   Buenos	   Aires	   Ministry	   of	   Social	  Development,	   Irene	  Novacovsky.	   I	  also	  approached	   the	  program	  by	  e-­‐mail	  asking	  whether	   I	  could	   do	   volunteer	   work	   for	   them	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	  program	  works,	  and	  was	  warmly	  welcomed	  to	  do	  so.	  I	  ended	  up	  spending	  two	  months	  not	  so	  much	  working,	  but	  observing	  and	  asking	  questions	  from	  the	  workers	  and	  the	  management	  at	  the	  CP	  main	  office	  in	  Buenos	  Aires.	  The	  participant	  observation	  accounts	  as	  one	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  data.	  Finally,	  as	  is	  common	  with	  case	  studies,	  earlier	  research62	  is	  used	  to	  account	  for	  the	  studied	  phenomenon.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Although	  very	  little	  research	  exists	  on	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	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The	  actual	  fieldwork	  at	  the	  office	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  was	  conducted	  during	  a	  two-­‐month	  period	  from	  the	  end	  of	  November	  2012	  to	  the	  end	  of	  January	  2013.	  During	  this	  time	  I	  spent	  two	  to	  three	  days	  a	  week,	  from	  two	  to	  six	  hours	  per	  day,	  at	  the	  main	  office	  of	  CP.	  My	  time	  was	  spent	   observing	   the	   situations	   where	   people	   were	   applying	   for	   the	   program,	   beneficiaries	  were	  submitting	  information	  for	  the	  officials	  and	  the	  officials	  were	  interviewing	  beneficiaries	  about	   their	   current	   situations.	   During	   the	   fieldwork	   I	   had	   several	   unofficial	   conversations	  with	   the	   program	   officials,	   while	   keeping	   a	   research	   journal	   the	   whole	   time,	   thus	   general	  observations	  and	  informal	  discussions	  were	  included	  in	  the	  research	  data.	  Before	  starting	  my	  fieldwork	  I	  lived	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  for	  three	  months,	  and	  during	  this	  time	  the	  material	  from	  the	  Ciudadania	   Porteña’s	  website	  was	   collected	   (from	   here	   on	   referenced	   as	   CP	  Website63,	   the	  topic	   and	   the	   date	   accessed).	   A	   large	   part	   of	   the	   data	   consists	   of	   this	   material	   from	   the	  program	  website.	  Although	  the	  law	  that	  CP	  is	  based	  on	  is	  retrieved	  from	  the	  website,	  it	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  LEY	  N°	  1878,	  and	  makes	  up	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  information	  considered	  most	  relevant	  was	  translated	  into	  English.	  Originally	  my	   goal	  was	   to	   conduct	  more	   than	   two	   interviews,	   but	   as	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   study	  shifted	   to	   a	   theoretical	   study	   of	   ideas,	   I	   decided	   that	   the	   interviews	   are	   going	   to	   be	   used	  merely	  to	  account	  for	  the	  process	  of	  implementation	  and	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decisions	   regarding	   the	  program	  design.	   I	   attempted	   to	   carry	  out	   three	   interviews	  with	  persons	   involved	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   program.	   The	   goal	  was	   to	   interview	   the	   former	   co-­‐director	   Irene	   Novacovsky,	   the	   current	   director	   (and	   former	   co-­‐director	  with	   Novacovsky)	  Pablo	  Pucciarelli	   and	  Gabriela	  Cerruti	   (see	   chapter	  5.3).	   I	  was	   able	   to	   interview	   the	   former	  two.	  The	  interview	  with	  Pucciarelli	  was	  conducted	  at	  his	  office	  at	  the	  premises	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  in	  Buenos	  Aires,	  while	  the	  interview	  with	  Novacovsky	  was	  carried	  out	  through	  Skype	  after	   I	   had	   returned	   to	   Finland.	   Both	   interviews	   lasted	   approximately	   forty	   minutes.	  Arranging	  the	  second	  interview	  was	  highly	  challenging.	  After	  several	  failed	  attempts	  and	  six	  months	   I	   succeeded	   in	   arranging	   the	   interview	   through	  with	   Novacovsky	   through	   Skype.	   I	  never	  received	  a	  response	  from	  Cerruti.	  Additionally,	  an	  interview	  that	  Novacovsky	  has	  given	  to	   the	   International	   Poverty	   Centre	   is	   used.	   The	   source	   does	   not	   include	   a	   date	   of	   the	  interview;	  therefore	  it	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  IPC).	  The	  interviews	  were	  semi-­‐structured64,	   conducted	   in	   Spanish,	   transcribed	   and	   translated	   into	   English.	   The	   data	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  buenosaires.gob.ar/areas/des_social/ciudadania_portenia/)	  64	  Meaning	  that	  a	  certain	  predetermined	  srtucture	  was	  followed,	  but	  the	  method	  allowed	  for	  taking	  up	  new	  themes	  and	  asking	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  (Hirsjärvi	  &	  Hurme	  2001,	  47).	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from	   the	   website,	   observations	   and	   interviews	   was	   then	   categorized	   to	   different	   themes	  partly	   corresponding	  with	   the	   essential	   design	   features	   of	   CCTs	   established	   in	   chapters	  4.3	  and	  4.4,	  while	  creating	  two	  new	  angles	  for	  the	  exploration	  of	  CP.	  	  Some	  personal	  conversations	  that	  I	  had	  with	  the	  officials	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  are	  included	  in	   the	   research	   data.	   All	   people	   I	   spoke	   to	  were	   aware	   that	   I	  was	   conducting	   research	   and	  werefully	   informed	   that	   the	   information	   passed	   on	   to	   me	   may	   be	   used.	   However,	   these	  discussions	  are	  cited	  anonymously	  and	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials).	  	  The	  analysis	  of	   the	   interviews	  was	   conducted	   from	  a	   “fact	  perspective”,	  which	  understands	  the	   information	   collected	   as	   a	   testimony	   of	   reality,	   and	   by	   using	   content	   analysis	   The	   fact	  perspective	   is	   characterized	   by	   its	   narrow	   view	   on	   the	   significance	   of	   “facts”	   and	  “information”.	   (Alasuutari	   1999,	   90-­‐91.)	   I	   considered	   the	   interviews	   to	   contain	   information	  and	  interpretations	  of	  past	  events	  and	  political	  choices.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  rhetorical	  nature	  of	   the	   interviews,	  but	   focused	  solely	  on	  the	  content	  of	   the	   information	  provided	  by	  the	  interviewees.	  While	  doing	  so	  I	  acknowledged	  that	  persons	  so	  closely	  affiliated	  with	   the	   program	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   highly	   critical	   regarding	   the	   program,	   and	   that	   the	  program	  is	  going	  to	  be	  portrayed	  ideally.	  But	  as	  this	  study	  deals	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	   transfers,	   my	   interest	   was	   in	   the	   theoretical	   principles	   and	   the	   way	   the	   program	   is	  portrayed,	   I	   did	   not	   find	   it	   problematic	   to	   interview	   only	   the	   creators	   and	   directors	   of	   the	  program.	  Originally	  I	   identified	  four	  reasons	  why	  I	  chose	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  as	  the	  case	  in	  my	  study.	  
First,	  disregarding	  the	  evaluations	  done	  by	  the	  Argentinian	  authorities	  I	  could	  not	  find	  a	  single	  mention	  of	  CP	  in	  existing	  literature.	  It	  was	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  articles	  about	  Latin	  American	  CCTs,	  and	  it	  was	  absent	  from	  research	  on	  the	  social	  policy	  system	  of	  Argentina.	  Second,	  unlike	  most	  of	  the	  programs,	  which	  are	  national,	  CP	  is	  the	  program	  of	  an	  autonomous	  city,	  Buenos	  Aires,	  thus	  focusing	  exclusively	  on	  urban	  poverty	  in	  one	  city.	  Third,	  CP	  appeared	  to	  exhibit	  all	  the	  basic	   characteristics	  of	   a	  Conditional	  Cash	  Transfer	  program	  and	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  Fourth,	  I	  got	  an	  opportunity	  to	  live	  in	  Buenos	  Aires.	  The	  data	  gathered	  through	  the	  website,	  interviews,	  observations	  and	  conversations	  makes	  up	  the	  structure	  of	  chapters	  5.3	  and	  5.4,	  which	  aims	  at	  exploring	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  as	  well	  as	  examining	  the	  established	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program	  as	  a	  policy	  solution.	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5.2	  The	  local	  context	  	  The	   Argentine	   Republic	   (República	   Argentina)	   is	   located	   in	   southern	   South-­‐America	  bordering	   Brazil,	   Uruguay,	   Bolivia	   and	   Paraguay.	   It	   is	   the	   second	   largest	   country	   in	   Latin	  America	   in	   terms	   of	   size	   and	   third	   largest	   in	   terms	   of	   economy.	   It	   has	   a	   population	   of	   41	  million.	  In	  development	  measurements,	  Argentina	  scores	  very	  high	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  countries	   in	  Latin	  America.	  Argentina	  ranks	  45th	   in	  the	  world	   in	  Human	  Development	  Index	  and	  second	  in	  Latin	  America	  behind	  only	  Chile.	  The	  gross	  domestic	  product	  is	  11	  340	  euros	  per	   capita65,	   462.3	   billion	   in	   total.	   (Malik	   2013.)	   The	   City	   of	   Buenos	   Aires	   is	   the	   capital	   of	  Argentina,	   located	   on	   the	  western	   shore	   of	   the	   river	   La	   Plata	   (Río	   de	   la	   Plata).	   The	   official	  name	   of	   the	   city	   is	   Ciudad	   Autónoma	   de	   Buenos	   Aires,	   Autonomous	   City	   of	   Buneos	   Aires	  (CABA).	  With	  the	  population	  of	  2	  890	  151	  it	  is	  the	  largest	  city	  in	  Argentina	  and	  together	  with	  the	  24	  municipalities	  of	  the	  Greater	  Buenos	  Aires	  make	  up	  the	  third	  largest	  metropolitan	  area	  in	  Latin	  America	  with	  a	  population	  of	  12.8	  million	  (INDEC	  2010).	  Although	  physically	  situated	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  the	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  is	  autonomous	  as	  its	  name	  suggests.	  	  
5.2.1	  Social	  policy	  and	  social	  protection	  in	  Argentina	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  2.2,	  Argentina	  is	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  pioneer	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	   regarding	   the	   evolution	   of	   formal	   social	   policy	   and	   social	   protection	   measures.	  Labelled	   an	   “early	   developer”	   Argentina	   and	   other	   similarly	   developed	   regions	   in	   LA66	  established	   their	   social	   policy	   institutions	   predominantly	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   growing	  number	  of	  immigrants	  turned	  urban	  salaried	  workers.	  This	  was	  an	  exceptional	  development	  path	  in	  LA	  where	  most	  other	  countries	  followed	  the	  “classic	  colonial”	  pattern,	  where	  the	  early	  welfare	   institutions	   were	   born	   from	   large	   worker	   concentrations	   based	   on	   plantations,	  estates	  and	  state	  owned	  enterprises.	  (Draibe	  and	  Riesco	  2007.)	  With	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   major	   nationwide	   network	   of	   public	   schools	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	  century	   	   (Faur	   2008,	   6),	   the	   earliest	   social	   protection	   measures	   established	   in	   the	   1920s	  (Mesa-­‐Lago	  1991,	   2007)	   and	   extensive	   public	   health	   clinics	   created	   after	   the	   second	  world	  war	   (Faur	   2008,	   7)	   Argentina	   had	   established	   a	   welfare	   regime	   that	   Franzoni	   (2008)	   has	  described	   as	   “stratified	   universalism”	  with	   extended	   policies	   for	   the	   core	   labour	   force,	   but	  little	   to	   those	   outside	   the	   labour	   based	   schemes.	   Reflecting	   Argentina	   through	   Esping-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Adjusted	  according	  to	  the	  purchasing	  power	  parity.	  66	  Namely	  Uruguay	  and	  cities	  such	  as	  Sao	  Paolo.	  It	  was	  the	  Río	  de	  la	  Plata	  region	  that	  was	  the	  concentration	  of	  urban	  workforce	  in	  Argentina	  and	  Uruguay.	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Andersen’s	   welfare	   regime	   framework,	   Barrientos	   (2004)	   states	   that	   the	   country	   has	  undergone	   a	   transition	   from	   a	   mainly	   conservative	   regime	   to	   a	   typically	   liberal	   one	   (see	  chapter	   3.4).	  Writing	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2001/2	   economic	   crises	   his	   analysis	   does	   not	  account	  for	  the	  recalibration	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  since	  then.	  	  The	  major	  expansion	  of	  social	  policies	  took	  place	  under	  the	  government	  of	  Juan	  Perón	  during	  the	  developmentalist-­‐state	  era	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s.	  Argentina’s	  first	  Health	  Ministry	  was	  founded	  during	  the	   first67	  Peron	  era	  (1946-­‐1955)	  and	  the	  universalistic	  nature	  of	  education	  was	   being	   extended	   to	   the	   health	   sector.	   Argentina	   based	   its	   health	   care	   system	  mainly	   on	  contributory	  Obras	  Sociales68,	   and	  other	   labour	  union	  administered	  health	  plans,	  while	   also	  developing	  a	  complementary	  public	  system.	  (Faur	  2008.)	  Led	   by	   Peron,	   the	   Justicialist	   Party	   that	   governed	   the	   country	   established	   a	  welfare	  model	  based	   on	   adult	   participation	   in	   the	   formal	   labour	   market,	   extensive	   public	   health	   and	  education	  services	  with	  a	  systematic	  policy	  of	  protection	  for	  the	  poor	  (Faur	  2008,	  7).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Repetto	  &	  Dal	  Masetto	  (2011,	  7)	  write	  that	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  peronism69	  in	  the	  1940’s	  the	  social	  protection	  measures	  became	  identified	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  workers	  in	  the	   formal	   labour	   force	   and	   contributory	   social	   security,	   with	   no	   mention	   of	   a	   systematic	  policy	   to	   protect	   the	   poor.	   What	   is	   clear	   though	   is	   that	   during	   the	   Peron	   era,	   the	   state	  established	  a	  role	  in	  both	  providing	  and	  regulating	  contributory	  social	  protection.	  Depending	  on	   whether	   you	   ask	   Faur	   or	   Repetto	   and	   Dal	   Masetto,	   the	   state	   established	   either	   a	  comprehensive	  social	  protection	  system,	  covering	  both	  formal	  labour	  force	  with	  contributory	  social	   insurance	   and	   the	   poor	   with	   a	   systematic	   policy	   of	   protection,	   or	   a	   system	   mainly	  covering	  the	  formal	  sector	  workers.	  While	  Peron’s	  first	  presidency	  of	  saw	  the	  state	  establish	  a	  developmentalist	  economic	  policy	  with	  social	  policies	   in	  a	  central	   role	   (see	  Draibe	  and	  Riesco	  2007),	   the	  military	  dictatorship	  that	  got	  its	  start	  in	  197670,	  came	  to	  replace	  the	  developmentalist	  model	  by	  destatization	  and	  deregulation.	  The	  era	  was	  characterized	  by	  economic	  turmoil,	  and	  the	  economic	  shocks	  and	  outright	   attacks	   on	   labour	   organizations	   resulted	   in	   an	   erosion	   of	   social	   protection	   (Faur	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Juan	  Perón	  served	  three	  terms	  as	  president	  of	  the	  republic	  1946-­‐52,	  1952-­‐55	  and	  1973-­‐74.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  He	  spent	  the	  time	  between	  his	  second	  and	  third	  terms	  in	  exile.	  	  68	  Contributory	  labour	  union	  based	  organizations	  for	  providing	  health	  care	  services.	  	  	  69	  A	  political	  movement	  based	  on	  the	  legacy	  of	  Juan	  Perón.	  70	  Argentina	  returned	  to	  democracy	  in	  1983.	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2008,	  Romero	  2002),	  while	  marking	  a	  beginning	  of	  the	  deteriorating	  overall	  living	  conditions	  (Repetto	  &	  Dal	  Masetto	  2011;	  Romero	  2002).	  After	   the	  return	  to	  democracy	   in	  1983,	  government	  policies	  were	   focused	  on	  stabilizing	  the	  economy	  and	   tackling	   inflation.	  The	  Alfonsin	  government	  adopted	  an	  Austral	  plan	   changing	  the	  currency	  from	  peso	  to	  austral	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  stabilize	  the	  economy	  short	  term	  to	  enable	  deeper	  structural	   changes,	  but	   the	   inflation	  returned	  quickly.	  Alfonsin	  resigned	   five	  months	  before	  the	  end	  of	  his	  second	  term	  amidst	  hyperinflation,	  riots	  and	  looting,	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  Menem,	  who	  had	  won	  the	  1989	  presidential	  elections,	  but	  wasn’t	  scheduled	  to	  take	  office	  until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year.	   Menem,	   in	   turn,	   attempted	   to	   take	   control	   of	   the	   hyperinflation	  through	   a	  Convertibility	  Plan,	   replacing	   the	   austral	  with	   a	   convertible	   peso	   fixing	   the	   peso-­‐dollar	   exchange	   rate	   to	   1:1,	   but	   with	   equally	   inefficient	   results,	   and	   during	   Menem’s	  administration	  Argentina’s	  public	  debt	  grew	  significantly.	  (Romero	  2002.)	  The	  last	  two	  decades	  in	  Argentinian	  social	  protection	  can	  be	  divided	  to	  two	  different	  periods	  (Faur	  2008;	  Repetto	  &	  Dal	  Masetto	  2011).	  The	  first	  one	  starts	  in	  the	  1990’s	  and	  continues	  until	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  2001.	  This	  period	  is	  characterized	  by	  privatisation	  of	  social	  security,	  transferring	  health	  care	  and	  educational	  responsibility	  to	  the	  provincial	  governments	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	   targeted	  and	   small-­‐scale	  measures	   to	   tackle	  poverty	   and	   social	   vulnerability.	  Followed	  by	  hyperinflation	  of	  1989	  and	  1990	  and	  most	  recently	  the	  devastating	  crisis	  of	  the	  years	  2001	  and	  2002.	  The	  consecutive	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  past	  decades	  contributed	   to	   dismantling	   the	   collective	   perception	   of	   social	   protection	   and	   new	   focus	   on	  poverty,	  vulnerability	  and	  their	  connections	  to	  informal	  labour	  has	  appeared	  (Repetto	  &	  Dal	  Masetto	  2011).	  	  Historically	  Argentinian	  social	  protection	  has	  centred	  heavily	  on	  contributory	  systems,	  but	  these	  have	  lost	  their	  integrative	  capacity	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  protect	  against	  social	  risks.	  This	  was	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  crisis.	  (Faur	  2008;	  Repetto	  &	  Dal	  Masetto	  2011.)	  
The	   second	  period	  started	   after	   the	   economic,	   political	   and	   social	  meltdown	   of	   2001	   and	   is	  notably	   different	   from	   the	   first.	   It	   is	   marked	   by	   re-­‐nationalising	   the	   pension	   funds,	  strengthening	  the	  states	  presence	  in	  areas	  of	  education	  and	  health,	  the	  unifying	  of	  the	  poverty	  fighting	  measures,	   as	  well	   as	  by	  a	   step	   towards	  more	   inclusive	  social	   security	   in	   combining	  
	  	   77	  
contributory	  and	  non-­‐contributory	   social	  protection	   instruments.	  The	   crisis	  of	  2001-­‐200271	  marked	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  social	  protection	  and	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  orthodox	  neoliberal	  economic	   model	   by	   the	   Menem	   administration	   of	   the	   1990’s.	   Following	   the	   crisis,	   the	  Argentinian	   economy	   recovered	  quickly	   and	   grew	   steadily	   at	   an	   average	   rate	   of	   9	   per	   cent	  from	  2003	  to	  200872.	   	  The	  international	   financial	  crisis	  of	  2008/09	  ended	  the	  rapid	  growth,	  but	  the	  economy	  quickly	  recovered	  to	  around	  7	  per	  cent	  annual	  growth	  in	  2010,	  which	  was	  coupled	  with	  a	   substantial	   increase	   in	   formal	  employment.	   (Repetto	  and	  Dal	  Masetto	  2011;	  ILO	  2012;	  Faur	  2008.)	  Although	   the	  number	  of	  workers	   in	   formal	   employment	   grew	  substantially,	   thus	   increasing	  the	   contributory	   social	   protection	   coverage,	   the	   more	   significant	   change	   occurred	   in	   the	  emergence	   of	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   assistance	   programs.	   The	   unifying	   of	   the	   poverty	  fighting	   measures	   in	   combining	   contributory	   and	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   protection	  instruments	   led	   to	   a	   more	   horizontal	   social	   protection	   coverage.	   The	   contributory	   social	  protection	   measures	   that	   guaranteed	   pensions,	   unemployment	   coverage	   and	   family	  allowances	   to	   the	  workers	  of	   the	   formal	   sector	  provided	  by	   the	   state	  and	   the	   trade	  unions,	  have	  been	  deemed	  inefficient	  in	  tackling	  poverty	  arising	  from	  unemployment	  and	  widespread	  informal	   labour.	   To	   address	   poverty	   arising	   from	   labour	   market	   informality,	   as	   well	   as	  situations	  where	  a	  person	  has	  never	  entered	  any	   labour	  market,	  non-­‐contributory	  pensions	  and	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   assistance	   instruments	   emerged.	   (Faur	   2008;	   Repetto	   &	   Dal	  Masetto	  2011.)	  
5.2.3	  The	  political	  context	  in	  CABA	  The	   autonomy	   of	   the	   city	   of	   Buenos	   Aires	   (Ciudad	   Autónoma	   de	   Buenos	   Aires,	   from	   here	  referred	   to	   as	   CABA)	   was	   an	   outcome	   of	   an	   agreement	   between	   then	   President	   of	   the	  Argentine	  Republic,	  Carlos	  Menem	  of	  the	  peronist	  Partido	  Justicialista	  (PJ)	  and	  the	  opposition	  leader	  and	  former	  President	  Raúl	  Alfonsín	  of	  the	  Unión	  Cívica	  Radical	  (UCR).	  The	  agreement,	  known	  as	  Pacto	  de	  Olivos	  (Olivos	  pact),	  was	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  executed	  in	  1994,	  which	  allowed	  two	  consecutive	  presidential	  terms,	  thus	  enabling	  Menem	  to	  run	  for	  re-­‐election,	   in	   exchange	   for	   cutting	   the	   presidential	   term	   from	   six	   to	   four	   years	   and	   granting	  autonomy	  to	  CABA,	  a	  traditional	  stronghold	  of	  UCR.	  (Natale	  1994.)	  PJ	  and	  UCR	  had	  held	  a	  firm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  According	  to	  Martin	  Feldstein,	  a	  Professor	  of	  Economics	  at	  Harvard,	  the	  overvalued	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  coupled	  with	  an	  excessive	  amount	  of	  foreign	  debt	  were	  the	  two	  proximate	  causes	  of	  the	  Argentine	  crisis	  (2002,	  8).	  72	  Although	  the	  extremely	  low	  starting	  point	  contributed	  to	  the	  growth	  numbers.	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grip	   on	  Argentine	   politics	   since	   the	   return	   to	   democracy	   in	   1983	   and	   the	   pact	  was	   in	   part	  created	  for	  the	  UCR	  to	  regain	  control	  of	   the	  city	  that	  had	  become	  controlled	  by	  the	  PJ	  party	  machine.	  	  Pacto	  de	  Olivos	  and	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  left	  Argentina	  in	  a	  political	  situation	  where	  PJ	  held	  national	  power,	  while	  CABA	  transformed	  into	  a	  counterweight	  to	  the	  nationally	  powerful	  PJ.	  (Fenwick	  2011,	  4-­‐5.)	  While	  Menem	  won	  the	  presidential	  re-­‐election	  in	  1995,	  the	  UCR	  candidate	  Fernando	  de	  la	  Rúa	  won	  the	  first	  mayoral	  elections	  held	  in	  CABA	  in	  1996.	  	  Since	  1995	  space	  had	  been	  growing	  for	  an	  opposition	  force,	  both	  at	  the	  national	  and	  at	  the	  CABA	  level,	  and	  that	  space	  would	  be	  filled	  by	  FREPASO73,	  which	  was	  formed	  by	  dissident	  members	  of	  PJ	  and	  UCR,	  the	  Unidad	  Socialista	  party	   and	  other	   leftist	   groups.	  Never	   gaining	   the	  national	   following	  of	   PJ	   or	  UCR,	   FREPASO	  nevertheless	   established	   a	   centre-­‐left	   alternative	   for	   the	   two	   traditional	   parties,	   putting	  emphasis	   on	   social	   problems	   and	   on	   ethical	   and	   political	   questions	   such	   as	   institutional	  degradation	  and	  corruption.	  	  After	  having	  formed	  a	  working	  relationship	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  UCR	  and	  FREPASO	  joined	  forces	  to	  form	  The	  Alliance	  for	  Work,	  Justice	  and	  Education74	  in	  1997.	  Running	  on	  the	  Alianza	  ticket,	  Fernando	  de	  la	  Rúa	  won	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  1999	   and	   Aníbal	   Ibarra	   triumphed	   in	   the	   mayoral	   elections	   of	   CABA	   in	   2000.	   Both	   were	  elected	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  “great	  depression”.	  (Fenwick	  2011;	  Romero	  2002.)	  Having	  won75	  the	  2000	  elections,	  Ibarra	  took	  office	  in	  CABA	  amid	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  saw	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  situation	  deteriorate	  during	  his	   first	  year	   in	  office,	  with	  December	  2001	  seeing	  the	  combining	  and	  escalation	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  a	  political	  crisis.	   In	  late	  November	  the	   government	   had	   freezed	   all	   bank	   deposits 76 	  resulting	   again	   in	   riots,	   looting	   and	  demonstrations.	  De	  la	  Rua	  was	  ousted77	  from	  Casa	  Rosada,	  seen	  off	  by	  mass	  protests	  outside	  the	  presidential	  residence	  that	  were	  brutally	  suppressed	  leaving	  several	  dead	  and	  wounded.	  (Romero	  2002.)	  According	  to	  Fenwick	  (2011,	  5)	  CABA	  fragmented	  politically	  after	  the	  2001	  fiscal	  implosion.	  The	  city	  was	  no	  longer	  controlled	  by	  the	  traditional	  PJ	  party	  machine	  and	  the	  traditional	  political	  forces	  had	  been	  discredited,	  so	  a	  political	  vacuum	  emerged	  that	  left	  room	  for	   new	   local	   political	   actors	   with	   the	   2003	   elections	   serving	   as	   a	   radical	   turning	   point	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Frente	  por	  un	  País	  Solidario.	  74	  Alianza	  para	  el	  Trabajo,	  la	  Justicia	  y	  la	  Educación.	  75	  With	  a	  clear	  margin	  over	  Menem’s	  former	  Minister	  of	  Economy	  ,	  the	  aforementioned	  Domingo	  Cavallo.	  	  76	  A	  measure	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  corallito.	  77	  He	  escaped	  on	  a	  helicopter	  and	  was	  followed	  in	  offce	  by	  two	  interim	  presidents	  during	  the	  course	  of	  two	  weeks,	  until	  Eduardo	  Duhalde	  (2002-­‐2003)	  took	  office	  on	  January	  2nd.	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representing	  an	  intense	  localization	  of	  party	  politics	  that	  would	  shape	  the	  city’s	  future	  and	  the	  
behaviour	   of	   its	   political	   actors.	   The	   localization	   of	   party	   politics	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	  independent	   nature	   of	   the	   campaigning	   and	   the	   following	   interparty	   coalitions.	   	   The	  incumbent	  mayor	   Ibarra	   campaigned	   on	   a	   coalition	   of	   four	   parties78,	   one	   of	  which	  was	   the	  newly	   elected	   President	   Nestor	   Kirchner’s	   FPV,	   with	   fighting	   poverty	   and	   defending	   social	  rights	   as	   the	   unifying	   theme	  between	   the	   parties.	   As	  much	   of	   the	   violence,	   demonstrations	  urban	   unrest	   that	   occurred	   during	   the	   2000-­‐2001	   crises	   took	   place	   in	   CABA	   and	   the	  surrounding	  greater	  Buenos	  Aires,	   it	  created	  a	  need	  to	  emphasize	  social	   justice	  on	  the	  city’s	  agenda.	  (ibid.)	  Poverty	   hit	   its	   peak	   immediately	   following	   the	   social	   unrest.	   During	   2002	   Argentina	  experienced	  the	  highest	  poverty	  rate	  in	  its	  recent	  history:	  54	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  population	  were	  under	  the	  poverty	  line	  and	  almost	  one	  fourth	  were	  under	  the	  line	  of	  indigence	  (Campos,	  Faur	   &	   Pautassi	   2007).	   	   To	   counter	   the	   worst	   effects	   of	   the	   crisis	   the	   federal	   government	  launched	  an	  employment	  program,	  the	  Plan	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas	  de	  Hogar	  Desocupados	  (Program	  for	  Unemployed	  Male	  and	  Female	  Heads	  of	  Households,	  PJJHD).	  PJJHD	  was	  a	  national	  workfare	  program	  introduced	  nationally	  in	  April	  2002	  to	  alleviate	  the	  impact	  of	  rising	  unemployment	  due	   to	   the	  worsening	  economic	   crisis.	  A	   stipend	  of	  150	  Argentine	  pesos	   (approximately	  40	  euros	  at	  the	  time)	  per	  month	  was	  provided	  to	  an	  unemployed	  head	  of	  household	  in	  exchange	  for	   participation	   in	   20	   hours	   of	   work	   per	   week	   in	   a	   workfare	   subproject79.	   The	   program	  reached	   16	   per	   cent	   of	   all	   Argentinian	   households,	   a	   never	   before	   seen	   scope	   for	   a	   non-­‐contributory	   social	   assistance	   program.	   PJJHD	   had	   two	   articulated	   objectives:	   to	   supply	   a	  minimal	  monthly	   income	   to	   all	   unemployed	   families,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   secure	   families’	   right	   to	  social	  inclusion	  and	  future	  labour	  reinsertion	  through	  involvement	  in	  productive,	  communal	  or	   educational	   activities.	   The	   conditions	  were,	   in	   turn,	   assumed	   to	   encourage	   a	   “real	  work	  culture”,	   and	   reduce	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   families.	   (Tabbush	   2009.)	   Along	   with	   the	   official	  attempts	  to	  promote	  work	  culture,	  the	  language	  used	  to	  frame	  PJJHD	  drew	  from	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	   strong	   labour	   movement	   emphasizing	   workers	   rights,	   while	   the	   beneficiaries	   were	  depicted	  as	  victims	  of	  neoliberalism	  and	  the	  economic	  crisis	  (Fenwick	  2013,	  159-­‐160).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  The ARI, the Socialist Party, Frente Grande and FPV	  79	  These	  included	  for	  example	  community	  services,	  minor	  construction,	  repair,	  expansion,	  maintenance	  or	  remodeling	  of	  schools,	  health	  facilities,	  basic	  sanitation	  facilities,	  small	  roads	  and	  bridges,	  culverts	  and	  canals,	  community	  kitchens	  and	  centers,	  tourist	  centers,	  low-­‐cost	  housing	  (Tabbush	  2009).	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However,	   after	   being	   elected	   President	   in	   2003	   Nestor	   Kirchner	   (PJ)	   attempted	   to	   replace	  PJJHD	  that	  had	  been	  implemented	  as	  an	  emergency	  program	  under	  the	  preceding	  president	  Eduardo	  Duhalde	  (PJ).	  The	  official	  plan	  of	  the	  Kirchner	  administration	  was	  to	  terminate	  PJJHD	  and	  build	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program.	  The	  idea	  for	  this	  type	  of	  policy	  solution	  came	  from	   Mexico80	  and	   was	   supported	   by	   Inter	   American	   Development	   Bank	   (IADB)	   (Fenwick	  2013,	   153).	   The	   idea	   to	   build	   a	   CCT	   materialised	   in	   2004,	   when	   the	   national	   government	  launched	  Programa	  Familias	  	  (Families	  for	  Social	  Inclusion,	  Familias	  para	  la	  Inclusión	  Social,	  PF).	   It	  was	  based	  on	  reformulating	   the	  program	  Programa	  de	  Atención	  a	  Grupos	  Vulnerables	  (PAGV,	  Programme	  to	  Serve	  Vulnerable	  Groups)	  that	  had	  been	  running	  since	  1996	  and	  been	  reoriented	   in	   2001	   with	   incorporation	   of	   an	   income	   transfer	   component	   Ingreso	   para	   el	  
Desarrollo	  Humano	  (IDH,	  An	  income	  for	  Human	  Development),	  creating	  a	  PAGV-­‐IDH	  that	  was	  operational	  from	  2002	  to	  2004.	  At	  this	  point	  the	  central	  components	  of	  what	  would	  become	  Programa	  Familias	  in	  2004	  had	  been	  established.	  The	  beneficiaries	  were	  households	  living	  in	  poverty	  with	  under	  19	  year	  old	  children,	  the	  transfer	  was	  a	  fixed	  amount,	  calculated	  to	  each	  household	   according	   to	   the	   number	   of	   children,	   and	   was	   conditioned	   on	   children’s	   school	  attendance,	   health	   check	   ups	   and	   activities	   related	   to	   personal	   improvement	   of	   the	  beneficiary	  women.	  The	  subsidy	  was	  granted	  to	  mothers,	  who	  were	  eligible	  only	  if	  they	  had	  not	  finished	  secondary	  school.	  (Campos,	  Faur	  and	  Pautassi	  2007;	  Faur	  2008.)	  As	  a	  workforce	  program	  PJJHD	  evaluated	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	  possible	  beneficiaries	  based	  on	  their	   employability.	   PJJHD	   was	   supposed	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   three	   new	   programs:	   a	   food	  program 81 ,	   a	   workfare	   program 82 	  and	   PF.	   Specifically,	   the	   strategy	   was	   that	   PJJHD	  beneficiaries	  who	  were	  considered	  “employable”	  would	  move	  on	  to	  the	  first	  two,	  while	  those	  beneficiaries	   (women)	   categorized	   as “unemployable”	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Labour	   and	   Social	  Security	  would	  be	  encouraged	  to	  “migrate”	  to	  PF.	  (Faur	  2008.)	  The	  migration	  never	  happened	  in	  the	  scope	  intended.	  When	  the	  program	  was	  launched	  in	  October	  2004	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Development	   expected	   to	   enrol	   750	   000	   “single-­‐mothers”83	  during	   the	   first	   six	   months	  (Campos,	  Faur	  and	  Pautassi	  2007;	  Faur	  2008),	  but	  throughout	  its	  existence	  PF	  never	  reached	  more	  than	  700	  000	  beneficiaries	  (Fenwick	  2013).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Based	  on	  interviews	  conducted	  by	  Fenwick	  2013.	  81	  By	  the	  name	  of	  Hambre	  mas	  Urgente.	  82	  By	  the	  name	  of	  Manos	  a	  la	  Obra.	  83	  The	  term	  was	  used	  at	  the	  Ministry’s	  website,	  cited	  in	  Faur	  (2008,	  31)	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Although	   PJJHD	   did	   not	   enrol	   new	   beneficiaries	   after	   2002	   as	   it	   was	   supposed	   to	   be	  terminated,	  the	  program	  continued	  to	  make	  payments	  until	  2009	  when	  Asignacion	  Universal	  
por	   Ijo	   (AUI,	   Universal	   Child	   Benefit)	   replaced	   both	   PF	   and	   PJJHD	   at	   the	   national	   level.	  Kirchner	  was	  never	  able	  to	  successfully	  dismantle,	  reform,	  or	  transform	  PJJHD	  and	  turn	  PF	  the	  only	   national	   social	   assistance	   program.	   The	   program	  had	   the	   non-­‐intended	   effect	   of	   being	  used	  for	  clientelistic	  means84,	  while	  creating	  powerful	  interest	  groups85,	  mostly	  composed	  of	  workers	  who	  had	  lost	  their	  jobs	  during	  the	  2001–2002	  crisis.	  The	  size	  and	  importance	  of	  this	  interest	   group	   contributed	   in	   Kirchner’s	   difficulties	   to	   dismantle	   and	   discontinue	   the	  programme.	   (Fenwick	  2013.)	  But	  while	   the	  national	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  program	  was	  never	  able	  to	  institutionalise,	  it	  was	  still	  active	  and	  running	  in	  2005	  when	  another	  CCT,	  with	  almost	   identical	   program	   design,	   was	   launched	   in	   Argentina,	   this	   time	   in	   the	   capital,	   the	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  
5.3	  Establishing	  a	  CCT	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  The	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  is	  a	  wealthy	  city	  with	  fiscal,	  political	  and	  administrative	  autonomy	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  in	  a	  position	  to	  run	  its	  own	  social	  policy	  programs,	  although	  the	  programs	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  also	  operate	  in	  the	  CABA	  territory.	  The	  former	  director	  and	  one	  of	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  program	  Irene	  Novacovsky	  noted:	  “Buenos	   Aires	   has	   a	   big	   budget,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   rich	   city	   characterized	   by	   large	   levels	   of	  
inequality	  and	  we	  felt	  that	  the	  city	  needed	  an	  instrument	  for	  distributing	  income.	  After	  the	  
crisis	  we	  realised	  that	  social	  protection	  was	  needed	  as	  social	  policy	  was	  very	  fragmented	  
with	  small	  scale	  programs”.	  (Interview	  29.1.2014.)	  When	   CABA	   entered	   into	   the	   planning	   stages	   of	   its	   own	   social	   assistance	   program,	   the	  national	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program	  Programa	  Familias	  had	  been	  established,	  but	   for	  some	   reason	   Programa	   Familias	   was	   not	   implemented	   in	   the	   Autonomous	   city	   of	   Buenos	  Aires.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Powerful	  and	  organized	  local	  groups,	  municipalities	  and	  social	  organizations	  presented	  community-­‐based	  projects	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  be	  financed	  by	  PJJHD	  (Fenwick	  2013).	  85	  The	  groups	  were	  highly	  organized	  by	  union	  leaders,	  political	  activists	  and	  politicians,	  mainly	  at	  the	  local	  level	  (Fenwick	  2013).	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“At	  the	  time	  Programa	  Familias	  did	  not	  prioritize	  Buenos	  Aires,	  it	  prioritized	  urban	  centres	  
with	  worse	   incidents	   of	   relative	   poverty.	   It	  was	   a	   national	   decision	   not	   to	   expand	   PF	   to	  
CABA.	   Programa	   Familias	   changed	   totally	   when	   the	   mothers	   (from	   Jefes	   y	   Jefas)	   with	  
under	  18	  year	  old	  children	  were	  allowed	  to	  move	  to	  PF,	  it	  became	  a	  vehicle	  for	  integrating	  
people	  from	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas	  and	  did	  not	  take	  any	  more	  beneficiaries”	  (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014.)	  The	   initiative	   for	   a	   local	   program	  was	   said86	  to	   come	   from	   Jorge	   Telerman,	  whose	   name	   is	  present	  at	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  When	  he	  was	  the	  acting	  minister	  of	  human	  and	  social	  rights	  in	  CABA,	  Telerman	  presented	  a	  bill	  to	  create	  the	  program,	  which	  was	  supported	  by	   Ibarra	  and	   included	   in	  his	  2004	  budget.	  Later	  Telerman,	  vice-­‐chief	  of	   the	  city	  government	  at	  the	  time,	  assigned	  his	  chief	  of	  cabinet	  Gabriela	  Cerruti,	  to	  put	  together	  a	  team	  of	  experts	  with	  a	  task	  of	  designing	  the	  program.	  And	  when	  the	  law	  1878	  that	  established	  CP	  was	   passed,	   Telerman	   presented	   it	   as	   the	   mayor	   of	   the	   city.	   (Novacovsky,	   Interview	  29.1.2014;	  Fenwick	  2011,	  7.)	  	  However,	  it	  was	  Cerruti	  who	  became	  the	  political	  driving	  force	  behind	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  (Nocakovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014).	  The	   team	   that	  was	  convened	   included	   the	   future	  directors	  of	   the	  program	  Pablo	  Pucciarelli	  and	   Irene	   Novacovsky	   among	   others.	   It	   consisted	   mostly	   of	   the	   same	   members	   that	   had	  worked	  together	  since	  1996	  in	  SIEMPRO	  (Sistema	  de	  Información,	  Evaluación	  y	  Monitoreo	  de	  Programas	  Sociales87)	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  policy	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  It	  was	  this	  group	  that	  had	   been	   responsible	   for	   the	   initiative	   on	   income	   for	   human	   development	   (Ingresso	   para	  desarrollo	  humano)	  (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014),	  a	  proposal	  that	  was	  later	  integrated	  to	  PAGV	  and	  eventually	  became	  Plan	  Familías	  in	  2002	  (Campos,	  Faur	  and	  Pautassi	  2007),	  thus	  the	  team	  had	  already	  created	  one	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program.	  The	  consensus	  was	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  totally	  transform	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  local	  social	  policy	   system	   that	  was	   perceived	   as	   fragmented	   and	   clientelistic.	   The	   aim	  was	   to	   establish	  legitimacy	   for	   the	   program	   proposal	   through	   collaboration	   via	   debates	   at	   the	   city	   level,	  seminars	   and	   specific	   courses	   that	   were	   organised	   to	   discuss	   policy	   proposals.	   	   The	   team	  assigned	  to	  create	  the	  program	  participated	  in	  various	  national	  and	  international	  seminars	  in	  order	   to	   compare	   different	   intervention	   and	   evaluation	   strategies	   along	   with	   other	  programmes	   of	   similar	   characteristics.	   NGOs,	   academic	   groups,	   technical	   groups	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  See	  Fenwick	  2011,	  7.	  87	  System	  of	  information,	  evaluation	  and	  monitoring	  of	  social	  programs.	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different	   national	   and	   city	   level	   ministries	   and	   legislators	   participated.	   (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014;	  Agosto	  et	  al.	  2012.)	  Also	  a	  big	  international	  seminar	  was	  organized	  with	  participation	  from	  officials	  of	  Oportunidades	  and	  Bolsa	  Família.	  	  In	  addition	  a	  social	  council88	  was	   formed	  with	   the	  most	   important	   civil	   society	   organizations,	   churches	   and	   universities.	  The	  importance	  of	  basing	  the	  program	  on	  a	   law	  that	  protects	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  rose	  from	  these	  discussions.	  (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014.)	  Novacovsky	   (Interview	   IPC)	   states	   that	   the	   ideal	   model	   would	   be	   that	   the	   national	  government	  in	  Argentina	  could	  establish	  a	  mechanism	  for	  social	  security,	  which	  would	  let	  the	  whole	   population;	   particularly	   children,	   adolescents	   and	   the	   elderly	   have	   access	   to	   a	   basic	  income.	   “However	  we	  do	  not	   live	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  model	  due	  to	  the	   limitations	  of	  the	  
federal	   government.	   Argentina	   has	   a	   national	   social	   security	   system	   used	   to	   pay	   retirement,	  
pensions	   and	   family	   benefits.	   But	   in	   a	   federal	   government	   we	   find	   no	   social	   security	  
mechanisms.”	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   basic	   income	   at	   the	   federal	   level	   and	   failure	   of	   Programa	  Familias	   to	   integrate	   people	   from	   the	   Autonomous	   City	   of	   Buenos	   Aires,	   the	   city	   created	   a	  non-­‐contributory	  social	  assistance	  program	  of	  its	  own.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  policy	  solution	  that	  was	  created.	  
5.4	  An	  overview	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  
The	  Program	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  “Con	  todo	  Derecho”	  is	  based	  on	  law	  1878	  of	  the	  Legislature	  of	   the	   Autonomous	   City	   of	   Buenos	   Aires.	   It	   was	   launched	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Social	  Development	  and	  became	  operational	   in	  November	  2005.	  CP	   is	  a	   targeted	  non-­‐contributory	  social	   assistance	   program	   benefitting	   58	   74489	  households.	   It	   provides	   a	   cash	   transfer	   to	  beneficiary	   households	   on	   the	   conditions	   that	   children	   and	   adolescents	   attend	   school	   and	  regular	  health	  check	  ups.	  The	  benefit	  is	  paid	  to	  female	  heads	  of	  households	  and	  is	  788	  pesos	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  The	  Social	  Council	  was	  created	  in	  December	  2004	  as	  a	  permanent	  collegial	  body	  and	  was	  composed	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  city	  government	  and	  from	  the	  following	  organisations:	  Arquidiócesis	  de	  Buenos	  Aires-­‐Pastoral	  Social,	  Federación	  Evangelista	  de	  Iglesias,	  Centro	  Islámico	  de	  la	  República	  Argentina,	  Asociación	  Mutual	  Israelita	  Argentina,	  Cámara	  Argentina	  de	  la	  Construcción,	  Central	  de	  Trabajadores	  Argentinos,	  Confederación	  General	  del	  Trabajo,	  Facultades	  de	  Derecho,	  Ciencias	  Sociales,	  Ciencias	  Económicas	  y	  Arquitectura	  de	  la	  Universidad	  de	  Buenos	  Aires,	  Facultad	  Latinoamericana	  de	  Ciencias	  Sociales	  and	  Sociedad	  Central	  de	  Arquitectos	  y	  Unión	  Industrial	  Argentina.	  (Agosto	  et	  al.	  2012)	  89	  Programa	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  –	  Con	  Tofo	  Derecho	  (2012)	  Informe	  del	  Área	  –	  Atención	  al	  Público	  2012.	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(71	   €)	   on	   average.	   (CP	   Website.	   Descripción	   del	   programa90,	   accessed	   18.5.2014.)	   The	  program	   is	   designed	   from	  a	  perspective	   of	   rights,	   and	   aims	   at	   establishing	   a	  mechanism	  of	  redistribution,	  at	  breaking	  the	   intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  and	  guaranteeing	  the	  right	  to	   exercise	   ones	   citizenship.	   (Novacovsky,	   Interview	   IPC91.)	   As	   the	   creators	   of	   Ciudadania	  Porteña	  had	  already	  created	  one	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Programa	  Familias,	  they	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  first	  experience	  with	  CCTs.	  Novacovsky	  stated	  in	  an	  interview	  (29.1.2014)	  that	  the	  design	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  PF,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   some	   fundamental	  differences	   the	   creators	   thought	  were	   improvements	   to	   the	  design	  that	  they	  learned	  from	  experience.	  Chapters	  5.1,	  5.2	  and	  5.3	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  context	  and	  the	  background	  of	  the	  program.	  This	  chapter	   continues	   by	   examining	   Ciudadania	   Porteña,	   a	   particular	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  program,	   pertinent	   to	   a	   certain	   context	   and	   a	   result	   of	   a	   certain	   chain	   of	   events.	   Therefore	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  approached	  as	  an	  exemplary	  analytical	  unit,	  tied	  to	  a	  certain	  time	  and	  space.	  It	  was	  studied	  as	  empirical	  proof	  of	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  phenomenon,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  a	  concrete	  example	  of	  how	  the	  social	  policy	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  has	  been	  put	  into	  effect.	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   assess	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   through	   the	   essential	   features	   of	  conditional	   cash	   transfers,	   which	  were	   established	   in	   chapters	   4.3	   and	   4.4:	   the	  benefit,	   the	  
targeting	  and	  the	  conditions.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  approach	  these	  features	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  they	  have	  been	  established	  in	  practice,	  to	  provide	  a	  counterweight	  for	  the	  earlier	  theoretical	  examination.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   key	   design	   features,	   two	   themes	   will	   be	   dealt	   with	   in	   this	  chapter.	  During	  my	  research	  I	  encountered	  two	  significant	  aspects	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  that	  separate	   it	   from	   the	  basic	   CCT	  model.	  First,	   the	  professional	   norms	   (see	   chapter	  4.2.3)	   had	  established	  a	  cash	  transfer	  as	   the	  means	  of	  payment	   in	  conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  However,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  does	  not	  transfer	  cash,	  but	  the	  benefit	  is	  paid	  to	  a	  debit	  card,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  exclusively	   in	   stores	  appointed	   for	   this	  purpose,	  and	   the	   items	   that	   can	  be	  bought	  are	  predetermined.	  Second,	  unlike	  most	  of	  the	  CCTs	  that	  are	  national	  and	  play	  key	  roles	  in	  rural	  environments,	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   functions	   in	   an	   autonomous	   city	   within	   a	   federal	   state,	  which	   brings	   particular	   challenges	   regarding	   urban	   poverty	   and	   overlapping	   legislation.	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  As	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  5.1,	  	  Novacovsky’s	  interview	  with	  the	  International	  Poverty	  Centre	  does	  not	  contain	  information	  about	  the	  date	  of	  the	  interview.	  The	  full	  text	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  http://www.ipcundp.org/publications/cct/Interview_Irene_Novacovsky.pdf	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These	  themes	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  after	  the	  objectives,	  the	  targeting	  process,	  the	  conditions	  and	  
the	  benefit	  of	  the	  program.	  
The	  Objectives	  According	   to	   the	   law	   Coidadania	   Porteña	   is	   based	   on,	   (Ley	   N°	   1878/2005)	   the	   general	  articulated	  objective	  of	  the	  Program	  is	  to	  decrease	  the	  level	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	   To	   achieve	   this,	   the	   Program	   provides	   a	   monthly	   subsidy,	   aimed	   at	   improving	   the	  income-­‐level	  of	  households	  living	  in	  poverty	  or	  indigence.	  Article	  two	  of	  the	  law	  1878,	  states	  that	   the	   transfer	   is	   aimed	   at	   supporting	   beneficiaries	   access	   to	   alimentation	   as	   well	   as	  promoting	   the	   access	   to	   education	   and	   health	   protection	   for	   the	   children,	   adolescents	   and	  their	  household	  members,	  job	  seeking	  and	  reinsertion	  to	  the	  labour	  market	  for	  the	  adults.	  The	  more	  detailed	  objectives	  are:	  -­‐	  To	  contribute	   to	   reducing	   inequality	   in	   the	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  ensuring	   the	  overcoming	  of	   indigence	  and	  significantly	   reducing	   the	  number	  of	  households	  living	  in	  poverty;	  -­‐	  To	  establish	  an	  automatic,	  transparent,	  objective	  and	  direct	  income	  transfer	  to	  households	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  basic	  needs,	  regardless	  of	  their	  insertion	  to	  the	  labour	  market;	  -­‐	   To	   encourage	   the	   development	   of	   children	   and	   youth	   up	   to	   18	   years	   of	   age,	  ensuring	  their	  enrolment	  in	  pre-­‐,	  primary-­‐	  and	  secondary	  school	  and	  promoting	  insertion	  to	  kindergarten;	  -­‐	  To	  reduce	  the	  school	  dropout	  and	  repetition	  rates;	  -­‐	  To	  facilitate	  the	  reintegration	  and/or	  continuity	  of	  youths	  from	  18	  to	  29	  years	  of	   age	   of	   beneficiary	   households	   in	   all	   levels	   of	   the	   formal	   education	   system	  (primary,	  secondary,	  tertiary,	  university	  and	  non-­‐university);	  -­‐	  To	  cooperate	  in	  the	  task	  of	  eradicating	  child	  labour;	  -­‐	   To	   promote	   maternal,	   child	   and	   adolescent	   health	   care,	   requiring	   medical	  controls	  that	  influence	  the	  early	  prevention	  and	  detection	  of	  disease	  and	  risk	  of	  death;	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-­‐	  To	   terminate	   the	   intergenerational	   reproduction	  of	  poverty,	   guaranteeing	   the	  social	  rights	  and	  the	  right	  to	  practice	  ones	  citizenship;	  -­‐	   To	   generate	   mechanisms	   facilitating	   access	   to	   documentation,	   which	   is	  fundamental	  to	  social	  inclusion;	  -­‐	   To	   encourage	   the	   autonomy	   and	   self-­‐esteem	   of	   women	   by	   assuring	   them	  independent	  income.	  The	   program	   objectives	   are	   very	   much	   in	   line	   with	   the	   general	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  model.	   The	   basic	   idea	   of	   CCTs	   is	   to	   reduce	   poverty	   in	   the	   present	  while	   generating	   human	  capital	   that	   will	   eventually	   lead	   to	   better	   standing	   in	   the	   labour	   market	   and	   break	   the	  intergenerational	  cycle	  of	  poverty.	  To	  do	  this	  CP	  promotes	  education	  for	  children	  and	  young	  adults.	  The	  objectives	  share	  the	  goal	  of	  creating	  a	   lasting	  social	  protection	  institution	  that	   is	  objective	  and	  free	  of	  possibilities	  for	  clientelism.	  Social	  rights,	  social	  inclusion	  and	  citizenship	  are	  emphasized.	  	  When	  the	  team	  of	  experts,	  led	  by	  Cerruti,	  gathered	  to	  create	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  the	  objective	  was	   to	   create	   a	   program	   that	   would	   revive	   the	   concept	   of	   citizenship.	   This	   would	   mean	  starting	   from	   guaranteeing	   the	   citizens’	   rights,	   such	   as	   alimentation,	   health	   and	   education,	  established	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  It	  would	  also	  require	  that	   the	   benefits	   should	   be	   on	   a	   level	   that	   guarantees	   the	   realization	   of	   these	   rights.	  (Pucciarelli,	   Interview	   1.2.2013;	   Novacovsky,	   Interview	   IPC.)	   Reviving	   the	   concept	   of	  citizenship	   was	   connected	   to	   an	   acknowledgement	   of	   a	   debt	   with	   the	   society.	   After	   the	  economic	  crisis	  the	  income	  inequality	  and	  poverty	  levels	  had	  risen	  significantly	  and	  the	  debt	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  state,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  the	  city,	  taking	  responsibility	  of	  the	  worsened	  economic	   conditions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   aim	   was	   to	   create	   a	   program	   that	   would	   be	  innovative,	   at	   least	   in	  Argentina,	   in	   terms	  of	  designing	   the	  program	  so	   that	   it	  would	  not	  be	  conditioned	  on	  labour	  market	  status.	  The	  creators	  of	  the	  program	  did	  not	  see	  unemployment	  but	  low	  income	  as	  being	  the	  problem	  regarding	  poverty.	  (Pucciarelli	  Interview	  2013.)	  In	   fact,	  unemployment	  was	  not	   the	  most	  pressing	   issue.	  The	  When	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  was	  founded	  in	  2005,	  45	  per	  cent	  out	  of	  the	  working	  population	  of	  5,3	  million	  in	  the	  Grand	  Buenos	  Aires	   area	   were	   working	   informally,	   outside	   of	   the	   formal	   labour	   standards,	   tax	   system,	  financial	  records	  and/or	  the	  pension	  system.	  The	  informality	  entails	  exclusion	  from	  the	  social	  security	   system	   by	   the	   worker	   and	   his/her	   household	   (MTEySS,	   INDEC	   &	   Banco	   Mundial	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2007).	  In	  other	  words,	  nearly	  half	  of	  the	  working	  population	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  was	  left	  without	  access	   to	   any	   type	   of	   social	   security.	   The	   focus	   on	   Social	   rights,	   social	   inclusion	   and	   social	  citizenship	  reflect	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  widespread	  informality.	  	  
The	  targeting	  process	  By	  the	  time	  I	  started	  my	  research	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  in	  November	  2012,	  two	  registrations	  for	  the	  Program	  had	  been	  carried	  out.	  The	  first	  registration	  was	  held	  in	  November/December	  2005	  and	  the	  second	  one	  in	  March/April	  2006.	  In	  order	  to	  apply	  the	  applicants	  needed	  to	  present	  documents	  and	  certificates	  for	  identity,	  family	  ties,	  health,	  education	  and	  the	  residence	  of	  all	  the	  household	  members	  and	  complete	  an	  application	  form.	  Since	  the	  Program	  favours	  women	  as	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  benefit92,	  the	  application	  process	  had	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  women	  over	  18	   years	   of	   age,	   whether	   they	   were	   heads	   of	   their	   households	   or	   spouses.	   All	   household	  members	   needed	   an	   official	   Argentinian	   document	   of	   identity,	  whether	   it	  was	   the	   national	  document	  for	  identity	  (Documento	  Nacional	  de	  Identidad,	  DNI)	  or	  a	  document	  of	  Temporary	  Residence	   (Credencial	   de	   Residencia	   Precaria).	   	   Those	   without	   Argentinian	   documentation	  were	   able	   to	   complete	   the	   registration	   as	   they	   received	   these	   documents.	   In	   order	   to	   be	  eligible	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  household,	  the	  process	  of	  official	  documentation	  had	  to	  be	  initiated.	  (CP	  website.	  Descripción	  del	  Programa,	  Accessed	  13.11.2012.)	  After	   the	   registration	   and	   application	   process,	   the	   program	   ran	   evaluations	   to	   determine	  which	  households	  were	   to	  receive	   the	  benefit.	   In	  order	   to	  minimise	  exclusion	  and	   inclusion	  errors,	   with	   emphasis	   on	   the	   former,	   CP	   devised	   a	   selection	   method	   combining	   three	  simultaneous	  and	  complementary	  procedures:	  1)	  a	  direct	  means	  test	  or	  a	  test	  of	  wealth;	  2)	  an	  indirect	  means	   test/a	   proxy	  means	   test	   and	   3)	   a	   procedure	   to	   correct	   systematic	   errors	   of	  exclusion	   and	   inclusion.	   The	   direct	  means	   test	   uses	   existing	   information	   from	   various	   data	  sources.	  This	  first	  procedure	  is	  done	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  applicants	  do	  not	  have	  possessions	  or	  other	   sources	  of	   income	   that	  would	  make	   them	   ineligible	   for	   the	  CP	  and	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	  data	  given	  about	  the	  household	  composition	  holds	  true.	  The	  first	  procedure	  is	  followed	  by	  an	  indirect	  means	  test.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  examining	  the	  potential	  income	  of	  the	  household	  through	  a	  statistic	  model	  applied	  to	  the	   information	  provided	  by	  the	  survey	  conducted	  by	  the	  Single	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  In	  the	  case	  of	  permanent	  absence	  or	  legal	  incapacity	  of	  the	  mother	  or	  the	  female	  head	  of	  household,	  the	  recipient	  is	  the	  father	  or	  the	  male	  head	  of	  household,	  whenever	  this	  is	  reliably	  demonstrated.	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Beneficiary	   Registry	   (RUB93).	   The	   RUB-­‐survey	   is	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   city	   officials	   through	  registration	  forms,	  and	  filled	  by	  the	  households	  that	  wish	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  social	  program	  of	  the	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  The	  RUB-­‐survey	  gathers	  information	  about	  the	  household	  composition,	   family	   relations,	   marital	   status,	   place	   of	   birth,	   health	   coverage,	   attendance	   at	  educational	  establishments,	  the	  educational	  level,	  the	  inclusion	  in	  the	  labour	  market,	  income,	  household	  assets,	  housing	  characteristics	  and	  the	  possible	  occurrence	  of	  child	  labour	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  household.	  (Chitarroni,	  Novacovsky	  &	  Wermus	  2009.)	  Finally	  a	  procedure	  to	  correct	  the	  errors	  of	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion	  was	  conducted.	  Given	  the	  experience	  with	  the	  persistence	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  errors,	  a	  detailed	  reexamination	  of	  the	  rejected	  cases	  was	  carried	  out.	  Based	  on	  the	  earlier	  evaluations,	  a	  series	  of	  visits	  and	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  the	  households	  were	  held	  by	  the	  expert	  staff	  of	  the	  program	  with	  the	  purpose	   of	   verifying	   the	   living	   conditions	   of	   the	   particular	   households.	   (Chitarroni,	  Novacovsky	   &	  Wermus	   2009.)	   Generally	   CCTs	   use	   two	   targeting	  mechanisms,	   whereas	   CP	  goes	  through	  a	  third	  “filter”	  to	  double	  check	  if	  some	  household	  that	  fills	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  was	  left	  out	  of	  the	  program	  and	  whether	  some	  household	  was	  included	  that	  should	  not	  have	  been.	   According	   to	   Chitarroni,	   Novacovsky	   and	  Wermus	   (2009,	   4),	   the	   combination	   of	   the	  three	   mechanisms	   results	   in	   significantly	   less	   exclusion	   errors	   than	   in	   other	   comparable	  programs.	  In	   general,	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   is	   directed	   to	   poor	   and	   indigent	   households	   living	   in	   the	  Autonomous	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  Households	  with	   income	  that	  does	  not	  exceed	  the	   line	  of	  indigence	  established	  by	  The	  National	  Institute	  of	  Statistics	  and	  Censuses	  (INDEC)	  by	  at	  least	  25	   per	   cent	   are	   considered	   indigent.	   Households	   with	   income	   that	   exceeds	   the	   line	   of	  indigence	  by	  at	  least	  25	  per	  cent,	  but	  does	  not	  top	  the	  poverty	  line	  for	  at	  least	  25	  per	  cent	  are	  considered	  poor.	  (Ley	  N°	  1878/2005)	  Official	  Argentinian	  documents	  are	  required	  from	  the	  applicants,	  but	  the	  notion	  of	  citizenship	  in	  the	  case	  of	  CP	  does	  not	  mean	  Argentinian	  citizenship,	  but	  residence	  in	  the	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  CP	  promotes	  access	  to	  official	  documentation,	  which	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	   inclusionary	   policy	   that	   is	   aimed	   at	   advancing	   citizenship	   rights.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Registro	  Único	  de	  Hogares	  Beneficiarios	  de	  Programas	  Sociales,	  a	  department	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  social	  fields	  but	  on	  the	  Presidency	  of	  the	  Ministers’	  Cabinet.	  This	  depertmant	  regularly	  conducts	  surveys	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  socioeconomic	  description	  of	  households.	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  8.2.2013.) 
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inclusion	   into	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   is	   a	   time-­‐consuming	   process,	   since	   after	   the	   initial	  registrations	   no	   beneficiaries	   have	   been	   able	   to	   enter	   the	   program	   directly.	   Following	   the	  initial	   registrations	   to	  Ciudadania	  Porteña,	   the	  new	  applicants,	   provided	   they	   are	   approved	  based	  on	  the	  household	  socioeconomic	  situation	  go	  through	  an	  adjustment	  period	  via	  an	  in-­‐kind	   transfer	  component	  of	  CP	  called	  Ticket	  Social.	   It	  provides	  a	  monthly	  subsidy	  of	  checks	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  food,	  hygiene-­‐	  and	  cleaning	  products	  from	  the	  shops	  appointed	  by	  the	  program.	   After	   all	   documents	   are	   in	   order	   and	   the	   conditions	   of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   have	  been	  met,	  the	  beneficiaries	  can	  advance	  from	  Ticket	  Social	  to	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  (Personal	  conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  8.2.2013;	  CP	  website.	  Ticket	  Social,	  Accessed	  25.1.2013.)	  
The	  Conditions	  After	   being	   selected	   as	   beneficiaries,	   a	   household	   must	   sign	   a	   charter	   of	   conditions	   thus	  accepting	  the	  following	  obligations:	  -­‐	  To	  carry	  out	  health	  checks	  for	  pregnant	  women,	  children	  and	  adolescents;	  -­‐	  To	  guarantee	  school	  attendance	  for	  children	  and	  adolescents	  of	  the	  household,	  from	  5	  to	  18	  years	  of	  age,	  without	  exceptions;	  	  -­‐	   To	   provide	   truthful	   information	   about	   the	   composition	   and	   conditions	   of	   the	  household	   and	   its	  members;	   informing	   about	   the	   changes	   that	   occur:	   deaths,	   a	  household	   member	   leaving	   the	   family	   unit,	   incarcerated	   household	   members,	  births,	  etc.;	  -­‐	  To	  not	   leave	  out	   information	  or	   falsify	  documents	  or	  certificates	  submitted	   to	  the	  program;	  -­‐	  To	  make	  adequate	  use	  of	  the	  resources	  provided	  by	  the	  Program;	  -­‐	  To	  attend	  the	  meetings	  called	  by	  the	  Program.	  The	  charter	  also	  states	  that	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  incompatible	  with	  all	  types	  of	  engagements	  (direct	  or	  indirect)	  with	  the	  government	  agencies	  of	  the	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  In	  the	  article	  10	  of	  the	  law	  1878,	  the	  conditions	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  co-­‐responsibilities	  and	  listed	  in	  more	  detail.	  Essentially	   the	   only	   conditions	   that	   are	   monitored	   are	   the	   conditions	   on	   education.	   The	  parallel	  system	  with	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  health	  clinics	  (discussed	  further	  under	  A	  CCT	  of	  an	  
autonomous	  city)	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  centralized	  information	  gathering	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	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officials	   7.12.2012).	   Unlike	   the	   health	   clinics,	   the	   schools	   are	   similar,	   so	   there	   are	   no	   such	  difficulties	  in	  collecting	  the	  data	  for	  school	  attendance.	  	  The	  data	  is	  collected	  by	  hand	  in	  each	  school	  and	  registered.	  There	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  barrios	  (neighbourhoods)	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  many	  beneficiaries	  attend	  each	  school;	  therefore	  the	  method	  of	  collecting	  data	  differs	  between	   the	   barrios.	   In	   some	   schools	   with	   few	   beneficiaries	   a	   form	   is	   filled	   when	   the	   CP	  officials	   visit	   the	   school,	   but	   in	   schools	   with	   a	   lot	   of	   beneficiaries	   the	   forms	   are	   filled	   in	  advance	  and	  the	  task	  for	  CP	  officials	  is	  only	  to	  collect	  them.	  There	  is	  no	  electronic	  system	  for	  this,	  so	  each	  form	  is	  filled	  by	  hand.	  A	  team	  of	  CP	  officials	  go	  on	  site	  to	  every	  school	  to	  veryfy	  that	   the	   beneficiaries	   attend,	   which	   information	   is	   missing,	   and	   which	   information	   is	   still	  needed.	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  3.12.2012.)	  The	  conditions	  of	  the	  program	  are	  derived	  from	  legislation	  and	  guidelines	  established	  by	  the	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  and	  it	  is	  declared	  at	  the	  program	  website	  that	  inasmuch	  as	  the	   charter	   of	   conditions	   (Carta	   Compromiso)	   serves	   as	   an	   affidavit,	   a	   failure	   to	   fulfil	   the	  obligations	   stated	   above	   can	   lead	   to	   partial	   or	   total	   suspension	   of	   the	   benefit.	   (Ley	   N°	  1878/2005.)	   The	   conditions	   on	   health-­‐care	   follow	   the	   guidelines	   established	   by	   the	  pregnancy-­‐preventive	   health	   care	   and	   child	   care	   system,	   while	   education	   in	   CABA	   is	  obligatory	   from	   pre-­‐school	   to	   the	   end	   of	   secondary	   school/high	   school.	   “We	  are	  not	  asking	  
anything	  outside	  of	  what	   legislation	  has	  already	  established”,	   Pucciarelli	   confirms	   (Interview	  1.2.2013).	   Novacovsky	   has	   stated	   that	   the	   conditions	   are	   inflexible,	   and	   in	   this	   way	   the	  program	  shows	  respect	   for	  children’s	  rights.	   In	  CP’s	  case,	  although	  the	  conditions	  on	  health	  and	   the	   attendance	   in	   the	   meetings	   called	   by	   the	   Program	   is	   explicitly	   announced	   in	   the	  program	   publications,	   the	   only	   conditions	   that	   are	   actively	   monitored	   are	   the	   ones	   on	  children’s	  school	  attendance.	   In	  essence	  this	  means	  that	  receiving	  the	  benefit	   is	  conditioned	  on	  following	  the	  law	  that	  makes	  school	  enrolment	  and	  attendance	  mandatory.	  If	  a	  beneficiary	  household	  does	  not	  include	  children,	  there	  are	  no	  conditions	  regarding	  education	  and	  health.	  	  	  In	  conclusion,	  three	  types	  of	  conditionalities	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  program.	  1)	  The	  conditions	  on	  entering	  the	  program	  2)	  the	  conditions	  on	  staying	  in	  the	  program	  and	  3)	  the	  conditions	  on	  what	  the	  beneficiaries	  may	  do	  with	  the	  benefit	  (discussed	  further	  under	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra).	  	  
The	  Benefit	  One	  of	  the	  things	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  two	  programs	  learned	  from	  PF	  was	  not	  to	  allocate	  a	  fixed	  benefit	   for	   everyone.	   Novacovsky	   (Interview	   29.1.2014))	   notes	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   CP	   are	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much	  bigger	  than	  in	  PF,	  and	  the	  benefit	  of	  PF	  would	  have	  been	  outdated	  as	  it	  was	  small	  and	  did	  not	  have	  an	  impact.	  In	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  the	  transferred	  amount	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  the	  household	  and	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Basic	  Food	  Basket	  	  (CBA,	  Canasta	  Básica	  de	  Alimentos)	  established	  by	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Statistics	  and	  Censuses	  (Instituto	   Nacional	   de	   Estadísticas	   y	   Censos,	   INDEC)	   and	   therefore	   is	   not	   equal	   to	   all	  households.	  The	  benefit	  amount	  is	  indexed	  according	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  food	  basket.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  the	  benefit	  being	  increased	  constantly.	  When	  I	  started	  my	  research,	  the	  average	  subsidy	  was:	  249,44	  pesos/month,	  while	  the	  minimum	  was	  80	  pesos/month	  and	  the	  maximum	   800	   pesos/month.	   In	   January	   2014	   the	   average	   subsidy	   had	   risen	   to	   788	  pesos/month	  (71€94),	  the	  minimum	  to	  336,57	  pesos/month	  (30€)	  and	  the	  maximum	  2190,50	  pesos/month	  (198€).	   	  (CP	  website.	  Descripción	  del	  Programa,	  Accessed	  22.1.2014.)	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   need	   to	   index	   the	   benefit	   has	   led	   to	   it	   being	   tripled	   during	   the	   course	   of	  approximately	  two	  years,	  while	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  the	  benefit	  has	  remained	  the	  same	  or	  decreased.	  Runaway	  inflation	  is	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  increases	  in	  the	  benefit.	  In	  Argentina,	  consumer	  prices	  and	   therefore	   the	  value	  of	   the	  basic	   food	  basket	   are	  monitored	  by	   INDEC,	   and	   the	  problem	  with	   this	   is	   that	   the	   statistics	   produced	  by	   INDEC	   are	  not	   reliable.	   According	   to	   the	   official	  numbers	  the	  annual	  inflation	  rate	  in	  Argentina	  during	  research	  was	  around	  10	  per	  cent,	  while	  the	  unofficial	   and	   correct	   rate	  was	   around	  25-­‐30	  per	   cent	   (Argentina	   IPC	  general,	   accessed	  10.5.2014).	   The	   official	   poverty	   line	   and	   the	   benefits	   granted	   by	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   are	  calculated	  based	  on	   the	  basic	   food	  basket,	  which	   is	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  official	   inflation	  rate.	   	   The	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   law	   1878	   states	   that	   the	   update	   of	   the	   provision	   is	   done	   semi-­‐annually	  according	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  Canasta	  Básica	  Alimentaria	  (Basic	  Food	  Basket).	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  provision	  and	  the	  poverty	  line	  would	  be	  indexed	  every	  six	  months	  based	  on	   the	   changes	   in	   consumer	   prices,	   announced	   by	   INDEC.	   Pucciarelli	   acknowledged	   the	  unreliable	   statistics	   INDEC	  produces	   and	   stated	   that	   CP	  has	   taken	   them	   into	   account	  when	  indexing	   the	  benefit,	   and	   the	  benefit	  has	  been	   indexed	  using	   the	  unofficial	  numbers	   for	   the	  cash	  transfer	  not	  to	  lose	  its	  value	  and	  effect.	  (Interview	  1.2.2013.)	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  Converted	  to	  €	  with	  a	  currency	  converter	  available	  at:	  http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ARSEUR:CUR	  (converted	  19.5.2014)	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  general	  benefit,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  grants	  a	  monthly	  student	  benefit	  worth	  400	  pesos95	  (36€).	  This	  component	  was	  added	  to	  CP	  in	  March	  2008	  and	  goes	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  –	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar	  (Studying	  is	  Working,	  EsT).	  	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar	  is	  a	  student	  allowance	  for	  young	  adults	  between	  18	  and	  29	  years	  of	  age96.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  apply	  for	   EsT	   when	   a	   person	   is	   enrolled	   on	   any	   level	   of	   formal	   educational	   system	  with	   official	  recognition	   (primary,	   secondary,	   tertiary	   or	   university)	   or	   special	   education	   and	   has	   been	  residing	   in	  Buenos	  Aires	   for	  at	   least	   two	  years.	   (CP	  website.	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar,	  Accessed	  2.5.2014.)	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  register	  for	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar.	  The	  students’	  households’	  eligibility	   for	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  determines	  the	  eligibility	   for	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar.	  Most	  of	  the	  applicants	  are	  already	  members	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  beneficiary	  households.	  If	  not,	  the	  eligibility	  will	  be	  determined,	  and	  if	  the	  household	  is	  eligible,	  it	  will	  enter	  CP	  through	  Ticket	  Social	  and	  the	  student	  will	   receive	   the	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	   for	   the	  beneficiaries	  of	  EsT.	   If	   the	  students’	   household	   consists	   of	   just	   the	   student,	   then	   the	   eligibility	   for	   Et	   and	   CP	   is	  determined	  based	  on	  the	  students’	  eligibility.	  The	  new	  subsidy	  works	  as	  an	  added	  benefit	  and	  does	  not	  decrease	   the	  amount	   that	  a	  beneficiary	  household	  normally	   receives.	  According	   to	  the	  officials	  of	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar,	  the	  benefit	  is	  generally	  used	  for	  studying	  at	  a	  university	  and	   for	   finishing	   primary	   or	   secondary	   school	   after	   dropping	   out.	   (Conversations	   with	   CP	  officials,	  4.1.2013.)	  The	  benefit	  in	  EsT	  differs	  from	  the	  general	  benefit	  of	  CP	  in	  that	  the	  EsT	  beneficiaries	  receive	  a	  fixed	  benefit	  that	  can	  be	  withdrawn	  in	  cash.	  They	  are	  handed	  a	  similar	  debit	  card	  (Tarjeta	  de	  compra)	  as	  those	  receiving	  the	  basic	  benefit,	  but	   it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  withdraw	  cash.	  When	  ET	  was	  first	  created	  the	  students	  received	  the	  benefits	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  regular	  debit	  card,	  that	  could	  be	  used	  only	  to	  buy	  the	  predetermined	  items,	  but	  it	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  that	  this	  system	  would	  have	  to	  be	  changed,	  since	  the	  students	  could	  not	  use	  the	  money	  to	  buy	  things	  they	  actually	  needed	  like	  books,	  materials,	  copy	  cards	  etc.	  It	  was	  apparent	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	   EsT	   that	   the	   students	  would	  need	   to	   be	   able	   to	  withdraw	   cash,	   but	   a	   technical	   difficulty	  prevented	   this.	   Once	   the	   technical	   issue	  was	   resolved,	   the	   EsT	   card	   could	   be	   used	   for	   cash	  withdrawals.	   (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  8.2.2013.)	  The	  basic	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	  model	   is	   based	   on	   a	   cash	   transfer.	   However,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Estudiar	   es	   Trabajar,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  does	  not	  transfer	  cash.	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  05/2014	  96	  When	  Estudiar	  es	  Trabajar	  started,	  it	  was	  directed	  to	  18	  to	  25	  year	  olds.	  
	  	   93	  
Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  Essentially	  the	  only	  design	  feature	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  that	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  the	  basic	  design	  of	  a	  conditional	  cash	   transfer	  program	   is	   the	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra,	   the	  debit	  card	  that	  is	  used	  make	  the	  transfer.	  The	  TdC	  can	  only	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  certain	  predetermined	  items	  like	   food,	   hygiene	   products	   and	   cooking	   fuel	   in	   predetermined	   stores	   appointed	   by	   the	  program.	  The	  view	  of	  a	  program	  official	  (3.1.2013)	  was	  that	  there	  are	  three	  different	  reasons	  for	  opting	   to	  deliver	   the	  benefit	  via	  debit	  card,	  with	  predetermined	   list	  of	   items	  that	  can	  be	  bought,	  instead	  of	  plain	  cash.	  	  First,	  to	  prevent	  the	  beneficiaries	  from	  doing	  business	  with	  the	  benefit	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  buying	   things	  and	  re-­‐selling	   them.	  Second,	   to	  prevent	   intermediaries	  from	   intervening	   in	   the	   payment.	   Third,	   to	   prevent	   the	   beneficiaries	   from	   buying	  	  ”unnecessary”	  items.	  
Figure	  4.	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra.	  	  
	  	  The	   authorities	   involved	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   program	   considered	   that	   the	   precharged	  magnetic	   card	   Tarjeta	   de	   compra	   would	   be	   a	   way	   to	   guarantee	   that	   the	   benefit	   would	   be	  directed	  to	  alimentation	  and	  other	  things	  written	  in	  law.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  basic	  rights	  to	  would	  be	   guaranteed	   and	   any	   other	   income	   the	   household	   receives	   could	   be	   used	   in	   any	  way	   the	  household	  chooses.	  (Pucciarelli,	  Interview	  29.1.2013.)	  The	  monetary	  transfers	  are	  carried	  out	  through	  Banco	  Ciudad	  de	  Buenos	  Aires	  (The	  Bank	  of	  Buenos	  Aires).	  	  The	  transfer	  is	  made	  by	  crediting	   the	   predetermined	   amount	   to	   the	   bank	   account	   created	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	  program.	  (CP	  website.	  Descripción	  del	  Programa,	  Accessed	  23.11.2012.)	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As	  mentioned	   above,	   the	  debit	   card	   in	  Estudiar	   es	  Trabajar	  works	  differently.	   It	  was	  noted	  that	   the	  students	  were	  unable	   to	  buy	  many	  necessary	   items	   they	  needed	   for	   studying.	   	  The	  students	  weren’t	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  cooking	  fuel,	  but	  needed	  copy	  cards	  and	  books,	  which	  were	  often	  not	   available	   at	   the	   stores	   and,	   anyway,	  were	  not	   on	   the	   list	   of	   predetermined	   items.	  When	  these	  difficulties	  became	  apparent,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  TdC	  in	  EsT	  was	  changed	  so	  that	  the	  students	  could	  withdraw	  cash.	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  29.1.2013.)	  Although	   the	   items	   that	   the	  beneficiaries	  can	  buy	  with	   the	  TdC	  are	  predetermined,	   in	  some	  cases	   the	   stores	   sell	   things	  outside	  of	   the	   limits	  of	   the	  card	  and	  end	  up	   losing	   their	   license.	  	  COTO-­‐supermarket	   is	   the	  only	   store	  providing	  updated	   information	   about	   the	  purchases	  of	  the	   beneficiaries,	   therefore	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   some	   stores	   would	   exchange	   the	   amount	   of	  ”credits”	  on	  a	  TdC	  to	  cash	  or	  let	  the	  beneficiaries	  buy	  things	  outside	  of	  the	  predetermined	  list.	  (Conversations	  with	  a	  CP	  official	  1.2.2013.)	  When	  asked	  about	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  CP	  does	  not	  actually	  transfer	  cash	  has	  something	  to	  do	   with	   preventing	   clientelism,	   the	   director	   Pucciarelli	   replied	   ”Exactly,	   the	   program	   was	  
designed,	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   to	   prevent	   every	   opportunity	   for	   political	   clientelism	   or	  
intermediation”.	  Pucciarelli	  points	  out	  that	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  program	  is	  transparent	  and	  the	  system	  works,	   the	  problems	  of	  clientelism	  and	  the	   intermediaries	  disappeared,	  and	  states	   that	  he	  doesn’t	  believe	   there	   to	  be	  any	  beneficiaries	  who	  would	  be	  receiving	  benefits	  due	  to	  political,	  institutional	  or	  social	  pressure.	  (Interview	  1.2.2013.)	  When	  the	  program	  was	  created	  the	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  right	  method	  for	  the	  income	  transfer.	  The	  director	  Pucciarelli	  points	  out:	  	  “If	  the	  payment	  method	  would	  be	  changed	  today	  it	  would	  be	  highly	  difficult	  and	  require	  a	  
lot	  of	  resources.	  There	  are	  70	  000	  cards	  that	  had	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	  70	  000	  households	  and	  
at	   that	   time	   this	   was	   an	   enormous	   task	   for	   us.	   We	   had	   to	   use	   the	   Argentinian	   postal	  
network	   and	   a	   lot	   of	   resources	   from	   other	   ministries	   to	   execute	   the	   process.	   So	   the	  
operational	  impediments	  to	  changing	  the	  70	  000	  cards	  creates	  concrete	  limits	  to	  changes	  
in	  this	  regard.	  But	  although	  we	  haven’t	  returned	  to	  discussing	  the	  payment	  method	  since	  it	  
was	   originally	   established,	   nothing	   indicates	   that	   we	   couldn’t	   do	   it	   in	   the	   future”.	  (Interview	  29.1.2013.)	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  as	  the	  means	  of	  payment	  was	  a	  decision	  made	  outside	  of	  the	  team	  of	  experts	  convened	  to	  create	  the	  program.	  Pucciarelli	  notes	  that	  if	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the	  decision	  would	  have	  been	  solely	  his	  he	  would	  have	  chosen	  a	  card	  that	  permits	  the	  buying	  of	  the	  predetermined	  things	  and	  withdrawing	  money	  and	  continues	  that:	  “The	  evaluations	  show	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  know	  perfectly	  well	  how	  the	  resources	  administered	  
by	   the	   program	   should	   be	   used,	   therefore	   if	   you	   ask	   me,	   there	   would	   be	   no	   problem	   in	  
transferring	  cash”.	  (Interview	  1.2.2013.)	  	  Novacovsky	  recalls	  that	  there	  was	  no	  consensus	  on	  the	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra,	  but	  states	  that:	  “It’s	  not	  that	  bad,	   it	  protects	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  program.	  Many	  times	  the	  middle-­‐class,	  
media,	  see	  these	  programs	  as	   illegitimate,	  claiming	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  use	  the	  cash	  to	  
buy	  alcohol.	  We	  did	  not	  think	  about	  public	  opinion,	  we	  acted	  as	  a	  technical	  working	  group	  
(grupo	  tecnico),	  the	  political	  decisions	  were	  made	  at	  the	  ministry	  and	  by	  the	  mayor,	  at	  the	  
political	   level	   they	   thought	   about	   the	   public	   opinion	   and	   though	   there	   might	   be	   public	  
resistance	  regarding	  cash	  transfers.”	  (Interview	  29.1.2014.)	  
A	  CCT	  of	  an	  autonomous	  city	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  differs	  from	  most	  of	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  that	  they	  are	   national	   and	   CP	   is	   the	   program	   of	   an	   autonomous	   city	  within	   the	   frontiers	   of	   a	   nation	  state.	  As	  a	  program	  of	  an	  autonomous	  city,	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  program	  are	  drawn	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  Buenos	   Aires,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   program	   is	   implemented	   in	   a	   capital	   city	   with	   a	  population	  of	  approximately	  three	  million	  people.	  This	  makes	  one	  of	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   its	   urban	   character,	   whereas	   one	   feature	   of	   Latin	   American	   social	  protection	   in	   general	   is	   the	   divide	   in	   urban	   and	   rural	   populations.	  While	   the	   urban	  middle	  class	   and	   some	   blue-­‐collar	   workers	   have	   been	   able	   to	   access	   relatively	   generous	   public	  protection	  measures,	  the	  rural	  population	  and	  informal-­‐sector	  workers	  have	  not	  (Haggard	  &	  Kaufman	  2008).	  	  The	  divide	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  populations	  is	  accentuated	  in	  programs	  such	  as	  Oportunidades,	  which	  started	  out	  as	  a	  program	  targeted	  specifically	  to	  address	  rural	  poverty	   and	   later	   expanded	   to	   cover	   urban	   areas	   as	   well.	   While	   a	   significant	   number	   of	  beneficiaries	  in	  Oportunidades	  and	  Bolsa	  Família,	  and	  in	  most	  other	  CCTs,	  are	  poor	  peasants	  and	  people	  from	  the	  countryside,	  CP	  deals	  exclusively	  with	  urban	  poverty.	  The	  urban	   context	   brings	   about	   specific	   challenges	   and	   advantages	   in	   comparison	  with	   the	  more	   countryside-­‐oriented	   CCTs.	   First	   of	   all,	   one	   of	   the	   problems	   identified	   with	   the	  conditions	   in	  Oportunidades	  has	  been	   the	  supply	  of	   schools	  and	  health	  clinics.	  The	  benefits	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are	  conditioned	  on	  school	  attendance,	  but	  in	  many	  rural	  areas	  the	  network	  of	  schools	  is	  scarce	  and	  children	  would	  have	  to	  travel	   long	  distances	  to	  reach	  the	  nearest	  school.	  The	  quality	  of	  education	  in	  these	  schools	  have	  also	  been	  questioned,	  asking	  whether	  the	  parents	  have	  valid	  reasons	  for	  not	  sending	  their	  kids	  to	  school	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Hanlon	  et	  al.	  2010).	  In	  Buenos	  Aires,	   the	  quality	  of	  education	  may	  differ,	  but	   the	  school	  network	   is	  extensive97.	  The	  health	  clinics	   present	   a	   problem	   regarding	   monitoring	   conditions.	   This	   is	   related	   to	   overlapping	  legislation.	  The	  second	  significant	   theme	  arising	   from	  CP	  being	  a	  program	  of	  an	  autonomous	  city	   is	   the	  overlapping	  of	  legislation	  between	  the	  state	  of	  Argentina	  and	  CABA.	  If	  the	  national	  and	  local	  legislations	  are	  in	  conflict,	  the	  national	  legislation	  overrides	  the	  local	  CABA	  legislation.	  In	  my	  research	   I	   encountered	   two	   noteworthy	   themes	   arising	   from	   the	   city-­‐state	   relationship:	   1)	  controlling	   the	   conditions	   on	   health,	   2)	   the	   effects	   of	   national	   legislation	   and	   overlapping	  social	  assistance	  programs.	  First,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  has	  various	  different	  conditions	  regarding	  health	  and	  education,	  but	  the	  conditions	  on	  education	  are	   the	  only	  ones	  actively	  monitored.	  The	  conditions	  on	  health	  are	  not	  implemented	  in	  the	  same	  capacity	  as	  the	  conditions	  on	  education	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  this	  task.	  When	  a	  person	  is	  applying	  for	  the	  program,	  a	  health	  certificate	  is	  required	  from	  all	  household	  members,	  and	  the	  beneficiaries	  are	  asked	  to	  present	  a	  health	  certificate	  when	  approaching	   the	   program	   in	   some	   capacity,	   but	   the	   benefit	   will	   not	   be	   reduced	   if	   a	   health	  certificate	  is	  not	  delivered	  according	  to	  the	  schedule	  on	  health	  conditions.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  cohesive	  data	  from	  the	  health	  clinics	  in	  the	  city.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  healthcare	   centres	   are	   administered	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   while	   some	   are	   administered	   by	  CABA,	  which	  makes	   regulating	   the	   health	   check	   ups	   a	   difficult	   task	   due	   to	   the	   overlapping	  systems.	  Additionally	  I	  was	  told	  by	  that	  the	  health	  clinics	  that	  organise	  the	  health	  check	  ups	  find	   themselves	   in	   a	   difficult	   situation	  when	   70	   000	   beneficiaries	   need	   to	   acquire	  medical	  certificates	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  2.1.2013.)	  	  Second,	   another	   issue	   related	   to	  monitoring	   compliance	  with	   the	   conditions	  has	   to	  do	  with	  federal	  legislation,	  that	  obliges	  the	  program	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  presence	  of	  under	  three	  year	   olds	   in	   the	   beneficiary	   households.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   a	   national	   law	  known	   as	   ley	   de	   San	  Martin	  (The	  law	  of	  San	  Martin),	  according	  to	  which	  under	  3	  year	  olds	  and	  pregnant	  women	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must	  be	  supported.	  The	  benefit	  may	  be	  reduced	  if	  a	  member	  of	  a	  beneficiary	  household	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  on	  education,	  but	  will	  not	  be	  suspended	  entirely	  if	  there	  are	  under	  3	  year	  olds	  in	  the	  household.	  The	  law	  is	  national,	  so	  the	  program	  cannot	  override	  it,	  if	  for	  some	  reason	  it	  would	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  (Conversations	  with	  CP	  officials	  2.1.2013.)	  One	  of	  the	  things	  that	  I	  noticed	  as	  I	  started	  to	  my	  fieldwork	  was	  that	  many	  beneficiaries	  came	  to	  submit	  papers	  dealing	  with	  either	  abandoning	  CP	  because	  of	  Asignacion	  Universal	  por	  Ijo,	  or	  applying	  for	  CP	  after	  resigning	  from	  the	  AUI	  child	  allowance.	  I	  was	  explained	  that	  this	  is	  a	  result	   of	   overlapping	   legislation.	   The	   fact	   that	   Buenos	   Aires	   is	   autonomous	   creates	  overlapping	  in	  the	  social	  protection	  systems	  with	  the	  national	  level.	  According	  to	  the	  national	  legislation	  CP	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  national	  social	  assistance	  programs.	  Therefore,	  if	  one	  wishes	   to	   claim	   CP,	   he/she	   is	   no	   longer	   eligible	   for	   the	   national	   child	   benefit	   Asignacion	  Universal	   por	  Hijo.	  The	   reason	   is	   national	   legislation:	   it	   is	   Ley	  Asignacion	  Universal	   por	   Ijo	  that	  makes	  CP	  and	  AUI	  incompatible.	  
	  “When	  Asignacion	  Universal	  por	  Ijo	  was	  established	  we	  didn’t	  consider	  the	  two	  programs	  
to	  be	  incompatible,	  but	  the	  state	  decided	  that	  they	  are	  not	  compatible.	  They	  are	  the	  ones	  
that	   cancel	   the	   benefits	   from	   the	   recipients	   of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña,	   not	   the	   other	   way	  
around.	  We	  tried	  to	  seek	  alternatives,	  for	  the	  programs	  to	  be	  compatible,	  but	  the	  state	  was	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In	  conclusion	  In	   an	   Argentinian	   context	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   fills	   a	   social	   protection	   vacuum	   in	   the	  Autonomous	   city	   of	   Buenos	   Aires.	   Starting	   from	   a	   fragmented	   and	   clientelistic	   social	  protection	  	  	  system,	  CP	  represents	  a	  step	  towards	  a	  more	  inclusive	  strand	  of	  social	  policy.	  On	  a	  national	  scale	  CP	  is	  a	  marked	  departure	  from	  the	  workfare	  model	  represented	  by	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas,	  as	   CP	   does	   not	   have	   any	   requirements	   regarding	   previous	   or	   current	   labour	   market	  participation,	  representing	  a	  more	  rights-­‐based	  and	  unconditional	  approach	  to	  poverty.	  The	  idea	  of	  CP,	  and	  Programa	  Familias	  that	  CP	  is	  based	  on,	  is	  different	  from	  the	  current	  national	  program	   Asignación	   Universal	   por	   Ijo,	   a	   conditional	   child	   allowance	   program	   that	   is	  conditioned	   on	   the	   beneficiaries	   having	   children,	   thus	   excluding	   the	   poor	   that	   do	   not	   have	  children.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Argentina,	  CP	  and	  the	  former	  Programa	  Familias,	  that	  CP	  is	  based	  on,	   take	  social	  assistance	  to	  a	  more	  universal	  direction	  in	  comparison	  to	  Jefes	  and	  Jefas	  and	  Asignacion	  Universal	   por	   Ijo.	   It	   does	  not	   have	  workfare	   obligations	   and	   it	   does	  not	   require	  having	  children.	  In	   terms	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers,	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   could	   be	   considered	   a	   textbook	  representative	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  many	  ways.	  Symbolically	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  framed	  from	   a	   perspective	   of	   social	   rights	   and	   citizenship.	   These	   aspects	   are	   emphasized	   at	   the	  program	   website	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   discourse	   of	   the	   interviewees.	   Particularly	   interesting	  aspect	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  the	  perceived	  “debt	  to	  the	  society”.	  Reviving	  the	  concept	  of	  citizenship	  was	  connected	  to	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  state,	  or	   in	  this	  case	  the	  city,	   is	  obligated	  to	  guarantee	  the	  means	  to	  exercise	  one’s	  citizenship.	  The	  acknowledgement	  of	  a	  debt	  echoes	  the	  early	  discussions	  in	  Brazil	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  about	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  guarantee	  the	  citizens	   a	   basic	   income.	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   is	   also	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   social	   contract	  between	   the	   beneficiaries	   and	   the	   program/city,	   evident	   in	   the	   use	   of	   co-­‐responsibilities	  instead	  of	  conditions.	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Table	  2.	  Essential	  design	  features	  of	  Oportunidades,	  Bolsa	  Família	  and	  Ciudadania	  
Porteña.	  	  
	   Oportunidades	   Bolsa	  Família	   Ciudadania	  Porteña	  
Coverage	  	  
	  
6,5	  million	  households,	  approximately	  30%	  of	  total	  population	   12	  million	  households,	  approximately	  26%	  of	  total	  population	   58	  744	  households,	  approximately	  25%	  of	  total	  population	  
Conditions	  on	  
education	  
School	  enrolment,	  at	  least	  an	  85%	  attendance	  rate	  	  	  Completion	  of	  high	  school	  	  	  
Minimum	  85%	  school	  attendance	  rate	  for	  children	  between	  6	  and	  15	  years	  of	  age	  	  	  
School	  enrolment	  and	  attendance	  for	  6	  to	  18	  year	  olds	  	  
Conditions	  on	  
health	  
All	  household	  members	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  required	  health	  centre	  visits	  	  Mothers	  must	  attend	  health	  and	  nutrition	  lectures	  
Children	  between	  0	  and	  7	  years	  of	  age:	  vaccination	  and	  follow-­‐up	  of	  nutritional	  development	  





Geographic,	  proxy	  means	  test	   Geographic,	  means	  test	   Means	  test,	  proxy	  means	  test,	  procedure	  to	  correct	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion	  errors	  
Means	  of	  
payment	  
Via	  debit	  card	   Via	  debit	  card	   Via	  debit	  card,	  predetermined	  	   	   	   	  
Sources:	   Fiszbein	  and	  Schady	   (2009),	  Alvarez	   et	   al.	   (2007),	   Lindert	   et	   al.	   (2007),	   Soares	   et	   al.	  
(2007),	  Ley	  N°	  1878/2005;	  Citarroni	  at	  al.	  (2009).	  	  Regarding	  design	  features,	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  is	  highly	  similar	  to	  the	  basic	  model	  established	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Brazil.	  There	  are	  technical	  details,	  like	  the	  use	  of	  a	  third	  targeting	  mechanism	  to	  correct	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion	  errors	  and	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  overlapping	  legislations	  of	  the	   local	   and	   federal	   level,	   which	   were	   examined	   above.	   The	   only	   theoretically	   significant	  deviation	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   i.e.	   the	   only	   difference	   from	   the	   basic	  policy	  solution	  is	  the	  means	  of	  payment	  in	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  could	  be	  considered	  an	  added	  condition	   to	   the	  policy	  model.	  One	  of	   the	  elements	  regarding	  the	   cash	   transfer,	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   4.3.2	   is	   that	   a	   cash	   transfer	   has	   the	   potential	   to	  stimulate	  demand	  in	  the	  economy	  while	  providing	  means	  for	  investment	  and	  start	  up	  capital	  (Hanlon	  et	   al.	   2010).	  Tarjeta	  de	   compra	   is	   theoretically	   closer	   to	   an	   in-­‐kind	   transfer	   than	  a	  cash	  transfer,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  this	  potential	  and	  it	  conditions	  the	  use	  of	  the	  benefit	  to	  predetermined	  items.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  TdC	  is	  considered	  to	  bring	  added	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  program,	  as	  it	  removes	  the	  possibilities	  of	  misusing	  the	  benefit	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  middle-­‐
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class	  and	  media	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion	  as	  conditions	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  to	  do	  (see	  Lindert	  &	  Vincencini	  2010)	  	  
5.4	  Implementing	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   present	   an	   overview	   of	   some	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   led	   to	   the	   launching	   of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	   in	  Buenos	  Aires,	  based	  on	   the	  existing	   literature	  and	  the	  data	  collected.	  The	  aim	  is	  not	  producing	  an	  exhaustive	  description	  of	  all	   the	  elements	  that	  contributed	  and	  led	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  CP	  in	  its	  context.	  I	  have	  not	  had	  access	  to	  interviews	  with	  Anibal	  Ibarra,	   Jorge	   Telerman	   or	   Gabriela	   Cerruti.	   Nor	   do	   I	   have	   transcripts	   from	   the	   seminars,	  political	   debates	   and	   social	   council	   meetings	   organized	   prior	   to	   establishing	   the	   program.	  Therefore	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  ideas	  and	  theoretical	  perspectives	  that	  were	  at	  play	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   as	   a	   policy	   solution	   were	   not	   in	   my	   reach	  during	  this	  research.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  summarize	  some	  of	  factors	  that	  were	  in	  play	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  at	  the	  time	  of	  creating	  and	  implementing	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  	  As	   Hall	   (1989)	   demonstrates,	   the	   substantive	   content	   of	   an	   idea,	   its	   estimated	   potential	   in	  solving	   a	   problem,	   is	   not	   enough	   for	   a	   policy	   to	   be	   adopted.	   Policy	   outcomes	   are	   not	  determined	   simply	   by	   rational	   actors	   that	   operate	   based	   on	   self-­‐interest,	   and	   the	   best	   idea	  does	  not	  necessarily	  end	  up	  as	  the	  one	  implemented.	  Administrative	  feasibility	  and	  cost	  play	  a	  role	  as	  well	  as	  political	  considerations.	  Political	  viability	  can	  simply	  mean	  the	  policy	  idea	  with	  the	  strongest	  interest	  groups	  backing	  it.	  A	  good	  idea	  with	  a	  strong	  policy	  rationale	  might	  win	  over	   an	   idea	   with	   a	   strong	   interest	   group	   backing,	   but	   this	   might	   require	   a	   powerful	  entrepreneur	   championing	   a	   convincing	   idea.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   new	   policy	   idea	   might	  create	  support	  and	  backing	  from	  strong	  interest	  groups,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  coalitions	  or	  by	  causing	  interest	  groups	  to	  see	  their	  interests	  from	  a	  different	  perspective.	  This	  chapter	  follows	   Hall’s	   model	   and	   deals	   with	   political	   viability,	   administrative	   viability	   and	   policy	  
viability,	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  political	  and	  policy	  liability.	  
5.4.1	  Political	  viability	  At	  the	  time	  of	  implementation,	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  CABA	  was	  ripe	  for	  a	  social	  protection	  program,	  as	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  was	  created	  and	  implemented	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  When	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  started	  in	  2004,	  Argentina	  had	  just	  experienced	  the	  worst	  economic	  crisis	  in	  its	  history,	  with	  severe	  levels	  of	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poverty	  and	  widespread	  social	  unrest	  especially	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  The	  government	  had	  failed,	  the	  president	  had	  escaped	  the	  presidential	  palace	  Casa	  Rosada	  in	  a	  helicopter	  and	  as	  Pucciarelli	  (Interview	  1.2.2013)	  put	  it,	  the	  creators	  of	  CP	  felt	  that	  there	  was	  a	  debt	  to	  pay	  to	  the	  citizens.	  In	  these	  conditions	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  something	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  to	  counter	  the	  worst	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis.	  Immediately	   following	   the	  escalation	  of	   the	   situation,	   the	   federal	   government	  had	   launched	  the	  employment	  program	  Plan	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas	  de	  Hogar	  Desocupados.	  In	  2004,	  after	  Kirchner	  took	  over	   the	   presidency,	   it	   launched	   a	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   program	  Programa	  Familias	   to	  replace	  the	  Plan	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas,	  but	  Kirchner	  was	  never	  able	  to	  successfully	  dismantle,	  reform,	  or	   transform	   PJJHD	   and	   turn	   PF	   the	   only	   national	   social	   assistance	   program.	   Nevertheless	  there	  was	  a	  national	  CCT	  in	  place	  when	  CABA	  decided	  to	  launch	  Ciudadania	  Porteña. Fenwick	  (2011)	  explains	  the	  launching	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  as	  policy	  competition	  between	  the	  local	  and	  the	  federal	  level.	  	  After	  the	  crisis	  CABA	  had	  fragmented	  politically,	  the	  peronist	  party	   machine	   no	   longer	   controlled	   the	   city	   and	   the	   traditional	   political	   forces	   had	   been	  discredited	  in	  the	  crisis,	  so	  a	  political	  vacuum	  emerged.	  New	  local	  political	  actors	  that	  were	  no	  longer	  connected	  to	  the	  federal	  level	  politics	  emerged,	  and	  the	  2003	  elections	  saw	  an	  intense	  
localization	  of	  party	  politics.	   She	   argues	   that	   the	   implementation	   of	   CP	   is	  most	   probably	   an	  example	  of	   “boundary	   control”	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   CABA	   could	  be	   “Characterized	  as	   local	  
politicians	  who	   are	  maximizing	   their	   influence	   over	   social	   protection	   policy	   to	   deprive	   the	  city’s	   residents	   of	   access	   to	   national	   allies	   and	   resources—in	   order	   to	   protect	   the	   city’s	  political	  and	  administrative	  autonomy.”	  (ibid.	  8.)	  	  The	   Deputy	   minister	   of	   the	   National	   Ministry	   of	   Social	   Development	   and	   the	   director	   of	  Programa	  Familias	  offered	  no	  reasons	  why	  Programa	  Familias	  was	  not	  expanded	  to	  CABA,	  but	  denied	   the	   reasons	   being	   political	   (Fenwick	   2011,	   7).	   Novacovsky	   (Interview	   29.1.2014)	  recalled	   that	   the	   national	   decision	   not	   to	   expand	   Programa	   Familias	   to	   Buenos	   Aires	   was	  related	   to	   Programa	   Familias	   favouring	   other	   areas	   with	   worse	   poverty	   levels.	   Programa	  Familias	  did	  not	  take	  beneficiaries	  after	  the	  mothers	  from	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas	  (with	  under	  18	  year	  old	  children)	  were	  allowed	  to	  move	  to	  PF,	  and	  became	  a	  vehicle	  for	  integrating	  people	  from	  Jefes	  y	  Jefas.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  CP	  was	  expanded	  because	  of	  awareness	  that	  the	  national	  CCT	   would	   not	   be	   implemented	   in	   the	   city,	   or,	   whether	   it	   was	   intentionally	   expanded	   to	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compete	  with	  Programa	  Familias	  and	  thus,	  attempted	  to	  delay	   its	   implementation	  (Fenwick	  2011,	   8).	   In	   other	   words	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   the	   need	   to	   establish	   a	   social	   assistance	  program	  outside	  the	  national	  level	  was	  a	  result	  of	  “boundary	  control”	  or	  simply	  a	  pragmatic	  decision	   in	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  economic	  crisis	  had	   left	  unprecedented	  poverty	   levels	  and	  the	  need	  to	  alleviate	  poverty	  was	  not	  possible	  through	  the	  national	  program.	  	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  economic	  crisis	  the	  interim	  mayor	  Anibal	  Ibarra	  campaigned	  on	  a	  ticket	  promoting	  elimination	  of	  poverty	  and	  defending	  social	  rights.	  Along	  with	  the	  mayor’s	  poverty	  agenda,	   there	   were	   strong	   policy	   entrepreneurs	   pushing	   for	   adopting	   a	   social	   assistance	  program.	  Jorge	  Telerman	  was	  the	  acting	  minister	  of	  human	  and	  social	  rights	  and	  he	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea,	  he	  then	  appointed	  Gabriela	  Cerruti	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  techincal	  group	  that	  was	  to	  design	  the	  program,	  and	  later	  presented	  the	  bill	  to	  Ibarra.	  Telerman	  later	  followed	  Ibarra	  as	  the	  mayor	  of	   the	  Autonomous	   city	   of	  Buenos	  Aires,	   and	  presented	   the	   law	   that	   established	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  Gabriela	  Cerruti,	   the	  political	  driving	   force	  behind	  Ciudadania	  Porteña,	  was	   put	   in	   charge	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Human	   and	   Social	   Rights.	  Whether	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  would	  be	  established	  is	  not	  clear,	  but	  politically	  the	  city	  was	  in	  need	  for	  a	  policy	  to	  counter	  the	  poverty	  and	  possibility	  of	  social	  unrest	  and	  there	  were	  important	  figures	  pushing	  for	  a	  program	  that	  would	  do	  that.	  
	  5.4.2	  Administrative	  viability	  Assessing	  administrative	   capacity	   in	   the	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	   is	  not	  within	   the	  reach	  of	   this	  study;	  nevertheless	  the	  capacity	  of	   the	  city	   in	   implementing	  a	  social	  assistance	  program	  is	  evident.	  The	  Autonomous	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  is	  a	  wealthy	  city	  with	  fiscal,	  political	  and	   administrative	   autonomy	   from	   the	   federal	   government.	   Due	   to	   these	   reasons	   it	   is	   in	   a	  position	   to	   run	   its	   own	   social	  policy	  programs	   if	   it	   so	   chooses.	   CABA	  did	  not	  need	  external	  financing	  or	  loans	  from	  international	  financial	  institutions	  for	  creating	  and	  implementing	  the	  program.	   (Novacovsky,	   Interview	   29.1.2014.)	   It	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   execute	   targeting	   and	  monitoring	  conditions98,	  two	  essential	  requirements	  for	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program.	  In	  establishing	  the	  program,	  it	  was	  a	  priority	  to	  create	  a	  law	  to	  protect	  Ciudadania	  Porteña,	  its	  institutional	   integrity	   and	   continuity.	   For	   the	   same	   reasons	   a	   decentralized	  mechanism	   for	  implementation	   and	   evaluation	   was	   established.	   This	   strategy	   seems	   to	   have	   worked.	  Although	   there	   was	   a	   change	   in	   the	   administration	   and	   the	   current	   governor	   of	   CABA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  The	  difficulties	  	  in	  monitoring	  the	  health	  conditions	  is	  not	  so	  much	  an	  administrative	  failure	  of	  the	  program	  or	  the	  city,	  but	  a	  result	  of	  overlapping	  legislation.	  Although	  I	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  data	  system	  used	  in	  public	  health	  services	  in	  CABA.	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Mauricio	  Macri,	  represents	  political	  interests	  contrary	  to	  redistribution,	  the	  program	  has	  not	  lost	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   resources	   or	   been	   modified	   in	   any	   way	   from	   outside	   of	   the	  program.	  
5.4.3	  Policy	  viability	  Taking	  a	  look	  at	  political	  and	  administrative	  viability	  can	  provide	  us	  information	  on	  whether	  a	  
policy	  could	   be	   implemented,	   but	   policy	   viability	   gives	   us	   information	   on	   the	   potential	   of	   a	  
particular	   policy	   to	   be	   implemented.	   The	   potential	   of	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   to	   be	  embraced	   by	   policymakers	   is	   essentially	   the	   topic	   of	   this	   study,	   and	   therefore	   the	   most	  important	  element	  regarding	  this	  thesis,	  of	  the	  three	  factors	  studied	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  (2011)	  show	  that	  only	  a	  small	  group	  of	  actors,	  top-­‐ranking	  officials	  and	  policy	  experts,	  both	  domestic	  and	  international,	  have	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  policy	  formulation	  in	  Latin	  America.	  They	  refer	  to	  these	  actors	  as	  belonging	  to	  an	  epistemic	  community	  sharing	  a	  
belief	   in	   a	   common	   set	   of	   cause	   and	   effect	   relationships	   as	   well	   as	   common	   values	   to	   which	  
policies	  governing	  these	  relationships	  will	  be	  applied.	  As	  was	  argumented	  in	  chapter	  4.2.3,	  the	  
idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  has	  become	  the	  norm	  in	  poverty	  reduction	  strategies	  among	  policymakers	   in	   Latin	   America.	   There	   are	   several	   factors	   suggesting	   that	   the	   epistemic	  community	  had	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  and	  that	  cross-­‐national	  learning	  influenced	  the	  creation	  of	  CP	  (see	  Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  2011:	  282).	  Ciudadania	  Porteña	  was	  created	  and	  financed	  without	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  but	  the	   creators	   of	   the	   domestic	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   program	   had	   earlier	  experience	   from	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   and	   the	   international	   policy	   community,	   and	  gained	  more	  experience	  during	  the	  process	  of	  designing	  the	  program.	  The	  technical	  team	  that	  was	   convened	   to	   design	   the	   program	   included	   the	   future	   directors	   of	   the	   program	   Pablo	  Pucciarelli	  and	  Irene	  Novacovsky.	  Pucciarelli	  knows	  Oportunidades	   from	  working	   in	  Mexico	  for	   several	   years	   (Interview	  1.2.2013).	  Novacovsky,	   in	   turn,	  has	  worked	  as	   a	   consultant	   for	  the	   Inter-­‐American	   Development	   Bank	   and	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   was	   involved	   in	   the	  development	  of	  Programa	  Familias.	  The	  policy	  idea	  for	  Programa	  Familias	  came	  from	  Mexico	  and	  it	  was	  financed	  by	  The	  Inter	  American	  Development	  Bank	  (Fenwick	  2013,	  153).	  Although	  IFI’s	   did	   note	   have	   a	   direct	   role	   in	   establishing	   CP,	   the	   technical	   team	   learned	   from	   the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  an	  international	  seminar	  that	  was	  organized	  during	  the	  planning	   stages	   of	   CP	  with	   participation	   from	  officials	   of	  Oportunidades	   and	  Bolsa	   Família.	  (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014.)	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It	   seems	   that	   the	   policy	   idea	   for	   CP	   did	   not	   come	   directly	   from	  Mexico,	   but	  was	   based	   on	  improving	  the	  model	  established	  in	  Programa	  Familias,	  a	  program	  that	  was	  based	  on	  idea	  that	  did	   come	   from	  Mexico.	   Nevertheless,	   Pucciarelli	   cites	  Oportunidades	   as	   an	   influence	   in	   the	  design	  of	  CP	  as	  well,	  but	  continues,	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  Oportunidades	  is	  totally	  different	  and	  that	  it	   served	   as	   an	   inspiration	   for	   the	   theoretical	   design	   of	   the	   program,	   but	   not	   as	   far	   as	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  implementation:	  “I	  think	  CP	  falls	  within	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  social	  policy,	  each	  
program	  has	  its	  particularities,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  theoretical	  concepts,	  we	  fall	  within	  this	  logic”	  (Interview	   1.2.2013).	   As	   a	   policy	   solution	   Ciudadania	   Porteña	   could	   be	   considered	   an	  improved	  version	  of	  Programa	  Familias.	  The	  design	  was	  very	  similar,	  with	   the	  exception	  of	  some	   fundamental	   differences	   that	   were	   thought	   to	   improve	   the	   design	   (Novacovsky,	  Interview	  29.1.2014).	  Although	   Franzoni	   and	   Voorend	   (2011)	   see	   that	   the	   epistemic	   community	   has	   been	   very	  successful	  and	  share	  the	  perception	  of	  Jenson	  (2009)	  and	  Sugiyama	  (2011)	  that	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  have	  converged	  around	  expert	   ideas	  on	   the	  problems	   and	   the	  desirable	  
solutions,	   they	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   domestic	   needs	   and	   priorities	   do	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	  specific	  design	  features	  of	  the	  CCTs.	  In	  reference	  to	  their	  research	  in	  Chile,	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  El	  Salvador,	  the	  researchers	  show	  that	  domestic	  needs	  and	  priorities	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	   specific	   nuances	   of	   the	   design	   features,	   but	   the	   idea	   remains	   the	   same.	   As	   an	   example	  Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  (2011,	  290)	  refer	  to	  the	  Costa	  Rican	  program	  Avancemos.	  By	  the	  time	  the	   CCT	   was	   created,	   professional	   norms	   within	   the	   epistemic	   community	   had	   long	  established	  it	  was	  better	  to	  give	  transfers	  to	  mothers.	  Yet	  the	  program	  initially	  transferred	  the	  money	   directly	   to	   the	   teenagers	   that	   were	   being	   targeted.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   money	   was	  transferred	  to	  the	  teenagers	  suggests	  that	  the	  domestic	  preferences	  play	  a	  role,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers,	  the	  basic	  policy	  model,	  is	  so	  strong	  that	  the	  researchers	  find	  this	  minor	  technical	  detail	  to	  be	  substantial.	  In	  Ciudadania	  Porteña’s	  case	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  as	  the	  means	  of	  payment	  is	  a	  clear	  departure	  from	  the	  basic	  CCT	  model.	   In	  the	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  the	  current	  and	  former	  directors	   of	   CP,	   Pucciarelli	   and	  Novacovsky	  both	   expressed	   that	   the	  decision	   to	   use	  Tarjeta	  de	  compra	  as	  the	  means	  of	  payment	  was	  not	  a	  choice	  they	  had	  been	  advocating	  nor	  a	  choice	  they	  were	  particularly	  pleased	  with,	  although	  both	  emphasized	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  that	  bad	  of	  a	  decision.	  It	  has	  been	  established	  as	  a	  norm	  to	  submit	  the	  transfer	  through	  a	  debit	  card	  in	  way	   that	   the	   beneficiaries	   themselves	   can	   decide	   what	   to	   consume.	   The	   use	   of	   Tarjeta	   de	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compra	  would	  support	  the	  findings	  of	  Franzoni	  and	  Voorend	  (2011)	  who	  suggest	  that	  despite	  the	  professional	  norms,	  domestic	  factors	  do	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  national	  CCTs.	  Although	  Fenwick	   (2013)	   suggest	   that	   the	   rights-­‐based	  conditional	   cash	   transfer	  model	  did	  not	   appeal	   to	   the	   labour	   union	   based	   social	   policy	   tradition,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   idea	   of	  conditional	   cash	   transfers	   had	   failed	   to	   institutionalize	   in	   Argentina	   on	   a	   national	   level	  through	  Programa	  Fmailias,	  but	  still	  resurfaced	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  when	  the	  policy	  makers	  were	  assigned	   the	   task	   to	   create	   a	  program	   to	   tackle	  poverty	   and	   inequality,	   speaks	   a	   great	  deal	  about	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  idea	  and	  the	  hegemonious	  position	  it	  has	  gained	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  poverty	  in	  Latin	  America.	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6.	  Discussion	  and	  conclusions	  
The	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   this	   thesis	   was	   that	   a	   social	   policy	   model	   based	   on	   social	  investment	   principles	   became	   dominant	   in	   Latin	   America	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	  Conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   on	   requirements	   of	   human	   capital	   accumulation	   became	   the	  prevailing	   idea	   on	   the	   anti-­‐poverty	   and	   development	   agenda	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	  subsequently	  in	  other	  development	  contexts.	  The	  policy	  model	  was	  built	  to	  tackle	  persistent	  and	  extreme	  poverty	  by	  attempting	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  and	  by	  breaking	  the	  intergenerational	   cycle	   of	   poverty	   in	   the	   long-­‐term.	   	   In	   this	   thesis	   the	   idea	   and	   the	   policy	  model	   were	   studied	   from	   a	   broad	   theoretical	   perspective	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   making	   two	  contributions	  to	  the	  research	  on	  conditional	  cash	  transfers.	  The	  primary	  aim	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  principles	  and	  assumptions	  that	  have	  guided	  the	  policy	  formation	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers,	  while	  assessing	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  policy	  model	  so	  appealing	  to	  governments	  from	  different	  ideological	  backgrounds.	  	  The	  secondary	  aim	  was	  to	  explore	  a	   little-­‐known	  CCT	  by	  using	   it	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	   idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  has	  been	  implemented	  in	  practice.	  By	   examining	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   as	  policy	  solutions	   and	   through	  problem	  definitions,	  this	   thesis	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   underlying	   theoretical	   principles	   and	   assumptions	   on	   two	  levels.	   The	   first	   being	   the	   level	   of	   agency	   and	   structure	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   interplay	   between	  individual	   human	   agency	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   behaviour)	   and	   structural	   constrains	   and	  opportunities.	  The	  second	  being	  the	   level	  of	  welfare	  production,	  as	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  political	   battles	   regarding	   social	   policy	   are	   fought	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state,	   market	   and	  individuals/households	   should	   play	   in	   the	   production	   of	   social	   protection,	   education,	  healthcare	  and	  other	  social	  services.	  I	   found	   that	   although	   conditioning	   a	   cash	   transfer	   to	   human	   capital	   accumulation	   clearly	  appears	   to	   be	   the	   prevailing	   idea	   among	   policymakers,	   i.e.	   there	   is	   powerful	   agreements	  
concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  at	  hand	  as	  well	  as	  the	  desirable	  solutions	  to	  take	  care	  of	  
these	  problems	  (Franzoni	  &	  Voorend	  2011,	  282),	  it	  is	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  allows	   it	   to	  be	   framed	  from	  different,	  somewhat	  contrasting,	  angles	  and	  thus	  allows	   it	   to	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  proper	   solution	   to	  various	  problems,	   constructed	   from	  various	  perspectives.	  The	  multidimensional	  hybrid	  policy	  solution	  permits	  the	  policymakers,	  politicians,	  the	  media	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and	  the	  public	  to	  construct	  i.e.	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  solutions	  for.	  	  Conceptually	   this	   study	   has	   linked	   the	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   to	   the	   social	   investment	  perspective	   and	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	   protection	   to	   the	   development	   agenda,	  consequentially	  representing	  a	  departure	   from	  the	  neoliberal	  view	  of	  seeing	  social	  spending	  as	   merely	   a	   cost.	   This	   study	   has	   found	   that	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   social	   investment	  perspective	  as	  well	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  protection	  to	  the	  development	  agenda	  has	  re-­‐legitimized	   state	   activity	   regarding	   poverty	   reduction,	   especially	   in	   terms	   of	   tackling	  persistently	  low	  incomes	  and	  their	  structural	  causes	  (UNRISD	  2010,	  135).	  	  Therefore,	  in	  terms	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs,	  the	  state	  has	  assumed	  a	  dual	  role	  of	  providing	  rights-­‐based	   social	   protection	   for	   those	   not	   contributing	   to	   a	   social	   insurance	   scheme,	   while	  combining	  this	  social	  protection	  with	  interventions	  on	  human	  capital	  accumulation.	  	  However,	  the	  rights	  based	  social	  protection	  and	  the	  interventions	  on	  human	  capital	  holds	  an	  idea	   that	   the	   beneficiaries	   need	   to	   participate.	   It	   could	   be	   concluded	   that	   the	   aspiration	   to	  steer	  the	  beneficiaries	  towards	  activities	  expected	  to	  enhance	  their	  children’s’	  human	  capital	  reflects	   a	   view	   that	   poverty	   is	   a	   result	   of	   individual	   behaviour,	   as	   opposed	   to	   structural	  failings.	   An	   individual’s	   lack	   of	   skills	   to	   compete	   in	   the	   labour	   market	   is	   identified	   as	   a	  problem	   and	   the	   interest	   in	   human	   agency	   and	   the	   aim	   to	   change	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	  beneficiaries	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  distrust	  in	  people	  in	  managing	  their	  own	  situations.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   the	   problem	   is	   acknowledged	   to	   include	   a	   structural	   element	   as	   well,	   as	  poverty	   is	   seen	   as	   intergenerationally	   transmitted	   condition	   with	   education	   being	   the	  strongest	   correlated	   variable	   for	   falling	   and	   remaining	   in	   poverty	   (Behrman,	   Gaviria	   &	  Székely	  2001).	  	  This	  study	  has	  shown	  that	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  are	  hybrid	  policy	  solutions	  that	  combine	  elements	   from	   rights	   based	   social	   protection,	   cost-­‐effective	   targeted	   social	   protection	   and	  economically	   productive	   social	   protection	   based	   on	   social	   investments.	   In	   other	   words,	  conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   social	   protection	   instruments	   consistent	   with	   “market	  principles”	   (Rawlins	   &	   Rubio	   2003)	   and	   “new	   social	   policies”	   based	   on	   neoliberal	  prescriptions	   (Molyneux	   2007),	   while	   simultaneously	   “symbolically	   embedded	   in	   a	   rights-­‐based	  framework”	  (Fenwick	  2013,	  148)	  and	  promoting	  social	  investments	  in	  human	  capital.	  Depending	  on	  the	  context,	  each	  aspect	  could	  be	  emphasized	  in	  legitimizing	  a	  CCT	  politically,	  thus	  making	  them	  potentially	  appealing	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political	  actors.	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The	  fact	  that	  the	  cash	  transfer	  is	  conditioned	  may	  appeal	  to	  the	  political	  right	  as	  making	  the	  poor	   responsible	   for	   their	   situation,	  whereas	   the	  political	   left	  might	   see	   that	   the	   conditions	  protect	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   children	   and	   levels	   the	   playing	   field	   for	   them	   in	   the	   future	   by	  addressing	  structural	  inequalities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  right	  might	  see	  the	  targeting	  a	  cost-­‐efficient	  way	  to	  reward	  the	  deserving	  poor,	  whereas	  the	   left	  might	  see	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  programs	   as	   representing	   a	   step	   towards	   more	   inclusive	   non-­‐contributory	   provision.	   For	  some	   they	  may	  be	   a	   solution	   to	   a	   problem	  of	   lack	   of	   citizenship	   rights,	   to	   others	   they	  may	  present	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   poor	   not	   having	   internalized	   society’s	   values	   and	   responsibilities.	  They	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  residual	  and	  overly	  paternalistic	  or	  as	  a	  step	  towards	  universalism	  and	  state	  led	  basic	  income.	  	  Political	   economy	   considerations	   appear	   to	   play	   a	   great	   role	   in	   the	   program	   design,	   as	  suggested	   by	   the	   examples	   from	   Brazil	   and	   Buenos	   Aires.	   As	   non-­‐contributory	   social	  assistance	   programs,	   the	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   are	   financed	   directly	   from	   general	   tax	  revenue,	  therefore,	  for	  the	  continuity	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  programs,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  just	  by	  the	  general	  public	  i.e.	  tax-­‐payers.	  The	  findings	  suggest	  that	  framing	  the	  conditions	  as	  co-­‐responsibilities,	  thus	  implicating	  a	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  state,	  legitimize	  social	  assistance	  for	  the	  general	  public	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  beneficiaries	  themselves.	  This	  study	  suggests	   that	   in	  examining	  conditions,	   it	   is	  essential	   to	   take	   into	  account	  what	  is	  conditioned	   and	   in	   which	   context.	   So	   far	   the	   debate	   around	   conditions	   has	   centred	   on	  paternalism	  and	  whether	   it’s	   ethical	   or	   not.	   If	   the	   supply-­‐side	   interventions	   are	   considered	  adequate,	  children	  learn	  at	  school	  and	  do	  not	  have	  to	  walk	  dozens	  of	  kilometres	  to	  get	  there,	  and	   they	   are	   treated	   against	   diseases	   at	   the	   health	   clinic,	   are	   the	   conditions	   categorically	  unethical,	  or	  could	  they	  be	  considered	  as	  guaranteeing	  the	  children’s	  rights	  to	  education	  and	  healthcare?	   Workfare	   conditions	   and	   added	   behavioural	   conditions	   on	   the	   parents	   (read	  mothers)	  evoke	  different	  ethical	  questions.	  So	  far	  governments	  have	  adopted	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  model	  without	  extensive	  data	  on	  the	  actual	  performance	  of	  conditions.	  The	  lack	  of	  existing	  comparable	  unconditional	  cash	  transfers	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	   see	   whether	   the	   increased	   school	   enrolment	   and	   attendance	  (Hanlon	   et	   al.	   2010,	   316)	   is	   due	   to	   conditions,	   compensating	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   or	   some	  other	  factor.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  comparable	  results,	  broader	  experiments	  with	  unconditional	  cash	  transfers	  would	  be	  needed.	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One	  thing	  to	  consider	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  “before	  and	  after”	  information	  about	  the	  beneficiary	  children.	  Since	  the	  first	  programs	  were	  launched	  roughly	  twenty	  years	  ago,	  today	  it	  would	  be	  possible	   to	   assess	   whether	   they	   have	   reproduced	   or	   are	   on	   the	   path	   of	   reproducing	   the	  conditions	   from	  where	   they	   started,	   or	   has	   the	   accumulated	  human	   capital	   improved	   their	  situation.	  The	   present	   study	   has	   contributed	   to	   the	   research	   on	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   from	   a	  theoretical	  perspective.	  Its	  main	  contribution	  to	  the	  vast	  literature	  on	  CCTs	  is	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfers	  and	  it’s	  potential	  to	  appeal	  to	  policymakers.	   In	   other	  words,	   it	   has	   contributed	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   CCTs	   in	   terms	   of	  
policy	  viability.	  This	  study	  was	  limited	  in	  its	  reach	  in	  many	  ways.	  The	  main	  limitations	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Ciudadania	  Porteña.	  I	  had	  no	  access	  to	  interviews	  with	  the	  political	  entrepreneurs	  behind	  the	  program	  implementation,	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  account	  for	  the	  decisions	   made	   regarding	   the	   specific	   choices	   regarding	   political	   economy	   for	   example.	  Another	   significant	   limitation	   regarding	   the	   case	   study	  was	   that	   during	  my	  observations	   in	  Buenos	  Aires,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  research	  was	  slightly	  different	  than	  in	  the	  final	  study	  at	  hand,	  resulting	   in	   focusing	  more	  on	  the	  design	   features	   that	   the	  discursive	  process	   that	   led	  to	   the	  idea	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  being	  adopted	  and	  implemented.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  on	  the	   mechanisms	   that	   lead	   to	   conditional	   cash	   transfers	   being	   established,	   as	   this	   would	  contribute	   to	  understanding	  why	   there	   are	   so	   few	  unconditional	   cash	   transfer	  programs	   in	  the	  developing	  contexts	  to	  provide	  a	  comparative	  perspective.	  Finally,	  as	  the	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  model	  has	  spread	  across	  the	  borders	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  been	  locked	  in	  as	  the	  prevailing	  idea	  in	  the	  international	  development	  community,	  it	  will	  be	   interesting	  to	  see	  how	  far	  will	   the	  success	  of	   this	   idea	  and	  the	  professional	  norms	  of	   the	  epistemic	  community	   tilt	   the	   focus	  of	  European	  and	  Scandinavian	  social	  protection	  towards	  conditioning	  the	  transfers	  on	  desired	  behaviour.	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